Sexta-feira, Setembro 19, 2003

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Esa fantasía llamada Cuba

RAFAEL ROJAS

En un pasaje de su novela Memorial del convento, José Saramago transcribió el diálogo imaginario entre Domenico Scarlatti y el cura portugués Bartolomeu de Gusmao. "Para que los hombres puedan ceñirse a la verdad, tendrán primero que conocer los errores y practicarlos", decía el músico. "Pero así no está el hombre libre de creer abrazar la verdad y hallarse ceñido por el error", replicaba el sacerdote. La conversación parecía estancarse en un callejón sin salida, ya que mientras el artista reclamaba la necesidad del cambio y la duda, del aprendizaje y la rectificación, el religioso, lo mismo que un ideólogo o un político autoritario, suscribía el apego al dogma y la lealtad sin fisuras.

Como el Scarlatti de su novela, José Saramago es un escritor que se atreve a corregir sus posiciones públicas. Su "hasta aquí he llegado" de la pasada primavera revela la voluntad de cancelar esa transacción simbólica por la cual un segmento autoritario de la izquierda occidental, empeñado en proteger el mito de la Revolución Cubana, oculta sus críticas al Gobierno de Fidel Castro. La evidencia de que aquella revolución fue una cosa -un profundo cambio social que trajo equidad e independencia a la ciudadanía de la isla- y el Gobierno cubano es otra -un régimen totalitario que niega derechos civiles y políticos elementales a la población- bastaría para cuestionar esa moratoria del juicio que La Habana impone a sus feligreses en el mundo.

El deslinde de Saramago, tajante como la propia lógica de lealtad que establece el castrismo, es el capítulo más reciente de una larga historia de encuentros y desencuentros entre Cuba y la izquierda occidental. Quien inauguró esa tradición de "utopía y desencanto", como diría Claudio Magris, fue Jean Paul Sartre en su viaje a la isla a principios de 1960. Sartre llegó a La Habana con aquella misión de "pensar contra sí mismo", de "romperse los huesos de la cabeza", tan propia del complejo de culpa poscolonial con que el pensamiento europeo y norteamericano se asoma a América Latina. Y encontró precisamente lo que sus ojos buscaban: una comunidad orgánica, regida por una misteriosa voluntad unánime, que la hacía avanzar hacia metas concretas (alfabetización, reforma agraria, paredones, "lucha contra bandidos") y que respondía a coro a la voz de un líder joven y hermoso. Fidel aparece en aquellas notas de Sartre para France-Soir como un ángel panteísta: "Lo es todo a la vez, la isla, los hombres, el ganado, las plantas y la tierra..., él es la isla entera".

La vasta cultura filosófica de Sartre parecía reducirse, entonces, al Rousseau del Contrato Social. Las páginas finales de Huracán sobre el azúcar fundan la literatura utópica sobre la Revolución Cubana en Occidente. Allí se habla del "Rambouillet Cubano", de "El Dorado" insular -la Ciénaga de Zapata que sería desecada para cultivar arroz y construir el "lugar turístico más bello del mundo"- y se describe un discurso de Fidel Castro como un acto de perfecta comunión política entre el caudillo y el pueblo, en el que ha desaparecido ya cualquier vestigio de democracia representativa: "Sola, la voz, por su cansancio y su amargura, por su fuerza, nos revelaba la soledad del hombre que decidía por su pueblo en medio de quinientos mil silencios". La nueva vida cubana era, según Sartre, "alegre y sombría", ya que el carácter utópico de la isla estaba determinado por la "angustia" de la "amenaza extranjera", por el gesto de enfrentarse a Estados Unidos en nombre de la humanidad.

Antes de la Revolución, la imagen de Cuba en Occidente carecía de "ese rostro de sombra", de esa solemnidad utópica. Cuba no era entonces una utopía, sino una alegre fantasía de la imaginación occidental. Fantasía turística, construida por el venero exótico de sus montes y playas, de sus mujeres y hombres tostados y sensuales, de sus casinos y hoteles, y asegurada por una moderna economía de servicio que impulsaron la mafia y el capital norteamericanos. Ésa es la imagen que recorre la avenida del Puerto, con sus bares y prostíbulos, con sus esquinas peligrosas y pasillos lúgubres, en Tener y no tener de Hemingway, y la que aparece como telón de fondo de las peripecias de Wormold, el falso espía británico de Nuestro hombre en La Habana: bares y clubes lujosos, proxenetas de múltiples burdeles, vendedores de postales pornográficas, calles estrechas, atestadas de Chevrolets, Fords y Chryslers.

En los últimos años, Cuba comienza a dejar de ser percibida como lugar de utopía social y recupera su vieja estampa de fantasía erótica. En su novela Ravelstein (2000), por ejemplo, Saul Bellow describe esos ejércitos de turistas europeos que, cada verano, pasan dos semanas en exclusivas playas cubanas y se "llevan la impresión de que los americanos lo han embarullado todo y de que Castro se merece el apoyo de escandinavos y holandeses independientes e inteligentes". Los personajes de Plataforma (2001), de Michel Houellebecq, son unos parisienses interesados en montar una agencia de turismo sexual, que realizan viajes exploratorios a paraísos eróticos como Tailandia y Cuba. En Baracoa y Guardalavaca, al oriente de la isla, estos ingenieros del placer conversan con nativos que reiteran el mismo lamento: "Pobre pueblo cubano, ya no tiene nada que vender, salvo sus cuerpos".

Así como aquella imagen moderna y sensual de los cincuenta tuvo su confirmación literaria nacional en Tres tristes tigres y La Habana para un infante difunto, de Guillermo Cabrera Infante, la actual imagen de decadencia erótica encuentra su corolario en las novelas de Pedro Juan Gutiérrez y Zoé Valdés, en las crónicas y ensayos de Raúl Rivero y Antonio José Ponte, en los filmes de Juan Carlos Tabío y Fernando Pérez. Lo curioso es que el Gobierno de Fidel Castro, en vez de combatir ese imaginario, lo aprovecha dentro de un discurso político, sumamente estereotipado, en el que la pobreza y el sexo, el placer y la miseria se entrelazan en una eficaz ideología turística. El cartel de propaganda del "Martí Mojito", la nueva bebida oficial ("auténtico licor de ron", "the soul of Cuba"), resume claramente este mensaje: varias escenas de las cuatro posibles parejas étnicas y sexuales (un cubano y una turista, un turista y una cubana, un cubano y un turista y una turista y una cubana) y el siguiente texto: "The Revolution will start at Happy Hour".

La actual fantasía cubana carece del glamour de la República y de la solemnidad de la Revolución, pero contiene, en el sentido de Slavoj Zizek, un doble mensaje político. Cuba es una pequeña nación alegre y erótica que se descompone socialmente, una comunidad comunista y virtuosa que se corrompe moralmente. ¿Víctima de quién? De Estados Unidos, según el Gobierno de la isla. De Fidel Castro y su régimen, según la oposición cubana. La fantasía cumple, pues, la función de un llamado de auxilio a Occidente, una solicitud de rescate o, simplemente, de compasión, que lo mismo puede ser usada por el Gobierno cubano para perpetuarse en el poder que por sus opositores para propiciar la transición democrática. Es, en suma, la fantasía política de un país poscomunista en el Caribe.

Medio siglo después del estallido de una revolución moralista, que se propuso corregir los malos hábitos "neocoloniales" del pasado burgués -el juego, la prostitución, el privilegio, la frivolidad-, la imagen turística de Cuba resurge, como moda siniestra, en la política simbólica del castrismo tardío. Los hijos de aquella burguesía derrotada y desposeída, como Consuelo Castillo, la hermosa cubanoamericana de la novela Animal moribundo (2002), de Philip Roth, sienten que la historia se vuelve una pesadilla ante sus ojos, cuando ven, por CNN o ABC, esas elegantes fiestas de fin de año en el cabaret Tropicana, con centenares de burgueses europeos, norteamericanos y canadienses, en una perfecta simulación del pasado, en un festejo perverso de la continuidad republicana. El gran final de la Revolución, dice Roth, es una burla, una farsa, un espectáculo sensual que remeda el encanto del antiguo régimen: "Una alocada celebración de nadie sabe qué".

(C) El Pais 2003

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La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional, un año después

PAUL KENNEDY (*)

El mundo centró su atención la semana pasada en los acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre, las Torres Gemelas, el Pentágono, el campo de Pensilvania y Al Qaeda. Mientras tanto, otro aniversario -diferente, pero relacionado- merece también reflexión, porque hace un año (17 de septiembre de 2002) que el Gobierno de Bush emitió su ya famoso documento titulado "La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos de América". Estaba pensado para convertirse en declaración clara y global de la política estadounidense posterior a la guerra fría y al 11-S, algo que anticipara futuras amenazas y abarcara todas las contingencias. Doce meses después -y éste ha sido con toda probabilidad uno de los periodos de doce meses más turbulentos de la historia contemporánea- parece un buen momento para realizar una evaluación provisional. La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional era en algunas partes sorprendentemente holística, dada la opinión generalizada en los medios de comunicación mundiales de que el Gobierno de Bush tenía un programa restringido, unilateralista y militar. Hablaba de tendencias mundiales urgentes como el deterioro del medio ambiente, las presiones demográficas y migratorias, el aumento de la pobreza y los ataques contra los derechos humanos. Y prestaba tributo a la necesidad de trabajar con las organizaciones internacionales, y a través de ellas, para solucionar esas crisis.

Pero si los pasados doce meses sirven de indicación, tendríamos que concluir que el documento es más un mecanismo retórico que un serio compromiso con la acción. Ciertamente, tenemos la bien recibida solicitud hecha por la Casa Blanca de miles de millones de dólares adicionales para combatir el sida en África (una cantidad que el Congreso va a rebañar); y también es cierto que Estados Unidos está pagando ahora su contribución anualmente calculada a Naciones Unidas. Pero tanto el Gobierno de Bush como el Congreso siguen desconfiando neuróticamente de cualquier acuerdo, organismo u operación de carácter internacional que pudieran poner trabas a la preciosa "soberanía" estadounidense. Y sus contribuciones a la ayuda para el desarrollo exterior, respecto al porcentaje de su producto interior bruto, siguen siendo las más bajas de todos los países avanzados. Puede que la "partitura musical" de la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional ofrezca una melodía para el mundo, pero la banda nacional cambia de tono.

Por supuesto, Estados Unidos no es el único país cuyo Gobierno dice una cosa y hace otra. Si tuviéramos que crear un Índice Mundial de Hipocresía -similar al Índice Mundial de Competitividad y al Índice Mundial de Corrupción-, Estados Unidos estaría probablemente a la mitad de la escala, muy por debajo de China, Rusia, Arabia Saudí, Francia, Libia, Corea del Norte y otros competidores. Pero es una pena que la mayor potencia del mundo exhiba una divergencia tan conspicua entre la palabra y los actos, y especialmente lamentable cuando su presidente proclama que el "estilo americano" es el mejor modelo para el éxito nacional. Cualquier familiar de Maquiavelo y de otros realistas (Bismarck o Kissinger, por ejemplo) sabrá que tales afirmaciones son un error habitual. Las grandes potencias deben a menudo cometer actos desagradables y aceptar compromisos incómodos.

Otros aspectos de la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad parecen, en retrospectiva, mucho más cuestionables. En primer lugar está la afirmación de que la intención de Estados Unidos es mantenerse en la medida de lo posible tan por delante de cualquier posible rival que aspire a la hegemonía mundial como para que a éste le resulte absurdo pensar siquiera en presentar el desafío. Esta política es a un tiempo comprensible y reconocible. Al fin y al cabo, a lo largo de todo el siglo XIX, la Armada británica decidió mantener una flota que igualara al menos a las de las dos siguientes armadas juntas. A otros países no les gustaba eso, pero tampoco querían soportar la carga económica necesaria para contrarrestar esa hegemonía. Lo mismo ocurre hoy en día con Estados Unidos. Pero la ambición de mantenerse perpetuamente en primera posición comporta una serie de problemas. Dado que ninguna otra nación o entidad política puede permitirse el gastar 400.000 millones de dólares anuales en sus fuerzas militares, como hace Estados Unidos, sus enemigos y rivales recurrirán a medios de agresión asimétricos. Los atentados de Al Qaeda en 2001, y las emboscadas por sorpresa que sufren las tropas estadounidenses en Irak y en Afganistán, son ejemplos evidentes de ello. Cuanto más dinero meta el Pentágono en nuevos cazabombarderos, más optarán sus enemigos por una guerra clandestina irregular.

Y aunque es posible que potencias en ascenso como China e India no intenten luchar contra Estados Unidos en mar abierta, sí podrían -llevados por el resentimiento hacia la hegemonía estadounidense- sentir la necesidad de fabricar sistemas de misiles de medio y largo alcance más avanzados para negar a las flotas estadounidenses la capacidad de acercarse a las costas asiáticas. En cuestión de pocos años, la potencia hegemónica tendrá que pensar seriamente en poner un grupo de batalla de portaaviones cerca de los estrechos de Taiwan. Con más dinero no siempre se compra más seguridad.

Otro aspecto cuestionable del documento sobre Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional es su confiada aseveración de que Estados Unidos adoptará medidas preventivas, siempre que sea necesario, para aplastar las que considere amenazas extranjeras (aunque advierte a otras naciones que no usen la prevención). Dejando a un lado la dudosa posición de la doctrina de prevención en el derecho internacional, dicha estrategia es, hablando en términos prácticos, difícil de aplicar correctamente, y muy fácil de aplicar incorrectamente. El ataque anglo-estadounidense contra Irak, ante la enorme oposición del Consejo de Seguridad y del mundo en general, es un ejemplo que viene al caso. El Gobierno estadounidense, empantanado ahora en una guerra de guerrillas en todo Irak, intenta persuadir a otros países para que ayuden a pacificar y a reconstruir ese territorio destrozado. El no contar con otros, el actuar preventivamente, el preferir la solución militar a la diplomática, parecen cada vez más estratagemas dudosas de un país resuelto a mantener su posición privilegiada en los asuntos mundiales. Menos arrogancia y más paciencia podrían resultar una mezcla mejor.

Finalmente está el problema de la victoria "a cualquier precio". Una semana después de que empezara la guerra, el vicesecretario de Defensa, Paul Wolfowitz, declaró ante el Congreso estadounidense que Irak financiaría su propia reconstrucción, y que lo haría de manera relativamente rápida. Qué irónica suena ahora esa afirmación. El presidente Bush ha anunciado que pedirá al Congreso 87.000 millones de dólares más para financiar el programa gubernamental de reconstrucción civil y seguridad militar en Irak, Afganistán y otras partes. Esa financiación masiva -Estados Unidos gasta ya 4.000 millones de dólares al mes sólo en Irak- aumentará el terrible desfase entre los ingresos y los gastos federales, y dará al Partido Demócrata, hasta ahora tan atemorizado, una oportunidad para atacar al líder imperial. No es de extrañar que las cosas estén cambiando en la capital. Esta vulnerabilidad explica la reacia decisión de devolver el asunto de Irak al Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, con la esperanza de obtener donaciones externas y fuerzas armadas de países como Alemania, Rusia, Francia e India. También explica la búsqueda de nuevos aliados -Lituania y El Salvador, por ejemplo- que aporten fuerzas, por nominales que sean, para el mantenimiento de la paz en Irak. (No tenemos más que esperar a que los fundamentalistas iraquíes hagan saltar por los aires los primeros convoyes estonios).

En resumen, la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional no está teniendo buenos resultados. Ha chocado con la realidad. Ninguna persona de buena voluntad le desea mal a las Fuerzas Armadas estadounidenses y a sus aliados en Irak, y seguramente todo el mundo desea que la democracia, la paz y la prosperidad lleguen a ese país en apuros. Hay sinvergüenzas que aspiran a frustrar esos objetivos, y tienen que ser derrotados. Pero las advertencias que antes de la invasión hicieron expertos de dentro y fuera del Gobierno están ahora resultando ciertas. El envite del presidente Bush en Irak se ha convertido ahora en un cautiverio en Bagdad. Hacemos bien en conmemorar el 11-S con dignidad, empaque y resolución. Pero eso no nos absuelve de examinar minuciosamente a aquellos que nos aseguraron que tenían una Hoja de Ruta y una gran estrategia que ayudarían a Estados Unidos a atravesar con seguridad el siglo XXI.

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(*) Si no saben quien es Paul, me da mucha pena pero no se los voy a explicar. Es tiempo ya de que lo sepan venerar.

(C) PAUL KENNEDY 2003

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OPINION

La trampa iraquí

FELIPE GONZÁLEZ (*)

Cada día que pasa parece más claro que Irak se ha convertido en una trampa para todos. Es evidente que la responsabilidad fundamental hay que situarla en el trío de las Azores, empeñado en desencadenar una guerra contraria a la legalidad internacional y basada en grandes mentiras, pero, sobre todo, errática como estrategia para combatir las amenazas reales que pesan sobre el mundo.

Pero esto importa menos hoy que las consecuencias que nos afectan por igual a tirios y troyanos. Tampoco tiene trascendencia, a estos efectos, que el Gobierno de España siga haciendo una especie de karaoke de todas las iniciativas y pronunciamientos del Gobierno republicano, sin asumir siquiera las responsabilidades que democráticamente afronta el Sr. Blair y el propio presidente Bush.

Hace un año, cuando era clara la determinación de iniciar esta guerra, expresé por primera vez la diferencia entre la amistad y la sumisión, preocupado por la actitud de los gobernantes de nuestro país. Hoy la reitero con mayor preocupación ante el curso de los acontecimientos. No es extraño que se reúnan para debatir posturas y acercar posiciones los líderes de Francia, Alemania y Gran Bretaña. A Europa le hace falta superar las fracturas producidas por ese alineamiento incondicional de algunos con una estrategia equivocada como la emprendida por la Administración de Bush. Menos extraño aún es la ausencia del Gobierno de España, cuya posición es la de EE UU aunque ésta gire hacia cualquier horizonte. ¿Para qué perder el tiempo? Es más fácil acercar posiciones con el Gobierno de USA en la seguridad de que el Sr. Aznar y otros dirán sí a lo que resulte.

Nuestro sitio en Europa deviene un apéndice no relevante de la posición del socio americano. La ministra de Exteriores lo expresaba en términos simbólicos cuando se hacía votos para que la bandera europea se coloreara con los mismos tonos que la americana.

Pero no queda mucho tiempo para reconducir lo que puede llegar a ser un desastre, alimentando y siendo alimentado por la caldera del conflicto israelo-palestino, que continúa actuando como factor clave de toda la inestabilidad del Próximo y el Medio Oriente.

A partir de noviembre, las urgencias electorales en Estados Unidos pueden enrarecer el proceso de toma de decisiones, en cualquiera de las direcciones que apuntaba en el pasado julio: retirada unilateral en forma de abandono de cualquier responsabilidad; aumento de la dosis de esta estrategia hacia el disparate, afectando a otros países; o búsqueda de una salida multilateral, bajo el amparo de Naciones Unidas para enderezar en lo posible el proceso de transición iraquí.

Soy consciente de que me repito, pero los errores que estamos viendo se repiten mucho más. Necesitamos contar con la Liga Árabe y con la Conferencia Islámica, entre otras cosas para resituar la crisis en su propio contexto regional y civilizatorio, sin dar la estúpida imagen de que la superpotencia occidental y cristiana, con la ayuda de socios ocasionales del mismo ámbito, se hace cargo de ordenar el mundo a su medida.

Necesitamos recuperar la confianza en la Unión Europea y elaborar una política común respecto del conflicto desencadenado, sin deslizarse hacia la fácil tentación de sustituir a las tropas ocupantes por las de la OTAN. Toda la ayuda que puede y debe prestarse para salir de esta trampa debe ser encauzada a través del Consejo de Seguridad, en un ámbito multilateral, sin mezclar organizaciones de defensa que van a percibirse -también- como arrogancia occidental frente al islam, no sólo como injerencia.

Necesitamos la presencia en la solución de Rusia y de China, además de los grandes países orientales.

Necesitamos que el Gobierno iraquí, sin posible legitimidad de origen en la transición, se legitime por los actos de gobierno con responsabilidad real sobre el territorio. De nuevo, la percepción de que estamos ante un órgano de mera consulta para el ocupante crea reacciones cada vez más incontrolables de rechazo a los unos y a los otros. Y necesitamos que la transición se acorte lo más posible para que el destino de Irak esté en manos de los iraquíes.

En nuestro país necesitamos recuperar sentido de la responsabilidad, llevando a un Gobierno irresponsable a posiciones sensatas, de respeto a los demás, empezando por los ciudadanos, en lugar de descalificar las voces que se alzan contra esta deriva peligrosa. Nosotros, como europeos, nos jugamos más que los propios Estados Unidos con la desestabilización de esta región vecina y estratégicamente decisiva. Nosotros somos más vulnerables a las amenazas que deben combatirse con más seriedad.

Cuando oímos la cantinela de que Irak es el territorio en que se dirime la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional, hay que advertir que hoy, tras la guerra, es más verdad que ayer y añadir que la centrifugación del terrorismo internacional va a continuar. Si somos serios reconoceremos que la amenaza del terrorismo es real y que la estrategia puesta en marcha para combatirlo no ha disminuido esta amenaza. Estados Unidos no es más seguro ahora que antes del conflicto. Lo mismo cabe aplicar a cualquier país de Europa o de la orilla sur del Mediterráneo, por hablar sólo de los vecinos.

¿A qué esperamos para rectificar y reconducir la estrategia de lucha contra el terrorismo internacional? Empecemos por salir de la trampa iraquí, sin abandonar al país a su propia desgracia. El empeño por mantener un discurso banal de película del oeste, cargado de apelaciones a la testosterona, cuando no de apelaciones a Dios, sólo puede agravar el desastre. Un poco más de inteligencia (en el sentido de los servicios y del liderazgo) nos vendría bien a todos. Porque con las tropas que ganan una guerra no se tiene garantía alguna de ganar la paz. Por eso vemos a los soldados ocupantes más preocupados por su seguridad que por la seguridad de la población, no digamos por la reconstrucción de ese país devastado.

En este clima, la llamada Hoja de Ruta para recuperar la senda de la paz entre israelíes y palestinos es algo menos que papel mojado. La buena fe europea contrasta con su pérdida de relevancia para influir en los actores directos de esta catástrofe. En Estados Unidos se siente la parálisis, la toma de distancia ante el avispero dramático en que se ha convertido el territorio, pero en la medidaen que se acerque el proceso electoral estos rasgos se acentuarán. Así, esta estrategia que complementaba la invasión iraquí y que se suponía habría de contribuir a mejorar su resultado y la valoración del mundo árabe, se ha torcido o se ha vuelto en contra. Este conflicto, el más permanente de la región, ha vuelto así a constituirse en epicentro de todos los demás.

En contra de lo que afirman los gobernantes españoles, ningún dirigente político, ni nacional ni europeo, se alegra de este fracaso. No se puede seguir ofendiendo gratuitamente a quienes han demostrado anticipadamente tener razón en su visión del problema y quieren ahora ayudar a reconducir los errores de otros con responsabilidad, sin servilismos que no han servido para nada, ni servirán.

La situación es tan seria y tan urgente que conviene olvidar la arrogancia con que se ampara la ignorancia y tratar de trabajar conjuntamente.

Alguien dijo: bombardearon e invadieron Afganistán para cazar a Bin Laden y ahí sigue; después hicieron lo propio con Irak para cazar a Sadam Husein y ahí sigue. Es como la reducción al absurdo de la guerra.

(*) ex presidente del gobierno
(C) El Pais 2003

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51º FESTIVAL DE CINE DE SAN SEBASTIÁN

Un demoledor documental cubano

'Suite Habana', de Fernando Pérez, inaugura la polémica y complicada edición del certamen

ÁNGEL S. HARGUINDEY - San Sebastián
EL PAIS - 19-09-2003

Resulta sorprendente, o cuando menos curioso, que la película que ha despertado el mayor número de comentarios y declaraciones públicas, orales o escritas, justo en las vísperas de la inauguración oficial de la 51ª edición del Festival Internacional de Cine de San Sebastián, sea un documental de casi dos horas de duración, La pelota vasca, la piel contra la piedra, de Julio Medem, que aún no se ha proyectado -se presentará el domingo 21- y que ha visto un muy reducido número de espectadores.

Las razones que pueden explicar el extraño fenómeno se basan en el contenido del documental: más de cien entrevistas a otros tantos personajes del mundo de la cultura y la política en torno al conflicto vasco; la negativa del PP y la plataforma ciudadana ¡Basta Ya! a intervenir en el filme; la petición de dos de los entrevistados -Gotzone Mora e Iñaki Ezkerra- de que fueran suprimidas sus intervenciones, y la demanda del grupo municipal del PP de que se retire de la programación oficial del certamen, a lo que se ha negado la dirección del mismo.

Cristina Cuesta, del colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo, señalaba ayer en una carta publicada en un diario local, entre otras cosas: "¿Es lo mismo una víctima de ETA que un militante de ETA? (...). No es igualmente respetable la idea de defensa de la dignidad humana que la comprensión, justificación o relativización del derecho a la vida y a la libertad, no merecen la misma consideración las víctimas del terrorismo que siempre hemos defendido el Estado de Derecho, incluso para nuestros asesinos, que los asesinos y sus cómplices ideológicos. Mientras no comprenda el señor Medem esta básica idea, no estará con la mayoría de las víctimas del terrorismo que defienden la verdad, la justicia y la memoria, principios que usted no cita ni una sola vez". Una dura respuesta a las declaraciones previas del realizador en las que explicaba que con su película "quería una polifonía de voces sin jerarquías". Todo permite deducir que la cuestión clave es la imposibilidad de ofrecer una pretendida ecuanimidad, un distanciamiento que anhela la objetividad para analizar un problema en el que la inmensa mayoría de las víctimas están en el mismo lado frente a quienes, desde reivindicaciones ideológicas abstractas -nación, independencia, patria, etcétera-, defienden, o no condenan ni persiguen claramente, el asesinato.

El segundo hecho, en este caso extracinematográfico, es la persistente huelga de los trabajadores del hotel María Cristina -lugar de alojamiento de las estrellas y realizadores que acuden al certamen-, con el consiguiente daño para la imagen del festival y la constatación de que no hay nada más eficaz que un comité de huelga para reconvertir un señorial y lujoso escenario, como lo es la entrada principal del mencionado hotel, en un homenaje escenográfico a alguna de las películas de Berlanga y Azcona: panfletos por todas partes, corrillos de huelguistas, numerosa presencia de policías en traje de batalla, megáfonos, gritos, pancartas...

Suite Habana, coproducción hispano-cubana dirigida por Fernando Pérez, fue la película seleccionada para inaugurar en la noche de ayer, jueves, la 51ª edición del festival. Un documental demoledor y deprimente sobre "un día simple en la vida de 10 habaneros comunes", espléndidamente realizado y fotografiado, sin diálogos, y con una impagable información antropológica sobre la cotidianidad del pueblo habanero.

Al margen del acierto, o no, de que un documental como Suite Habana compita con películas de ficción, con repartos estelares y todo lo que conlleva una obra que desde la imaginación pretenda conmover al espectador, lo cierto es que con filmes como el realizado por Fernando Pérez las difusas fronteras entre creación y realidad se diluyen aún más.

A aquellos espectadores que por su edad o cinefilia recuerden el cine anterior a los efectos digitales, la visión del filme inaugural del certamen les traerá a la memoria el cortometraje PM, de Alberto Sabá Cabrera Infante y Orlando Jiménez Leal: doce minutos en blanco y negro, con una técnica similar al llamado "free cinema" y en el que se mostraban unas escenas cotidianas nocturnas de un bar periférico de La Habana en 1961. El comandante Fidel ("al que asome la cabeza, duro con él, Fidel", cantaban por entonces Carlos Puebla y los Tradicionales) aplicó la canción al pie de la letra: fue el inicio del largo y doloroso exilio de los hermanos Cabrera Infante -Guillermo defendió siempre el ingenuo y sincero cortometraje de su hermano-. El legendario comandante aprovechó la ocasión para decir una de sus afamadas frases lapidarias: "Con la Revolución, todo. Contra la Revolución, nada". Cuarenta y dos años después, Suite Habana multiplica por cien las demoledoras conclusiones de quien pretendía mostrar la vida cotidiana. Parafraseando al escritor que, a su vez, parafraseaba al compositor, el documental de Fernando Pérez podría subtitularse Pavana para un pueblo difunto.

El propio realizador explica, a propósito de esta contradicción gubernamental, que "PM estaba muy bien realizado y fue muy impactante. Fue una de las obras que provocaron una escisión entre los intelectuales cubanos. Fue un documental que no se exhibió, pero hay que ubicarlo también en el contexto de la época. Eran los años 60 y 61. Existía esa vida nocturna, pero también estaba la invasión de la bahía de Cochinos y la campaña de alfabetización. Era una realidad muy convulsa. Y también te ponía ante definiciones y decisiones. Muchas obras de arte están determinadas por sus circunstancias".

La tierna historia de Francisquito -un niño de 10 años con síndrome de Down- y sus relaciones con su padre; la venta callejera de manises de Amanda, de 79 años, para ganar algún dinero extra con el que sobrevivir en compañía de su marido, profesor jubilado de marxismo; los anhelos de Ernesto, de 20 años, peón albañil y bailarín de ballet clásico en sus días festivos; la elegancia dominical de Julio, de 67 años, zapatero remendón, o la sorprendente transformación de Iván, de 30 años, trabajador de la lavandería de un hospital, en una espectacular drag-queen son algunas de las historias cotidianas que muestra la cámara dirigida por Raúl Pérez Urieta en el filme de Fernando Pérez. El denominador común de las mismas es, sin duda, la falta de horizontes y estímulos: se sobrevive porque no hay más remedio, pero se vive y sobrevive en un paisaje urbano terrible. Todo es monótono, gris, sin alicientes ni alegrías. De hecho, las únicas sonrisas son las de Francisquito y sus compañeros de colegio. El resto es desolación. Dicho de otra manera: tras contemplar Suite Habana se entiende mejor a los balseros. El comandante sigue diciendo lo de "Patria o Muerte". Los ciudadanos rasos y los espectadores saben que ya todo es "Patria y Muerte". Fernando Pérez ha sido sabio y sincero, ésa es su grandeza.

En la ceremonia de inauguración, presentada por Edurne Ormazábal y María Barranco, en un escenario con una gran estructura metálica abierta con pantallas en diferentes niveles, se concedió el Premio AISGE a toda una vida al actor Alfredo Landa. También se dieron los premios de la crítica FIPRESCI a Uzak, del turco Nuri Bilge Ceylan, como mejor película del año, y a Christoffer Boe como mejor nuevo director del año por su película Reconstruction.


ADEMAS...

"Cuba ha sido y es todavía un sueño posible"

ROCÍO GARCÍA - San Sebastián
EL PAIS

A Fernando Pérez le gusta caminar por La Habana, ciudad en la que nació hace 58 años. Fue en esas calles donde conoció a los personajes que aparecen en Suite Habana, el filme que ayer inauguró la 51ª edición del Festival de Cine de San Sebastián. A muchos de ellos los ha ido viendo día tras día y Pérez se preguntaba muchas veces cuáles serían sus vidas y realidades. "Son así, viven así", aseguró ayer el director al hablar de los 10 habaneros con los que recorre un día en la vida de la capital cubana. Todos le eran desconocidos, excepto el ferroviario, que por las noches toca el saxofón y que es su vecino.

Suite Habana son 10 historias sórdidas, sin diálogos ni narración, únicamente con imágenes, sonidos callejeros y música. "La palabra sórdida no es el sentimiento que yo veo en esa realidad. La vida en La Habana es muy compleja y está llena de dificultades. Como director, mi pretensión no es la de calificar la realidad de la ciudad, sino mostrarla como yo creo que es, como la veo. Es una realidad muy representativa, pero no la más representada y quizás eso es lo que ha sorprendido más al espectador cubano, que se ha sentido muy identificado y ha reaccionado de manera muy afectiva", explicaba ayer su realizador.

En efecto, el filme-documental -"todo en la película es real"- ha sido exhibido en La Habana en el cine Chaplin a lo largo de seis semanas, con gran éxito de público, hasta que se ha deteriorado la única copia que tenían en la isla. Los productores españoles del filme intentan enviar dos copias más a Cuba para que se pueda continuar su exhibición. Fue el propio Pérez quien pidió que Suite Habana se proyectara en esa sala, que es la cinemateca, en la creencia de que su película requiere cierta concentración para verla. Por ello, ayer, el director, horas antes de la inauguración oficial del festival, en el que estuvo ya hace 15 años presentando su película Clandestinos en Zabaltegi, andaba algo preocupado. "Cuando nos comunicaron que el filme había sido elegido para inaugurar San Sebastián, todo mi equipo saltó de alegría, excepto yo que me puse muy serio. Le agradezco al festival esta deferencia, pero no el susto que tengo en el cuerpo porque siempre he pensado que Suite Habana es una película para ver tranquilamente en un cine y no en en una proyección precedida de una ceremonia y discursos y eso me tiene muy preocupado".

No sabe si Fidel Castro ha visto la película y si le habrá gustado o no. "Es probable porque Fidel ve muchas películas. Pienso que le habrá gustado; bueno, no sé. El cine siempre provoca reacciones distintas", explica cauteloso. Él siempre ha vivido en Cuba, donde trabaja para el Instituto de Cine Cubano, con un sueldo de 400 pesos al mes que le duran cuatro días. El resto del jornal lo busca en las películas y en conferencias o cursos que imparte. "Creo que la realidad cubana tiene muchas complicaciones, pero hay que mirarla desde su complejidad. Siento que Cuba ha sido y es todavía un sueño posible en la medida en que se mire sin dogmatismos".

Pérez sigue teniendo sueños, al igual que los 10 vecinos de Suite Habana. Uno quiere ser bailarín, otro músico, otro cuidar de su hijo pequeño, otro estrenar trajes cada noche... Sólo uno de ellos, Amanda, una viejita que se gana la vida y la de su marido, enfermo en una hamaca, vendiendo cucuruchos de maní en las calles de la ciudad, aseguró que ya no tiene sueños. "Lo curioso es que Amanda, cuando se estrenó la película en La Habana, se tiñó el pelo y se compró un vestido nuevo. Ese día empezó a recobrar las ilusiones", afirma satisfecho Pérez.

(C) EL PAIS

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POINT DE VUE

Cuba libre !

par Arpad Göncz, Vaclav Havel et Lech Walesa
LE MONDE | 18.09.03

Il y a aujourd'hui exactement six mois, le régime de Fidel Castro faisait arrêter 75 représentants de l'opposition cubaine. Plus de 40 coordinateurs du Projet Varela et plus de 20 journalistes, avec d'autres représentants de divers mouvements qui militent pour la démocratie, ont ainsi atterri en prison. Tous ont été condamnés, au terme de parodies de procès, à des peines allant de six à vingt-huit ans d'enfermement, uniquement parce qu'ils osaient exprimer une opinion autre que l'opinion officielle.

Pourtant, la voix des Cubains qui pensent librement se fait de plus en plus forte, et c'est précisément ce qui doit légitimement inquiéter Fidel Castro et son gouvernement. En dépit de l'omniprésence de la police secrète et malgré la propagande gouvernementale, des milliers de Cubains ont déjà fait la preuve de leur courage en signant le Projet Varela, qui s'inspire de la Constitution actuelle, pour demander l'organisation d'un référendum sur la liberté de parole et de réunion, la libération des prisonniers politiques, la libre entreprise et des élections libres.

Pourtant, la réponse du régime au Projet Varela comme à d'autres initiatives est, au mieux, le mépris, au pire, la persécution. La dernière vague d'affrontements, accompagnée de diatribes anti-européennes de la part des dirigeants politiques cubains, peut se résumer à une manifestation de faiblesse et de désespoir - rien d'autre.

Le régime est en train de s'essouffler - exactement comme s'essoufflèrent les dirigeants du Parti dans les pays de derrière le rideau de fer, à la fin des années 1980. L'opposition intérieure gagne en force - même les actions de police, en mars, ne sont pas parvenues à la mettre à genoux. Les temps changent, la révolution vieillit en même temps que ses chefs, le régime est inquiet. Fidel Castro ne le sait que trop bien : un jour viendra où la révolution mourra avec lui.

Personne ne sait exactement ce qui se passera alors. Néanmoins, plus il sera clair à Bruxelles, à Washington, au Mexique, chez les exilés autant que parmi les résidents cubains eux-mêmes, que la liberté, la démocratie et la prospérité de Cuba dépendent du soutien aux dissidents cubains, meilleures seront les chances d'une future transition pacifique de la société cubaine vers la démocratie.

Aujourd'hui, il est de la responsabilité du monde démocratique de soutenir les représentants de l'opposition cubaine, sans se soucier du temps pendant lequel les staliniens cubains parviendront encore à se cramponner au pouvoir. L'opposition cubaine doit bénéficier du même soutien international qu'ont reçu les représentants de la dissidence politique dans cette Europe qui, jusqu'à une date récente, était encore divisée. Des condamnations officielles, assorties de mesures diplomatiques spécifiques, de la part de l'Europe, de l'Amérique latine et des Etats-Unis, seraient une manière appropriée de faire pression sur le régime répressif de Cuba.

On ne saurait prétendre que l'embargo américain imposé à l'encontre de Cuba ait donné les résultats recherchés. On ne saurait le dire davantage de la politique européenne, qui s'est montrée jusqu'à présent affable à l'égard du régime cubain. Il est temps de mettre de côté les divergences transatlantiques concernant l'embargo sur Cuba et de centrer les efforts sur un soutien direct aux dissidents cubains, aux prisonniers pour délit d'opinion et à leurs familles. Il faut que l'Europe dise sans ambiguïté que Fidel Castro est un dictateur et que des pays démocratiques ne peuvent pas envisager de partenariat avec une dictature tant qu'elle ne s'engage pas dans un processus de libéralisation politique.

Dans le même temps, les pays européens devraient constituer un "Fonds pour la démocratie cubaine" afin de soutenir l'émergence d'une société civile à Cuba. Un tel fonds serait disponible immédiatement en cas de changements politiques dans l'île.

L'expérience historiquement récente de l'Europe, en matière de transition pacifique de la dictature vers la démocratie, en Espagne d'abord, plus tard dans les pays d'Europe centrale, a servi d'inspiration à l'opposition cubaine. C'est donc l'Europe, tout particulièrement, qui ne devrait pas hésiter aujourd'hui, en raison de sa propre expérience. Son histoire l'y oblige.

Traduit de l'anglais par Françoise Cartano.

Arpad Göncz est ancien président de la République hongroise. Vaclav Havel est ancien président de la République tchèque. Lech Walesa est ancien président de la République polonaise.

• ARTICLE PARU DANS LE MONDE DU 19.09.03

Segunda-feira, Setembro 15, 2003

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CUMBRE DE CANCÚN

La otra batalla de Cancún: romper el G-23

Los países africanos han resistido las presiones de EE UU y la UE

SOLEDAD GALLEGO-DÍAZ (ENVIADA ESPECIAL)
Cancún

EL PAIS | 15-09-2003

El toma y daca de la cumbre de la OMC, agricultura por nueva oleada de globalización en inversiones y otros mecanismos comerciales, llevaba implícita otra gran batalla comercial y política: conseguir romper el G-23, y sobre todo enfrentar a los cinco grandes que lo lideran: Brasil, Argentina, China, India y Sudáfrica y a los países africanos más pobres. No ha sido así, pero nadie puede sentirse satisfecho. Cancún se cierra sin acuerdo y los países pobres no han logrado nada. "Mejor eso que empeorar el texto de Doha", había anunciado un portavoz de Brasil. Las espadas siguen en alto hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2004.

En las últimas horas todo se centró en dos capítulos. Brasil podía aceptar un acuerdo parecido al que planteaba Europa en temas agrícolas, pero India se oponía con ferocidad a que se hablara de nada que tuviera que ver con los "temas de Singapur".

El negociador indio, el poderoso ministro de Comercio, Arun Jaitley, de 51 años, contó con el apoyo incondicional de Malasia y se desveló como uno de los negociadores más duros de Cancún. "Esta es la ocasión para que los países en vías de desarrollo dejen su impronta en la OMC. Si se pierde esta oportunidad pasarán décadas antes de encontrar otra", explicó.

Al empezar esta cumbre europeos y norteamericanos no daban un céntimo por la capacidad del G-23 para permanecer unidos, pero según fueron pasando las horas esa confianza se fue debilitando. Finalmente, fueron los países africanos los que marcaron el terreno: no romperían el acuerdo del G-23. Si los países ricos no aceptaban acuerdos agrícolas sin contrapartidas globalizadoras, simplemente no habría acuerdo. Cancún sería un fracaso.Las negociaciones se desarrollaron en cinco grandes grupos de temas y en cada mesa presidió un "facilitador", un personaje neutral encargado de redactar el texto que formó parte del borrador final. El facilitador del capítulo agrícola, por ejemplo, fue George Yeo, "un general de Singapur que lo único verde que conoce es el uniforme y que, sin embargo, ha hecho un buen trabajo", decía ayer un miembro de la delegación europea.

Mecanismos de negociación

Después, se reunió todo en un nuevo borrador, en el que los "cuántos" y "cuándo" figuraban en blanco entre corchetes y comenzó la auténtica discusión y las maniobras de pasillo para concertar alianzas, romper acuerdos, amenazar o prometer a los más débiles, o tantear las fuerzas.

En Cancún, por ejemplo, la UE luchó desesperadamente, sin éxito, por encontrar apoyos en los temas de Singapur. Y Estados Unidos, que tenía en la OMC mejor fama que Europa (el delegado de Burkina Faso lo resumió así: Washington viene de frente mientras que Europa nos engaña) tiró todo ese prestigio por la borda con su Farm Bill y los 40.000 millones de dólares que Bush aprobó el año pasado como nuevas ayudas para subvencionar a sus agricultores.

El ministro de Comercio de Ghana, Alan Kyeremateng, se lo reprochó: "No tendrán autoridad moral para decir que ayudan a los países pobres hasta que quiten esas ayudas que afectan a la mayoría de nuestras poblaciones".

El fondo de la discusión ha sido hasta donde llega el compromiso alcanzado en Doha. La Ronda de Doha, opinan muchos países en vías de desarrollo, fue casi un milagro. Fuera porque los países ricos quedaron asustados por el violento fracaso de la reunión de Seattle, o porque Estados Unidos acababa de sufrir los ataques del 11-S y estaba emocionado por la simpatía que despertaba en todo el mundo, lo cierto es que la OMC aceptó por primera vez un principio importante: el comercio internacional sería también un escenario para ayudar a los países pobres.

Por más que el recién nombrado secretario de Estado español de Comercio, Francisco Utrera, pareciera ignorar esa realidad (ayer aseguró tranquilamente en una conferencia de prensa que "la OMC no es un organismo para promover el desarrollo de nadie") lo cierto es que el documento de Doha recogió 64 veces la palabra "desarrollo" y que la protesta de la mayoría de las ONG presentes en Cancún fue que la Ronda del Desarrollo, como se la conoce internacionalmente, no podía acabar siendo una pura retórica.

En Cancún ha quedado claro el papel que desempeñan las ONG en estas reuniones, ayudando a los países pobres a preparar sus intervenciones No es extraño que entre los políticos occidentales algunas comiencen a molestar. "Si nos dejan entrar es por la presión de esas manifestaciones en la calle que tantas críticas despiertan", asegura el responsable de una ONG cristiana. La ministra de británica de Agricultura, Margaret Becket, no se mordió la lengua y acusó a las organizaciones humanitarias, más o menos, de llenarle la cabeza de pájaros a los países pobres. Oxfam no se dejó impresionar y trajo a Cancún a su nuevo fichaje, Mary Robinson, ex presidenta de Irlanda y ex comisionada de la ONU para Derechos Humanos. Difícil acusarla de alocada.

Y difícil olvidar que en la cumbre de la OMC hubo nada menos que 700 miembros de lobbys industriales y agrícolas de EE UU y otros tantos de la UE. No se les vió tanto como a los miembros de las ONG porque siempre prefieren visitar las delegaciones oficiales antes que las salas de prensa. No reclaman la atención de la opinión pública como hacen los grupos humanitarios pero tienen su mismo reconocimiento (son también "no gubernamentales") y una gran efectividad.

(C) EL PAIS

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The Miami Herald - september 15, 2003

Talks collapse as countries clash on issues

The failed negotiations deal a blow to White House plans to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.

BY JANE BUSSEY
jbussey@herald.com

CANCUN, Mexico -- Global trade talks collapsed Sunday as poor countries balked at proposals by rich nations that would make it easier for corporations to do business around the globe, while refusing to cut agricultural subsidies for farmers in wealthy countries.

The 146 trade ministers had spent five days in World Trade Organization talks, but in the end were unable to agree on much of anything.

The failed negotiations dealt a setback to President Bush's ambitious trade agenda -- which has bipartisan support on Capitol Hill -- and to White House plans to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.

Trade ministers from 34 nations in the hemisphere are scheduled to meet in Miami in late November to discuss progress on the effort, but the newest development could mean the White House faces an uphill battle.

Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, led the drive to pry open U.S. agricultural markets.

Placing blame

''There was just a fundamental difference over key issues,'' said Richard Bernal, a long-time Jamaican trade diplomat.

``Everybody has to take some of the blame.''

U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick blamed others for being unwilling to compromise.

''Some countries have to decide if they want to make a point or make progress,'' said a weary Zoellick after a last-ditch effort to salvage the meeting failed.

But he said it was unclear what impact the WTO collapse would have on the FTAA negotiations.

''We are now offering another opportunity to create something across the Americas,'' Zoellick said, adding that the United States would be willing to negotiate more trade agreements with individual nations in the hemisphere if the FTAA initiative faltered.

A U.S. industry representative said negotiating on a regional or nation-to-nation basis might be the best solution.

''We do have to ask ourselves whether it's worth it to put all of our energy into the WTO or whether we should say the time has come to emphasize bilateral trade negotiations,'' said Frank Vargo, vice president for international affairs at the National Association of Manufacturers, which represents 14,000 companies in the U.S. including General Electric Co. and 3M Co.

Assertive stance

Sunday's events marked a new assertive stance on the part of developing countries, which say they have gotten little benefit from opening their markets to foreign imports.

They also complain that Europe and the United States have failed to reciprocate.

Observers pointed to this new North-South face off as one of the biggest changes to emerge from the talks. U.S. and European negotiators had predicted that the so-called ''Group of 21'' trade bloc of poor countries would split. But led by Brazil, China, India and South Africa, the bloc held.

Talks broke down over demands by the European Union that the global trade body expand trade negotiations to include investment rules that set out broad new rights for corporations while constraining domestic laws, opening up government contracts and changing rules over unfair trade practices.

New constraints could extend to outlawing minority set asides in local contracts.

The United States supports most of those issues, many of which are included in the FTAA negotiations, but U.S. trade negotiators said market access was the major goal.

Objections sounded

The objection from developing countries is that these new issues will add new financial burdens to negotiations, are complex and are highly intrusive in domestic policies.

Most of the talk focused on agricultural issues, especially the emotional appeal from poor countries in West Africa that cotton subsidies in Europe and the United States were making paupers out of small farmers in Benin, Bukina Fasso, Chad and Mali.

But negotiators admitted that the negotiations snagged on the investment issues and the ministers never even opened bargaining over farm rules.

Although the collapse damages the prestige of the WTO and key negotiators, trade talks are not dead.

Negotiators now return to Geneva, the headquarters of the WTO, for new talks. But there seemed to be little hope of reaching an agreement by 2005 as scheduled.

Nongovernmental organizations like the Sierra Club, Oxfam, ActionAid, and the Our World Is Not For Sale coalition hailed the breakdown as a major victory.

''For the first time ever the developing countries got their say,'' said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.

``The outcome is not surprising. The agenda is unacceptable.''

© 2003 The Miami Herald

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L'ampleur des désaccords Nord-Sud met l'OMC en échec

LE MONDE | 15.09.03

Après cinq jours de négociations, le sommet de Cancun sur la libéralisation du commerce mondial s'est soldé par un échec, dimanche 14 septembre. Pays riches et pays pauvres n'ont pu aplanir leurs divergences sur la plupart des sujets en discussion. La conférence a officiellement capoté sur les dossiers dits "de Singapour" (concurrence, investissements, marchés publics), mais les désaccords sur l'agriculture et les tarifs douaniers demeurent entiers. Les pays pauvres affirment que leurs vues ont été ignorées. Le cycle de négociations de Doha, prévu pour s'achever fin 2004, est désormais menacé. L'Organisation mondiale du commerce et ses procédures sont vivement critiquées par les Américains et les Européens.

Cancun de nos envoyées spéciales

La nouvelle est tombée, dimanche 14 septembre à 15 heures, provoquant des cris de joie et des applaudissements des ONG (organisations non gouvernementales) et des délégués du Sud. Le ministre kényan, Mukhisa Kituyi, a, le premier, annoncé l'échec de la conférence ministérielle de Cancun. Il a fallu plus d'un quart d'heure pour que l'information soit confirmée, laissant la foule entre stupeur et incompréhension. Très vite, les ministres du Sud sont arrivés pour expliquer les raisons de cet échec.

Ce ne sont pas les désaccords sur l'agriculture qui ont directement précipité la rupture mais les sujets plus obscurs dits "de Singapour" : investissement, concurrence, facilitation des échanges et transparence des marchés publics. "Le fossé d'incompréhension entre nous, les pays en développement, et les pays industrialisés était énorme. Nous leur avons dit et répété qu'il était impossible d'engager des négociations sur ces sujets. Ils ont insisté, et n'ont pas voulu comprendre que nos économies ont de grosses difficultés", a expliqué la ministre malaisienne du commerce international, Rafidah Aziz. "A quoi bon continuer des rounds de négociations si nos préoccupations de survie - je ne dis même pas de développement - ne sont pas prises en compte ?" a déclaré la ministre sénégalaise des PME et du commerce, Aïchatou Agne Pouye.

A Cancun, l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), contestée depuis sa création en 1995, a essuyé un nouveau revers même si la rencontre n'était qu'un rendez-vous d'étape sur l'agenda du cycle de négociations lancé à Doha. A Seattle, en 1999, les pays en développement avaient dit "non" au lancement d'un nouveau round de négociations multilatérales. Ce sont encore eux qui, à Cancun, ont mis en échec la cinquième réunion ministérielle de l'OMC.

Dans cette institution où la règle du consensus fait qu'un seul pays peut bloquer la machine, ce n'est pas un ou deux pays qui ont empêché les 146 pays-membres d'atteindre un compromis, mais une coalition de 21 pays en développement. Ce "Groupe des 21" (G21), conduit par les nouvelles puissances émergentes, Inde, Brésil et Chine, a été appuyé par un front solidaire formé de 90 pays pauvres à dominante africaine.

"Nous avons été capables de montrer qu'une alliance entre les pays en développement était possible, non sur une base idéologique mais sur des problèmes concrets, a déclaré Celso Amorim, ministre brésilien des affaires étrangères, au nom du "G21". Ce n'est pas un groupe rhétorique mais un groupe professionnel, qui veut construire un système commercial ouvert et juste."

Il répondait indirectement au secrétaire américain au commerce, Robert Zoellick, qui n'avait eu de cesse, comme son collègue européen Pascal Lamy, d'ironiser sur la supposée fragilité de cette alliance. C'est peut-être sur ce défaut d'appréciation, que d'aucuns qualifieront de manque de sens politique, qu'ont failli l'Américain et l'Européen, les deux plus gros joueurs de l'OMC. Quand ils se sont rendus compte que les pays en développement n'étaient pas prêts à reculer et qu'il leur faudrait faire des concessions, il était déjà trop tard. L'entêtement de l'émissaire bruxellois à défendre son mandat sur les sujets dits "de Singapour" a fini d'exaspérer les pays qui avaient été d'emblée les plus catégoriques, comme l'Inde et la Malaisie.

Les pays les plus pauvres, jusqu'à présent toujours marginalisés dans les négociations en raison de leur faible poids dans les échanges mondiaux - moins de 1 % -, ont tenu tête. La gestion désastreuse du dossier du coton a certainement conforté cette alliance, qui s'était ébauchée il y a quelques mois à Genève. Après avoir fait miroiter une réduction des subventions pratiquée par les Etats-Unis sur ce produit vital pour les pays du Sahel, le texte proposé n'en disait pas mot. Cela a été perçu par l'ensemble des nations en développement comme une "insulte". Les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas ralliés à la proposition européenne d'éliminer totalement les subventions.

L'OMC aussi porte sa part de responsabilités dans cet échec. Le président de la conférence, le ministre mexicain des affaires étrangères, Luis Ernesto Derbez, a été critiqué pour ne pas avoir produit un texte reprenant les préoccupations des uns et des autres. "Vous avez négligé délibérément les positions d'un grand nombre de pays en développement. C'est une tentative d'imposer les vues de quelques pays sur le plus grand nombre", a dénoncé le ministre indien du commerce, Arun Jaitley. Le Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, directeur général de l'institution, a paru très en retrait. Sur le dossier du coton, dont il s'était saisi personnellement, il n'a fait preuve d'aucune influence.

L'OMC aura du mal à se relever de cet échec. L'absence de résultat sur ce rendez-vous intermédiaire rend quasiment impossible de parvenir à boucler les négociations d'ici fin 2004. L'accord sur l'accès aux médicaments pour les pays en situation d'urgence sanitaire, signé à Genève, n'a pu être ratifié par l'ensemble des membres. Il pourrait ainsi être remis en question.

En dépit des mines défaites qu'affichaient les négociateurs, dimanche soir, l'issue de Cancun n'est un drame ni pour les Etats-Unis ni pour l'Europe. L'un et l'autre peuvent continuer à nouer des alliances bilatérales et régionales sans l'OMC. A l'inverse, pour les pays les plus pauvres, c'est une vraie occasion manquée d'ouvrir une brèche dans le protectionnisme des pays riches.

Laurence Caramel et Babette Stern

• ARTICLE PARU DANS LE MONDE DU 16.09.03

Sexta-feira, Setembro 12, 2003

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EL TITIRITERO

Alejandro Armengol

Imagine por un momento: ¿un oso bailarín por las calles de la Pequeña Habana? ¿Unas strippers audaces o inocentes cheerleaders? Nada de eso necesita Miguel Saavedra para captar la atención de las cámaras.

Siempre presente con su reducido grupo de agitadores, Saavedra es un personaje que nos representa para bien y para mal. ¿Por qué la comisión de la ciudad no se ha reunido y bautizado una calle con su nombre? Se lo merece. Si en una época resultó imposible hablar de La Habana sin mencionar al Caballero de París, hoy ocurre lo mismo con él y Miami. Finalmente hemos logrado tener un apellido ilustre que simboliza nuestro peor destino. Falta el Cervantes, porque este otro Saavedra no se detiene ante la dificultad de un párrafo, la sumisión ortográfica y el apego a la palabra, pero no importa. Los objetivos de este nuevo hidalgo son más amplios: no hay protesta innecesaria que lo encuentre impasible. Donde la gritería impere, donde la estupidez amenace, allí estará Saavedra: el manifestante errante.

Pertenecer a la breve troupe de Vigilia Mambisa no es un destino carnavalesco. Uno no puede dejar de admirar el espíritu de este grupo de infatigables voceadores. Basta que aparezca una cámara en el horizonte, para que renazcan los rostros maltratados por los años, para que las gargantas se entusiasmen. Su organización nos recuerda la necesidad de la libre expresión. Nadie mejor que él para poner a prueba nuestra sinceridad ante el principio de que cualquier voz tiene el derecho a proclamar lo que piensa quien la emite, aunque resulte un eufemismo hablar de pensamiento en este caso.

El problema con Saavedra es que no creo que sus acciones estén guiadas por igual criterio libertario. Durante años, las variadas manifestaciones organizadas por Vigilia Mambisa han sido la expresión más vulgar de las diversas campañas atemorizadoras llevadas a cabo en esta ciudad. Cosa curiosa. El principal objetivo de la mayoría de estas campañas han sido los artistas: pintores y músicos fundamentalmente. ¿Por qué preocupa tanto el arte a este hombre poco ilustrado? No es simplemente un empeño personal. Si lo fuera, sus opiniones y actos no merecerían un comentario. Pero Saavedra se ha convertido en una figura pública. No hay exposición, concierto o puesta en escena que involucre la participación o el vínculo con artistas procedentes de Cuba en que no esté presente. Su rostro aparece en las pantallas y su nombre en la prensa local y nacional. Nadie se detiene en sus palabras, pero ningún periodista pasa por alto sus gestos a la hora de informar sobre los diversos actos culturales de esta ciudad, los que con frecuencia hacen titulares.

Saavedra no representa una posición más en el debate de ideas que se lleva a cabo todos los días, tampoco una de las tantas opiniones propias de un exilio diverso: es una caricatura, la imagen estereotipada siempre al auxilio de cualquiera que quiera presentarnos como una comunidad ignorante, irracional y torpe. En este sentido le hace daño al exilio, aunque pretenda todo lo contrario. Es por ello que vale la pena criticarlo: por la utilización que se hace en el exterior de las labores de una organización y un hombre que apenas logran reunir una veintena de seguidores, cuando la generosidad sustituye a la aritmética a la hora de contar.

¿Por qué ese empeño contra los artistas procedentes de Cuba? La respuesta es sencilla. Economía de medios y amplia cobertura. No es que estos artistas estén libres de culpa, es que Vigilia Mambisa convierte al debate cultural y la disparidad de criterios en escándalo callejero. El afán de protagonismo, el interés en ''robar cámara'', tergiversa una confrontación saludable.

Hay quienes consideran que no vale la pena detenerse en las labores de un grupo cuyas actividades apenas producen comentarios risibles e indiferencia: la carencia de seguidores es la mejor justificación de la existencia de Vigilia Mambisa. Pero no hay que considerar inofensiva a una organización que en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales se destacó por su labor intimidatoria durante el recuento de votos en el sur de la Florida. Si Vigilia Mambisa no ha logrado convertirse en una fuerza organizadora capaz de lanzar una turba peligrosa a la libertad ciudadana es porque vivimos en una sociedad democrática, no por la falta de interés de sus miembros. La diferencia entre las manifestaciones que realiza esta agrupación y los actos de repudio ejecutados por el régimen de Fidel Castro se debe al poder que le confiere a los segundos un estado totalitario. Nada los aparta en el apego a la irracionalidad, la intolerancia y la simplicidad de los medios.

Saavedra es un hábil titiritero siempre dispuesto a mostrar su espectáculo. A veces actúa por cuenta propia, otras no es más que un simple títere de intereses mayores, como ocurrió durante el recuento electoral. Tiene todo su derecho. Pero no debe ser ignorado. Es la mejor manera de proteger la misma libertad que le permite mostrarse, irritado y vehemente, ante el fotógrafo de turno.

© 2003 El Nuevo Herald

Quinta-feira, Setembro 11, 2003

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PERFIL: José Lezama Lima

EL PEREGRINO INMOVIL

Eliseo Alberto
EL PAÍS - 23-08-2003

José Lezama Lima (1910-1976), poeta universal del siglo XX cubano, apenas habitó dos casas en 66 años y sólo viajó tres veces al extranjero -de niño, a Estados Unidos, y de adulto, a México y Jamaica-. Al recordarlo, desde la admiración, no puedo dejar de preguntarme si será cierto que a la hora de sentarnos a relatar la historia de nuestros pueblos huérfanos, al menos las versiones emocionales de lo sucedido, la contundencia de la "verdad" resulta más importante que la vibración del "mito". La vida y la obra de Lezama logran un equilibrio en apariencia imposible: desde el descubrimiento mismo de su vocación literaria, hechizo que habría de convertirlo en su propio talismán, su ídolo, el escritor Lezama Lima enclaustró al hombre José entre cuatro paredes de verbos y sonoridades; esa sumisión, sin embargo, fue estímulo suficiente para realizar la hazaña de proponernos un mundo tan deslumbrante como real, una Cuba, una Habana, un espacio donde la imagen debía adelantarse a los hechos, en la convicción de que la poesía también era carne en el banquete sensorial de lo que aún llamaban patria, sin sobredosis política. La primera vez que cruzó el horizonte (esa cruel frontera de las ínsulas, por donde llegan o salen nuestras desgracias) fue en 1918, y por una corta temporada, porque la mala suerte les cortaría el paso en una bahía de aguas profundas. Su padre, el coronel José Lezama Rodda, oficial de academia, moriría en Pensacola, Florida, a la altanera edad de 33 años. Desde esa traumática experiencia, Lezama tendría pánico a salir de la isla; en heroica consecuencia, decidió entonces cargarse el mundo en los bolsillos. Lejanía y tragedia serían las dos cartas más temidas de su tarot personal. "El único viaje que me tienta será el que emprenda saltando como un conejo de constelación en constelación", me dijo en la sala de su casa, mientras la noche nos invadía, y no pude evitar una sonrisa al recrear la escena contra la pantalla de la luna.

"Es que hay viajes más espléndidos: los que un hombre puede intentar por los corredores de su casa, yéndose del dormitorio al baño, desfilando entre parques y librerías", diría en otra ocasión al novelista argentino Tomás Eloy Martínez: "Casi nunca he salido de La Habana. Admito dos razones: a cada salida empeoraban mis bronquios; y, además, en el centro de todo viaje ha flotado siempre el recuerdo de la muerte de mi padre. Gide ha dicho que toda travesía es un pregusto de la muerte, una anticipación del fin. Yo no viajo: por eso resucito". De regreso a la isla, el niño Joseíto (así le llamarían siempre las muchas mujeres que pastorearon su vida) fue a vivir al mejor de los sitios posibles: en la mansión marcada con el número 9 del paseo del Prado. Allí leería a Cervantes, a Platón y a Goethe, tres de los dioses que habrían de acompañarlo siempre. Por entonces, Cuba se está inventando a sí misma. La Habana se menea. Nuestra corta experiencia republicana se estremece de sorpresa en sorpresa. Un habanero sonriente arrebata el trono del ajedrez a un filósofo alemán, tres santiagueros ponen a medio mundo a cantar sones, los estudiantes aprenden a protestar en las plazas públicas, un camagüeyano edita Sóngoro Cosongo, las prostitutas francesas pretenden reinar entre mulatas y, en prueba de amor, los chulos se matan a tiro limpio a la salida de los bares. Un refrán amargo atestigua que la alegría dura poco en casa del pobre. En 1929, todo espejismo de prosperidad se vino abajo por crisis mundial del capitalismo y la madre de Lezama tuvo que mudarse con sus hijos al hombro a una vivienda más humilde, a dos cuadras del Prado: Trocadero número 162 -"en la acera de enfrente de las rameras prodigiosas"-.

Trocadero número 162 era una casa a pie de acera con un pe-queño patio interior, dos cuartos enanos, una cocina manchada por los humos del kerosén, un oscuro comedor y una sala luminosa que se abría a los pregones de la calle por una ventana de hojas anchas. Le-zama instauró allí su reino personal, la fortaleza que habría de abrigarlo ante el desencanto y las ráfagas de la soledad. Un ejército de mujeres cuidaría de él, día tras día y noche tras noche: la madre, Rosa Lima Mercado; la nodriza Baldomera; sus hermanas, Rosa y Eloísa; su esposa, María Luisa Bautista. Ellas eran sus guardianes. Sus defensoras. A manera de escudos de armas, los cuadros comenzaron a dignificar las paredes. Los libros invadían la estancia. Rodeado de Habanas y habanos, envuelto en el humo de su leyenda, el poeta pisaba sobre la alfombra de las carátulas e iba apisonando los libros en el suelo, como patea un balón el elefante del circo. Escribía a mano sobre una tabla que coloca-ba entre los brazos de un butacón enorme. Una tabla de maderas cru-das donde (si no me equivoco) se leía el logotipo de una marca de cerveza. Las cuartillas garabateadas caían al piso, otoñales. El fuego consumía el tabaco en el cenicero y, a medida que la ceniza ganaba en longitud, el puro perdía equilibrio e inclinaba la balanza hacia la punta de la embocadura ensalivada. Así lo recuerdo, descifrando los complicados jeroglíficos de su poética monumental sin pedirle nada a nadie, salvo a Dios (¿será?), para que el asma no viniera a romper el mágico momento en que sus delirios encontraban las palabras justas con las cuales debía elaborar una particularísima y de nuevo indescifrable revelación. Presumía de tres tesoros en la sala: un busto de José Martí, un búfalo de jade y una limosnera argelina. Debe ser un disloque de mi memoria, pero aquella casa siempre me olió a barbería. Lezama no encajaba en ninguna de las categorías más contagiosas de lo cubano. Abogado de carrera, nunca fue músico ni bailarín ni boxeador ni pelotero ni abakuá ni tiratiros ni buen amante ni alardoso ni experto en dominó ni borracho ni bromista ni mira huecos ni sandunguero ni comecandela ni mujeriego. Sólo poeta, un oficio devaluado. De joven, era un notable caminador. Los amigos lo evocan por las calles de libreros (Obispo, por ejemplo, La Manzana de Gómez), marcando el paso al ritmo de los ahogos del asma. Aquellas excursiones por los laberintos de la vieja ciudad se fueron espaciando poco a poco, a medida que la realidad le iba dejando de interesar y prefería refugiarse en un mundo, el suyo, donde se sentía a gusto, dominante y, en lo que cabe, temerario; un universo conformado a partir de la lectura, la sabiduría y la resignación. "He recordado mucho, hasta convertirla en vivencia, la frase de Nietzsche en el Zaratustra 'el desierto está creciendo'. Qué frase para los tiempos que corren", confiesa a su hermana Eloísa en una carta de 1963: "Es el desierto, el desierto que crece indeteniblemente. (...) Si no hay libertad, no hay posibilidad, no hay imagen, no hay poesía. Si no hay libertad, no puede haber verdad". El 1 de enero de 1966 ("por la mañana, con menos frío") pone al correo otra carta, ésta para su hermana Rosita: "Yo vivo en la eternidad, en lo que queda al pasar por el espejo. Precisamente lo que no tengo es lo que poseo, el latido de la ausencia... Dicha grande decía en su diario Martí. Sufrir tiene también su dicha, es como si nos desgajásemos y apareciese el ramaje nuevo". Si antes visitaba a los amigos, de casa en casa, desde mediados de los sesenta cambió de estrategia y comenzó a preferir que los amigos fueran a él, por él, un recurso que le permitía filtrar los afectos, depurarlos, elegirlos. A lo largo de su sedentaria existencia, Lezama fue engordando con tanta progresión que, camino a la muerte en el hospital Calixto García de La Habana, los enfermeros debieron sacar la camilla por esa única ventana, pues, se dice, el poeta no cabía por la puerta. Había llegado La Hora o La Mudada, como a él le gustaba decir; con cierto tiempo de antelación, tuvo a bien elegir la frase que, tallada en mármol, alumbraría su tumba: "El mar violeta añora el nacimiento de los dioses, / porque nacer es aquí una fiesta innombrable".

La fiesta era la eternidad; la ausencia, otro (re)nacimiento. En el segundo mismo de su muerte, comenzó su resurrección, su multiplicación. El fantasma del poeta que mejor entendió los misterios de una Cuba desarraigada y raigal, improvisada y profunda, vuela libre entre los espejos de la gran literatura. Destella equívocos. Los que tuvimos la dicha de conocerlo, y adorarlo, nos fuimos robando una a una sus muchas imágenes posibles. Las secuestramos. En este caso, quiero pensar por consuelo, el saqueo es homenaje. Esa dispersión de sus reflejos debe ser una broma que Lezama ideó risa a risa desde su diminuto claustro habanero, como un duende travieso que decide dejarnos en herencia una enorme confusión. La confusión puede ser un camino hacia la claridad o la transparencia. Los extremistas políticos hoy se disputan su reclutamiento y tiran de su cuerpo hacia la izquierda o hacia la derecha, con idéntico desparpajo. Para unos fue una víctima; para otros, un héroe. Un perseguido o un adelantado. Un ermitaño o un maestro. Un poeta oscuro, un hombre lúcido. Un demonio bueno. Un demonio malo. ¿Paradiso o Infierno? ¡Mío! ¿Tuyo? No: nuestro. Quizás la verdad más cercana a la verdad sea la suma de todos esos malentendidos. Una vez le preguntaron qué era lo que más admiraba en un escritor: "Que maneje fuerzas que lo arrebaten, que parezcan que van a destruirlo. Que se apodere de ese reto y disuelva la resistencia", dijo Lezama: "Que destruya el lenguaje y que cree el lenguaje. Que durante el día no tenga pasado y por la noche sea milenario. Que le guste la granada, que nunca ha probado, y que le guste la guayaba que prueba todos los días. Que se acerque a las cosas por apetito y que se aleje por repugnancia". Tal vez ése sea su mejor retrato.

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La poesía como principio y fin

El escritor José Lezama Lima (Campamento de Columbia, La Habana, 1910-La Habana, 1976) estudió Derecho en la capital cubana, donde participó en las manifestaciones contra el régimen machadista. Dirigió el departamento de Literatura del Consejo Nacional tras la Revolución castrista. Poeta, ensayista y novelista, fundó la revista Verbum (1937) y estuvo al frente de Orígenes. Su obra poética se inició con Muerte de Narciso (1937) en la que mostraba una gran originalidad metafórica, aunque fue Enemigo rumor (1941) la obra que más influyó en la sensibilidad cubana. Sus novelas Paradiso y Oppiano Licario muestran el universo barroco del autor y la brillantez de su escritura.

© El País

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cubaencuentro.com / Jueves, 11 de septiembre de 2003

AISLACIONISMO Y AMENAZA NUCLEAR

La reticencia norteamericana a trabajar en proyectos y pactos de colaboración internacional tiene en permanente jaque la seguridad nuclear del planeta.

por ALEJANDRO ARMENGOL, Miami

Pese las contundentes declaraciones que aparecen con frecuencia en la prensa, el gobierno del presidente George W. Bush no está haciendo lo suficiente para impedir que los elementos químicos imprescindibles para construir un arma de destrucción masiva caigan en manos terroristas. Hay materiales nucleares almacenados en zonas dispersas que no cuentan con una protección mínima. Están regados por el mundo sin que exista un control estricto sobre los mismos, y sin que se sepa con certidumbre el grado de seguridad con que se conservan.

Se estima que hay uranio enriquecido en 350 locaciones, ubicadas en cincuenta países. En algunas, la cantidad acumulada es muy pequeña. Pero en otras hay lo suficiente para hacer una o más bombas. Varias de estas zonas incluyen reactores de investigación que utilizan uranio enriquecido. Los reactores fueron provistos a los países por Estados Unidos y la extinta Unión Soviética en la época de la guerra fría.

Sin embargo, ese uranio enriquecido podría ser empleado ahora en la fabricación de armas atómicas, y se han modificado los vínculos norteamericanos y rusos con las naciones donde se hallan las instalaciones, o ya no existen los regímenes a los cuales se hizo entrega de equipos y componentes tan peligrosos. Los lugares más conocidos se encuentran en los territorios de la ex Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), pero no son los únicos. También hay en los países que formaban la Europa del Este, en el Medio Oriente y en África.

Si algunos de estos materiales no han caído aún en poder de los grupos terroristas se debe a un conjunto de circunstancias, en donde factores tan disímiles como la casualidad —quizá es mejor hablar de buena suerte— y la dedicación de varios agentes y departamentos de seguridad han jugado un papel preponderante. Pero no es gracias a que se han establecido los procedimientos, las leyes y medidas adecuados para evitarlo. La historia de los esfuerzos para evitar una catástrofe de tal naturaleza permanece encerrada en el más absoluto secreto. La incompetencia y la falta de coordinación para establecer una serie de normas que hagan que la seguridad mundial no sea un hecho fortuito está suficientemente documentada.

Lo lógico es pensar que no se han escatimado esfuerzos para controlar los depósitos de plutonio y uranio enriquecido —imprescindibles en la fabricación de bombas nucleares— diseminados por el mundo. Sobre todo a partir de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001. La lógica no se corresponde con la realidad. Se ha avanzado algo, pero no lo suficiente.

Lo malo es que, en ocasiones, la administración norteamericana tiene atadas las manos para actuar de forma rápida y simple. Lo peor es que, en otras, su propia ideología le impide hacerlo. Más desalentador todavía resulta que tanto republicanos como demócratas están aferrados a sus puntos de vista disímiles sobre el problema. Peligroso en extremo es que parece posible que no se llegue a un acuerdo en un futuro cercano.

Hubo un caso donde la colaboración internacional sirvió para librar al mundo de un grave peligro nuclear, pero este ejemplo ilustra más lo mucho que aún falta por hacer, que los resultados alcanzados. La amenaza se mantuvo por años, sin que se destacara lo suficiente en la prensa internacional y sin que preocupara en exceso a los gobernantes del país más poderoso del planeta y a los mandatarios de otros estados. Antes de solucionarse, la situación enfrentó los obstáculos más disímiles y por diez años el peligro se mantuvo latente sin que se llegara a un acuerdo para poner fin a la amenaza.

Ocurrió la noche del 22 de agosto de 2002. En una operación combinada —donde participaron varios helicópteros, 1.200 soldados serbios completamente equipados, numerosos francotiradores, una considerable fuerza policial que bloqueó decenas de calles y carreteras, tres camiones (dos usados para engañar a los posibles secuestradores) y diversos observadores internacionales—Estados Unidos logró el traslado, de Serbia a Rusia, de unas cien libras de uranio enriquecido.

Por más de una década el uranio permaneció en el Instituto Vinca de Ciencias Nucleares de Belgrado. El material se encontraba en contenedores que hacían fácil su transporte. Durante ese tiempo estuvo protegido apenas por una alambrada y unos pocos guardias mal adiestrados y peor equipados, que tenían sólo armas cortas. La instalación se encontraba en tal grado de deterioro, que los participantes en la misión encontraron ratas muertas en el tanque de agua del reactor.

Por más de dos lustros —es decir, bajo los gobiernos de George Bush, Bill Clinton y George W. Bush— el uranio enriquecido permaneció en un país en guerra, cuya minoría fundamentalista albanesa tiene vínculos con la red terrorista Al Qaida de Osama bin Laden. Fue algo así como dejar varias cajas de cartuchos de dinamita junto a un derrame de gasolina, con varias antorchas encendidas en el medio, y esperar simplemente a que el viento apagara las llamas, el combustible se evaporara o un aguacero providencial inutilizara los cartuchos.

Casi once años sin llevar a cabo todos los esfuerzos posibles para retirar al menos los explosivos, para continuar con la alegoría. Existen informes de inteligencia de que, durante el régimen de Slobodan Milosevic, hubo intentos por parte de Sadam Husein y Bin Laden de obtener el material. Si hubiera sido comprado o robado por los terroristas, habría resultado fácil elaborar con él dos o tres bombas similares a las arrojadas en Hiroshima. Ahora los rusos lo convertirán en uranio apto para uso comercial.

El llamado "Proyecto Vinca" fue concebido mucho antes del derribo de las torres gemelas de Nueva York. Pero incluso después de los atentados terroristas, los trámites burocráticos demoraron la misión por casi un año. Es una historia con un final feliz, pero también sirve para ilustrar los peligros y las dificultades, tras los intentos de colocar en un lugar seguro los elementos necesarios en la fabricación de bombas nucleares.

Con anterioridad, Rusia había estado renuente a reconocer su responsabilidad en los materiales nucleares distribuidos durante la era soviética. En 1994, Estados Unidos tuvo que llevar a cabo una operación similar en Kazajstán, pero en esa ocasión sin la colaboración rusa. Fueron los ingleses y los norteamericanos los que en 1998 lograron trasladar materiales de ese tipo de la antigua República Soviética de Georgia a Gran Bretaña. Hay que reconocer que en la actualidad las buenas relaciones entre los presidentes Bush y Vladimir Putin han permitido un notable avance en la colaboración para llevar a cabo estas misiones. Pero ello no basta para enfrentar los casos disímiles, presentes en diversos países.

No es una historia sólo de naciones y gobernantes. El Proyecto Vinca también indica los vínculos complejos entre los gobiernos y las empresas privadas en el mundo actual. En 1993, Estados Unidos estuvo de acuerdo en adquirir, para su uso pacífico, la mayor parte del uranio procedente de los misiles soviéticos desmantelados. Sin embargo, ahora quien se encarga de comprar el uranio —transformado en Rusia para su uso comercial— es la USEC, Inc., una empresa privada con acciones públicas en la bolsa de valores neoyorquina.

La USEC fue en una época una corporación propiedad del gobierno norteamericano —similar a la ferrocarrilera Amtrak— y su labor fundamental era el procesamiento de uranio para las plantas energéticas del país. En 1998, la corporación fue vendida por el gobierno federal a un grupo de inversionistas, que pagaron $1.900 millones y heredaron así la ejecución del convenio ruso-norteamericano. De esta forma, la puesta en práctica de un acuerdo estratégico por 20 años —denominado "De megatones a megavatios"— pasó a depender de los afanes lucrativos de un consorcio empresarial.

Los planes de privatización se iniciaron bajo el gobierno de Bush padre y fueron completados por Clinton. Desde entonces existen interrogantes sobre esa decisión del gobierno norteamericano, de otorgarle una función propia de la seguridad nacional a la industria privada.

A partir de 1998, el interés de sacarle ganancias al acuerdo con Rusia y la necesidad de Estados Unidos de reducir la amenaza nuclear no han coincidido siempre. Como cualquier empresa, cuyas acciones se cotizan en el mercado bursátil, la USEC, Inc. ha hecho lo posible por reducir costos y salir adelante, en un país donde no se construye una planta eléctrica que emplee energía atómica desde hace más de dos décadas. Durante ese tiempo ha tenido que hacer frente, además, a la competencia extranjera, representada por varias firmas internacionales que cuentan con subsidios de sus gobiernos respectivos.

Bajo esas circunstancias, la USEC, Inc. se ha visto obligada a negociar con Rusia el precio del combustible atómico, no en base a las necesidades políticas y estrategias, sino de acuerdo a la ley de la oferta y la demanda. Cabe preguntarse si la privatización fue correcta. Esta inquietud no sólo ha sido expresada por políticos que podían catalogarse de "liberales", sino también por miembros de la actual administración norteamericana, abanderada del neoliberalismo. Por ejemplo, Richard Falkenrath, un prominente funcionario del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, considera que la privatización de la USEC fue un "terrible error".

Como ocurre generalmente en firmas de este tipo, los vínculos entre empresa y gobierno terminan en muchos casos reducidos a una misma persona con dos trajes distintos, o en dos momentos diferentes, pero no excluyentes de su carrera. Ernest J. Moniz —subsecretario de Energía durante el gobierno de Clinton— es ahora miembro del consejo de USEC Inc. y James Schlesinger —secretario de Energía durante la administración de Jimmy Carter— labora en éste como asesor estratégico.

A veces, ni siquiera se cambia el traje o se espera el momento del retiro gubernamental, y se cae en el conflicto de intereses —o en el soborno vulgar, de forma evidente o encubierta— que pone en peligro no sólo la integridad corporativa, sino la mejor adecuación del convenio, de acuerdo con las prioridades de las naciones firmantes. Por ejemplo, hace casi tres años, la USEC, Inc. adquirió una empresa de Pennsylvania. Luego trascendió que uno de los dueños de la compañía comprada era Yevgeny O. Adamov, entonces ministro de Energía Atómica de Rusia (Adamov se vio obligado a renunciar a su cargo político en Rusia hace unos dos años, bajo acusaciones de corrupción. Los ejecutivos de USEC, Inc. alegan que desconocían que éste fuera uno de los propietarios de la empresa de Pennsylvania).

Si la privatización de USEC muestra una cara de la intromisión de la industria privada en los asuntos de Estado, en el Proyecto Vinca también está presente otra faceta del capital privado: la ayuda desinteresada a un plan gubernamental. Frente a la obtención de ganancias, el objetivo público.

En el caso del Proyecto Vinca, los serbios estaban de acuerdo en entregar el uranio, pero exigían a cambio que Estados Unidos se encargara de la labor de limpieza, a fin de borrar cualquier rastro de radioactividad. Sin embargo, el congreso norteamericano tiene estrictamente prohibido utilizar los fondos asignados a la eliminación de materiales necesarios en la fabricación de bombas nucleares en labores exclusivamente de "protección ambiental". Fue necesaria la participación de un grupo no lucrativo, la Iniciativa contra la Amenaza Nuclear (NTI), dirigida por Ted Turner y el ex senador Sam Nunn. La NTI donó cinco millones de dólares para las labores de limpieza, e hizo posible la salida del uranio para Rusia.

Hay, sin embargo, un elemento común que une a ambos tipos de participación privada —la lucrativa y la no lucrativa— en las funciones propias de un gobierno: la dependencia al capital privado, que desvirtúa una labor que el Estado y sólo el Estado debe llevar a cabo. Depender de la generosidad de los magnates para evitar un peligro nuclear es un acto suicida.

Más allá de una colaboración entre el sector público y el privado —con sus aspectos favorables y desfavorables— hay otra cuestión de singular importancia puesta de manifiesto por el Proyecto Vinca: las limitaciones que enfrenta la actual administración norteamericana. El establecimiento de un amplio sistema de cooperación internacional que facilite y agilice el colocar en un lugar seguro materiales tan peligrosos.

Estas limitaciones le son impuestas, en parte, por la legislación existente al respecto, pero también responde a la ideología de varios miembros prominentes de la actual administración. Las leyes vigentes hacen extremadamente difícil que Washington pueda expandir algunos de sus sistemas más efectivos de retirada de materiales nucleares, más allá de los territorios que conformaron la desaparecida Unión Soviética.

Una ley norteamericana, aprobada en 1991 —a iniciativa de Nunn, entonces senador demócrata por el estado de Georgia, y de Richard Lugar, senador republicano por Indiana— permite el financiamiento necesario para almacenar y destruir las armas nucleares desactivadas en Rusia y tres ex repúblicas soviéticas. Esta legislación debe ampliarse.

En diciembre de 2001, el ex senador Nunn y el senador Lugar acudieron a la Casa Blanca, con la idea de extender el programa, a la luz de la amenaza representada por Al Qaida. Se reunieron con Rice, la asesora de Seguridad Nacional, y hablaron con el vicepresidente Dick Cheney. En un primer momento la administración se mostró interesada en la idea, pero en una versión más limitada. Las buenas intenciones no bastaron. En la primavera de 2002 fueron suspendidos los fondos para el programa Nunn-Lugar. Hace alrededor de un año, el Senado aprobó otorgar una mayor flexibilidad al Departamento de Defensa para emplear los fondos destinados a la seguridad nuclear donde se considere necesario. Pero la Cámara de Representantes —dominada por los republicanos, que se guían por su clásico prejuicio contra la ayuda exterior— se opuso a la utilización amplia de dichos fondos.

A su vez, el Proyecto Vinca es un ejemplo de una vía amenazada de no tener continuación, o de un logro cuyo éxito no le garantiza que se extienda a otros casos. Pese a que varios funcionarios gubernamentales norteamericanos saludaron la operación como un importante paso de avance, existe la oposición por parte del ala más extremista y militante de la administración Bush —los llamados "halcones", de los cuales forman parte Rice, Cheney, el ministro de Defensa Donald Rumsfeld y otros— hacia cualquier plan que fundamente su ejecución en la cooperación internacional.

Lo acaban de demostrar en la guerra contra Irak. Según ellos, Estados Unidos tiene que ejercer su papel hegemónico, sin depender en última instancia de la participación del resto del mundo. Cualquier acción que se lleve a cabo —ya sea la lucha contra el terrorismo u otro conflicto futuro contra cualquier país considerado una amenaza para la seguridad nacional norteamericana— debe realizarse sin las ataduras que representan los pactos internacionales. El apoyo mundial se concibe como subordinación, no como participación decisiva.

Tal enfoque representa el peligro de una vuelta a un aislacionismo norteamericano que no tiene cabida en el mundo actual, pese a la superioridad en armamentos que posee este país. El Proyecto Vinca —un episodio completamente olvidado en la actualidad— es una prueba de la posibilidad de seguir con éxito un camino contrario. Una señal que debe contribuir a abrir los ojos y abandonar una política errónea. Un ejemplo para contrarrestar una actuación empecinada, que puede tener consecuencias devastadoras, tanto para Estados Unidos como para el resto del mundo. Un hecho útil para oponerse al afán equivocado de abarcar todos los peligros de forma unilateral. Un resultado real que se contrapone a una terquedad aislacionista y prepotente, que tendrá repercusiones negativas en un mundo donde ya se ha demostrado que no necesariamente un país poderoso, sino una red terrorista y un grupo de desalmados, puede infringir un daño enorme.

La amenaza de despertar un día con la visión aterradora de un hongo nuclear debe estar por encima de las diferencias ideológicas y de enfoque. Ahí está el Proyecto Vinca para demostrarlo. No comprenderlo así puede resultar catastrófico en el futuro.

(c) 1996-2003 Asoc. Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana

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Reforma - 11 de septiembre de 2003

VIVEN "TURISMO REVOLUCIONARIO" EN CHILE

Dos "peregrinos" recuerdan su mes de "turismo revolucionario" en Chile durante la época de Salvador Allende

Durante los tres años que duró el gobierno de Salvador Allende, Chile -rodeado de dictaduras- se convirtió en una suerte de "tierra prometida" para miles de militantes de izquierda latinoamericanos, agobiados por gobiernos autoritarios y sin la esperanza de una revolución esperando a la vuelta de la esquina.


Para la izquierda del Cono Sur sudamericano, La Habana quedaba lejos, el viaje resultaba caro y -lo más importante- un sello cubano en el pasaporte no era la mejor carta de presentación a la hora del regreso. Para ellos, el Chile de la Unidad Popular (UP) tenía la ventaja de estar más cerca y poseía un encanto especial: era un anticipo tangible de lo que ocurriría en sus propios países.

Decidieron cruzar los Andes para contemplar con sus propios ojos la primera experiencia latinoamericana de "transición pacífica al socialismo" de América Latina.

Tal fue el caso de incontables sudamericanos que hoy tienen entre 48 y 65 años y que hace tres décadas vivían en países en los que que una coalición similar a la UP -como luego fue el Frente Amplio uruguayo- estaba lejos de llegar al gobierno. En esa época, por lo demás, ya se sentían los ruidos de botas y sables.

Los "peregrinos" se desplazaban individualmente o en grupos pequeños y, por lo general, en tren o en bus. Algunos se atrevían incluso a cruzar los Andes al volante de un modesto Fiat 600.

Diego tenía 18 años en febrero de 1973, cuando abordó un tren en el que también viajaba el escritor argentino Julio Cortázar. "No tenía dudas de por qué quería ir a Chile: contemplar una transformación revolucionaria de la sociedad. Allí un gobierno de izquierda estaba poniéndola en práctica. No más teoría, no más elucubraciones, las masas en el poder", afirma hurgando en su memoria.

Gonzalo, 24 años entonces, que también participó de aquella travesía, conserva otros recuerdos. El viaje al Chile de Allende significó para él acceder a todo aquello que la censura en su país impedía: "En Santiago abundaban los libros de autores que estaban censurados en Argentina, Uruguay o Brasil, y se conseguían a precios baratísimos. Lo mismo sucedía con la música de protesta, las conferencias de intelectuales que jamás irían a Uruguay, Brasil o Argentina (gobernada entonces por el teniente general Alejandro Lanusse), la prensa independiente, las manifestaciones casi diarias de obreros y estudiantes".

El precio de los bienes culturales resultaba comparativamente muy barato, sobre todo si los visitantes no cambiaban sus divisas al tipo de cambio oficial. A pesar de sus convicciones, casi todos recurrían al mercado negro.

Ambos visitaron barrios populares de Santiago, en los que la Unidad Popular tenía gran influencia, y universidades ocupadas por estudiantes, participaron de asambleas y de uno de los actos de la campaña de la UP para las elecciones legislativas de marzo de 1973. La consigna que más recuerdan de aquel mitin fue 'Momios (fascistas) al paredón, momias al colchón'.

A pesar de que en febrero de aquel año ya se escuchaban rumores de conspiraciones militares, los visitantes identificados con el gobierno de la UP creían tocar el cielo con las manos.

"Había un clima de libertad inimaginable en nuestros países. Era un gobierno realmente democrático", recuerda Diego, quien también se encontró en lugares públicos con exiliados uruguayos, cuyas fotografías figuraban en todas las comisarías de Montevideo.

Las bondades del viaje no se agotaban en la experiencia cotidiana.

"Además -cuenta Gonzalo- confirmábamos al fin nuestras teorías: la identificación de los trabajadores y los desheredados con la Unidad Popular y el MIR, mientras que las clases dominantes se identificaban con la Democracia Cristiana y el Partido Nacional. Esa actitud demostraba la conciencia que tenían unos y otros de cuáles eran sus intereses. Eso era muy diferente que en Uruguay, Argentina y Brasil, donde la izquierda se nutría de la clase media".

Algunas experiencias, sin embargo, no confirmaban sus ideas previas.

"El mayor desconcierto era el desabastecimiento, que atribuíamos al boicot de la derecha, pero que de todos modos no era nada entusiasmante", señala Diego.

Tampoco encontraron entre la policía de Chile con las fuerzas de seguridad de otros países sudamericanos. Cuando escuchaban nuestro acento nos señalaban con el dedo y nos decían 'Tupamaros' o 'Montoneros' con gesto nada revolucionario".

Después de un mes de "turismo revolucionario" en Chile, Diego y Gonzalo partieron cargados de libros, discos y panfletos. A sus espaldas quedaba un país en pleno efervescencia, donde seis meses después el gobierno de la Unidad Popular alcanzó una imprevista celebridad mundial a causa del golpe de Estado encabezado por Augusto Pinochet.

Copyright © Grupo Reforma Servicio Informativo

Quarta-feira, Setembro 10, 2003

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U.S. Football Coach Visits Old Cuban Home

By LISA J. ADAMS
Associated Press Writer

HAVANA - For Carl Parrick, the only thing left of the house where he lived as a teenage boy in pre-Castro Havana was a fading wallet-size color photograph from 1958.

It was enough. On Friday, armed with maps, his memories, and the help of friendly hotel staff, the 56-year-old high school football coach from Chula Vista, Calif., rang the doorbell at 2109 Calle 218 and stepped over the threshold into his past.

"This is it. It's all grown up, but this is it," Parrick said, after stepping out of the taxi and moving timidly toward the front door, his eyes wet with tears. "This is really something. People said not to get my hopes up."

The idea of attempting a homecoming to a place forbidden to most Americans occurred to Parrick last November, when he and the assistant coach at Bonita Vista High School, Dan Hodges, were trying to pick a site away from home to stage the 2003 season opener with their La Jolla High School rivals.

In previous years, they had traveled to Las Vegas and places as far-flung as Hawaii, Parrick thought, "So, this time I said, 'Let's go to Havana, Cuba.'"

Hodges had his doubts, but started making the calls to the State Department and filling out the piles of U.S. and Cuban forms necessary to travel to the communist island — a trip forbidden under current U.S. law. Four or five months later, Parrick received the good news: He could go home again.

Last Sunday morning at 3 a.m., Parrick landed at the Jose Marti International Airport accompanied by football players, parents, assistants, and school principals — 280 people all together. On Friday night, Bonita Vista won the game, 31-22.

During his weeklong stay, the coach was impressed by nearly everything he saw: the historic forts of Old Havana, the dazzling white-sand beaches of Varadero, the perfectly preserved 1950s Buicks and Chevrolets rolling down the boulevard past El Malecon, the capital's famous seawall.

But nothing hit him quite as hard or as deeply as when he saw the carport-turned-garage where his parents' gleaming 1951 Cadillac once sat, the hole workers carved out of the front cement roof to make room for the palm tree the family planted, the former downstairs closet where he threw his coat after arriving home from school.

Parrick lived in the neighborhood then known as Country Club Nuevo Biltmore for two years beginning in 1957, when Fulgencia Batista was still in power and his father was a pilot stationed in Havana with the U.S. Navy.

A student in the Cuban public schools, the adolescent Carl played baseball and kickball against rival teams and spent much of his free time riding his bicycle past luxury hotels or diving with his friends off the seawall into the warm Atlantic. He remembers how one afternoon his parents joined Ernest Hemingway for lunch at his secluded estate.

When a young lawyer and rebel named Fidel Castro came to power, Parrick's family at first stayed put. At the time, the world was still unsure of Castro's intentions — he had portrayed his rebellion as a nationalist revolution, and had not yet declared Cuba a socialist country.

Parrick remembers the day when some of Castro's soldiers gave him a red-and-black armband — which he promptly put on his sleeve — commemorating the July 26, 1953, attack on the military barracks at Moncada that launched the revolution.

"I remember sitting in their jeeps," Parrick said. "They were really friendly to us. To me it was an enjoyable time."

Then one day, when Parrick was in the 7th grade, in the spring of 1959, his father informed the family that they were going to have to leave the country.

"I remember I didn't want to go," he said. "I loved it here."

It didn't dawn on Parrick that he had been a witness to history in the making until several years later, when he revisited the pages of his mother's scrapbook containing articles about Castro's takeover and a TV Guide cover featuring the bearded revolutionary.

Now, Parrick is trying to impress upon his students the significance of their trip, "that it's more than just a football game."

"We want them to understand the culture," he said. "A lot of people have misconceptions about Cuba. The people are so friendly. ... The country grabs hold of you."

Practicing what he preaches about intercultural exchange, Parrick spent at least an hour sharing recollections of his old life and photographs of his new one with Jinnay Rodriguez, her parents, Miriam and Pedro, and her grandmother, Esperanza Ortega, who now live in his former house on 218 Street.

As a parting gift, he gave them three T-shirts decorated with American flags, old cars, and football themes.

"This is very emotional, to have him come here and remember the years when he was a child," Miriam said.

"Our house is your house," Jinnay told him.

Parrick was clearly moved.

"I have a lot of deep emotions," he said. "After 44 years, I'm back home again."

(C) AP 2003

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Reports: Lopez-Affleck Calif. Nuptials Postponed

LOS ANGELES (Reuters) - The wedding of Hollywood lovebirds Jennifer Lopez and Ben Affleck has been postponed because a media frenzy is thwarting their efforts to keep the nuptials private, three entertainment television programs reported on Wednesday.

According to reports on "Entertainment Tonight," "Access Hollywood" and "Extra," invited guests were told the wedding was off, at least for the time being.

Publicists for singer-actress Lopez, 33, and Affleck, 31, could not be immediately reached for comment.

The couple and their representatives have been extremely tight-lipped about wedding plans in hopes of keeping the ceremony private.

But details have been leaking over the past several days in various publications, including the alleged location -- a swank estate in the hills near Santa Barbara.

Hotels in and around the usually quiet seaside town north of Los Angeles have been filling up as reporters, photographers and TV crews booked rooms hoping to get close to the event.

A rehearsal dinner reportedly was set for Saturday, with the wedding slated for the following day.

"Extra," quoting a source close to the couple, said the media frenzy became too much for them. The source said Affleck and Lopez feel things have "gotten out of control" and that at this point, they would prefer to sneak off at a later date with only their immediate families.

(C) Reuters 2003

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CON DIOS, NUNCA CON EL DIABLO

Por Bernardo Marqués-Ravelo


Mientras en La Habana se conocía la negativa de Grecia a que Castro visite ese país, en ocasión de los juegos olímpicos del próximo año —en un gesto más de propaganda política que de eficacia— y Holanda, por su parte, le negaba el apoyo financiero a la Bienal de Pintura de la ciudad, en cumplimiento de un acuerdo establecido por los gobiernos de la Comunidad Europea, Elizardo Sánchez Santacruz se metía en camisas de once varas con las autoridades.

Asumir una actitud independiente aunque moderada frente al régimen de la Plaza de la Revolución, es de por sí un acto de casi heroicidad por los riesgos que se corren. A saber: desde la más refinada infamia, los chismes más gruesos y complicados, y la zozobra siempre perenne de estar a las puertas de los pabellones carcelarios de la tiranía.

El dirigente de la oposición acaba de ser acusado en otro libelo aparecido hace pocos días en la capital de la isla — redactado por Arleen Rodríguez y Lázaro Barredo, dos periodistas de los medios controlados por el partido comunista— de ser un agente de la Seguridad del Estado. Lo llaman “Juana” o “Eduardo”, sus supuestos seudónimos.

Acusar a Elizardo de colaborar en —para y con— los servicios secretos del gobierno, además de ser otra infamia, resulta una ridiculez mayúscula. Suponer que un hombre de la agudeza, la madurez política y la experiencia del dirigente de la Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN) trabaja para la inteligencia castrista es presumir que el dirigente oposicionista está haciendo un doble juego. Y ese no es Sánchez Santacruz.

Yo no meto las manos en el fuego por razones obvias. Uno nunca sabe, y con “los muchachones” del G2 no se puede dudar de casi nada. Son capaces de cualquier vileza, es obvio. Pero yo conozco, personalmente, a Elizardo. Y no me atrevería a tan festinado juicio. Ni siquiera por una broma: es demasiado serio lo que está en juego, y excesivos resultan los riesgos que se corren.

Al mismo tiempo, Gutiérrez Menoyo se pasea —suelto, orondo y campante— por las calles de La Habana. Entretanto, sufren prisión en las ergástulas comunistas de Cuba, Raúl Rivero y Manuel Vázquez Portal, dos poetas y escritores, con sentencias que se acercan a los veinte años. Sin embargo, ni uno ni otro, nunca, han esgrimido un arma contra el sistema del barbudo.

Menoyo tiene un historial tenebroso. O al menos, oscuro. Nunca estuvieron claras las razones de la conspiración contra el dictador Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, “Chapitas”, a principio de los ‘60. Parece ser que actuaba, según se rumora, vinculado a la policía política de aquellos años. Aunque en el ‘64 se infiltró en la isla, por la región oriental de Baracoa, para sostener combates en esas sierras contra las milicias de Castro.

Después pasó 22 años a la sombra y no “de las muchachas en flor”. Dos décadas y unos pocos meses que transcurrieron entre turbias y desagradables aventuras, signadas por las peripecias de actitudes no muy nítidas o, al menos, muy poco transparentes, al decir de algunos estudiosos del tema.

Y ahora regresa para presentase como el salvador de la nación. Un personaje que viene a decirles a los cubanos cómo se “hace patria” dentro del archipiélago. Al menos es lo que se infiere de la biografía, redactada por su hija, Patricia, una editora que reside en San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Menoyo dice esgrimir una limpieza inmaculada, toda vez que puede demostrar que no ha recibido un centavo de Estados Unidos. Pero no dice que sus fondos los obtiene de la Social Democracia europea, hasta hace poco capitaneada por su “cúmbila” Felipe González y otros personajes de esa laya, con suficiente poder para maniobrar en las lides sociales del archipiélago.

Le sabe mucho a los entretelones de la política este hombre. Quizás su sabiduría le llegue de su padre, un médico sagaz, y valiente —infiero que honesto— que combatió en las filas de la República española, en los tempranos ‘30 del siglo anterior. Y que después emigró a Cuba, con su familia en ristre.

Lo cierto es que el ex comandante apareció, semanas atrás, en San Cristóbal de La Habana y a la salida, en el aeropuerto capitalino de Rancho Boyeros —ahora José Martí—, aprovechó la presencia de los periodistas extranjeros para declarar que se quedaba en la isla, que “hacía falta una nueva revolución”, y otro montón de palabras.

Con su actual actitud Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo sí que actúa con un doble juego. O acaso más. Le pone la mesa, en bandeja, al dictador para su deleite, y de paso, atenta contra las legítimas razones de la oposición interna. Buscando un papel protagónico, que nunca ha tenido, el ex guerrillero —parece ser que Menoyo es un ex de todo—, viene ahora de apaga fuego, en muy mala hora. Con las bases llenas y casi 300 opositores tras las rejas.

Pero esta vez el español es un comodín, una carta marcada. Poco o nada podrá este aventurero, desacreditado ya por la historia contemporánea de nuestra patria.

Quizás los lectores piensen que soy demasiado intolerante con el personaje. Nada de eso. Se trata de que en los momentos de crisis, como los que experimenta Cuba, no es posible ni inteligente mover esas fichas, por el peligro que entraña. A quien le sirve, en realidad, es a Castro, cegado por el poder y siempre dispuesto a saciar sus apetitos brutales en carne ajena.

Porque con Castro resulta imposible el diálogo. Es de esos hombres que se ha asignado una tarea divina: perpetuarse en el poder mientras tenga un ápice de vida y, de ser posible, más allá de su desaparición física.

Por si acaso, por suerte, siempre preferiré pactar con Dios y nunca, jamás, con el diablo y sus más cercanos secuaces. Y lo dejo aquí escrito, firmado y con fecha.

Miami, septiembre de 2003

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Publico - 09-09-2003

Morreu Leni Riefenstahl

Cineasta e fotógrafa alemã que colaborou com o III Reich

A fotógrafa e cineasta alemã Leni Riefenstahl morreu ontem à noite, aos 101 anos de idade, avançam hoje as agências AFP e Reuters, citando a revista alemã "Bunte Magazine". Riefenstahl foi durante anos a cineasta oficial do regime nazi.

"O corpo dela simplesmente parou", disse à "Bunte" Horst Kettner, o seu companheiro. A polémica cineasta faleceu em sua casa, em Poecking, no sul da Baviera.

Helene (Leni) Bertha Amalie Riefenstahl nasceu a 22 de Agosto de 1902, em Berlim Wedding no seio de uma família endinheirada. Aos 16 anos, inicia, em segredo, aulas de expressão corporal e “ballet” clássico. Seria a dança que lhe abriria as portas do mundo do cinema. Estreia-se como actriz, em 1926, no filme “Der Heilige Berg” (“A Montanha Sagrada”), descoberta por Arnold Fanck, que procurava uma bailarina para o papel principal de Diotima. “A Montanha Sagrada” foi um dos muitos filmes “de montanha” que nos anos 20 se realizaram na Alemanha, enaltecendo a força física e a “raça”, um género de nacionalismo muito marcado e alimentado por um misticismo exaltado onde se encontram em germe os princípios que irão balizar o cinema nacional-socialista.

Meu Führer

Em 1931, lança-se na realização com “Das Blaue Licht” (“A Luz Azul”), que teve a colaboração de Béla Balázs como argumentista. Riefenstahl assumia ainda a produção, para além de participar como actriz, surgindo a fazer escalada descalça. Nesse mesmo ano, funda a sua companhia cinematográfica. A cineasta tinha como próximo projecto a realização de “Das Tiefland” (que só se estrearia em 1954), mas é aqui que entra a “encomenda” do Führer para realizar um documentário sobre o Congresso do Partido Nacional-Socialista. Na sua autobiografia, Riefenstahl relata o encontro em que Hitler lhe encomendou “O Triunfo da Vontade”: “Temo, meu Führer, não estar à altura de fazer esse filme.” “E porque não estaria à altura de o fazer?”, interroga Hitler. “O conteúdo é-me totalmente estranho, nem sequer sei distinguir os SA dos SS...”, respondeu Rienfenstahl. “Está bem assim ...”, replicou-lhe o Führer, “desse modo não verá senão o essencial. Não quero um filme monótono sobre o congresso. Quero um documentário artístico.”

Admiração ou aversão?

A observação da cinematografia de Leni Riefenstahl continua cingida ao maniqueísmo: admiração ou aversão. Se, por um lado, se encontra em Riefenstahl um génio depurado como um diamante, por outro é impossível apartar “O Triunfo da Vontade” (1935) e “Olympia — Ídolos do Estádio” (1936) do “Império dos mil anos”. Riefenstahl defendeu-se até ao fim das acusações e alegava que era apenas uma “artista ao serviço da sua arte”. “O Triunfo da Vontade”, o melhor filme de propaganda alguma vez realizado, atinge um esplendor hipnótico nascido sobretudo da montagem, da variação entre as grandes angulares da multidão em êxtase e os gigantescos “close-up” de Hitler, que o transformam numa figura divina. Riefenstahl repetiu, há poucos dias, no canal ARTE, que fez “O Triunfo da Vontade” como fez, porque era incapaz de “fazer coisas mal feitas”.

É possível aceitar a renúncia de responsabilidade da centenária cineasta? A resposta a esta questão passa pelo conhecimento do resto da sua obra, só deste modo se pode tentar perceber até que ponto “O Triunfo da Vontade” tem a ver com um projecto estético pessoal que se identifica com a “doutrina” ou se é só um fenómeno de circunstância, num século que tornou evidente que “uma pessoa pode ler Goethe ou Rilke à noite, tocar Bach e Schubert, e cumprir a rotina do trabalho em Auschwitz pela manhã”, como escreveu o ensaísta George Steiner.

Nunca “desnazificada”

“Tiefland”, o último filme que realizou antes de se dedicar à fotografia, oferece não só o exame feito pela cineasta da sua própria culpabilidade face ao nazismo, mas expressa também uma consciência pré-feminista que coloca sob uma nova perspectiva a sua aceitação do fascismo e da dominância masculina. A estreia alemã de “Tiefland”, em 1954, mereceu pouca atenção do público, mas a crítica aplaudiu a sua qualidade técnica e artística. O presidente do Festival de Cannes, Jean Cocteau, ficou tão impressionada com a obra que solicitou ao Governo alemão que fosse exibida no festival, um pedido que Bona recusou. Durante décadas “Tiefland” foi completamente ignorado nas análises sobre a obra de Riefenstahl, ou atacado como um exemplo do “anacronismo” e “egocentrismo” da realizadora. Até aos anos 90, o único interesse de “Tiefland” parecia ser a acesa controvérsia gerada em 1949 pela revista “Revue”, que acusou Riefenstahl de ter usado ciganos de campos de concentração como figurantes e os ter maltratado durante o filme. Um tribunal de Munique inocentou a cineasta da acusação, mas até hoje a polémica continua. Na passada sexta-feira, Riefenstahl foi ameaçada com um processo por “negação do Holocausto”. Examinando “Tiefland” — como o fez Robert von Dassanowsky na “Camera Obscura” — contra a definição de estética fascista de Susan Sontag (que recusa a Riefenstahl quer a capacidade de mudar de opinião ou de estilo cinematográfico) este filme traduz o desenvolvimento da cineasta. Em “Tiefland” são implodidos os ideais fascistas. Marta, a heroína é uma não ariana, uma cigana, uma mulher forte e independente. Aqui o tirano, o marquês assassinado, vê a sua autoridade e ordem destruídas por uma “outsider” que flirta com o mal sem nunca perder o bem. “Tiefland” é a pedra-de-toque para compreender Riefenstahl.

Outros artistas toleraram ou apoiaram o fascismo europeu e continuaram o seu estrelato no pósguerra: Céline, Roberto Rossellini, Salvador Dalí, G.W. Pabst, Douglas Sirk, Richard Strauss, Herbert von Karajan, Gottfried Benn, Ernst Jünger, Gustaf Gründgens, entre outros. Mesmo Veit Harlan, o realizador do filme anti-semita “Jud Süss”, que trabalhou de perto com o ministro da Propaganda Goebbels e Fritz Hippler, criador do mais infame dos filmes de propaganda nazi “Der ewige Jude”, foi “desnazificado”, em 1951, e empregado como tradutor do Exército norteamericano. A ausência de mulheres nesta listagem é notória.

(Texto de Helena Ferro de Gouveia, in PÚBLICO 22/08/2002, no centésimo aniversário de Riefenstahl)

Segunda-feira, Setembro 08, 2003

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The Value of Engagement with Cuba

Statement of Philip Peters
Vice President, Lexington Institute (*)


Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify on a subject of great importance to American foreign policy in this hemisphere: United States relations with Cuba.

Many experts did not expect Cuba’s political system to survive the horrendous economic troubles it suffered when the Soviet bloc disappeared a decade ago. To hasten its demise, Congress passed new laws in 1992 and 1996 that strengthened American economic sanctions. As a result, Cuban imports became more expensive, Cuba encountered higher costs and new difficulties arranging shipping for its trade, and investment in Cuba became more risky for foreign companies that were interested in forming joint ventures.

Yet Cuba’s political system survived and remains stable. Its economy stayed afloat and restored a measure of growth by allowing foreign investment, allowing farmers to sell their surplus production on the open market, allowing limited small enterprise, allowing Cuban citizens to hold foreign currency and to receive family remittances from abroad, and by building a new tourism industry that has now replaced sugar as the top foreign exchange earner.

These modest market-based reforms have increased incomes and living standards for millions of Cubans and brought new ways of doing business to workers and managers who before had only known the ways of state planning.

However, they leave many of Cuba’s problems unsolved. Growth and job creation remain insufficient, and not all Cubans are able to benefit from the opportunities available in the new sectors of the economy. Highly educated and skilled Cubans often work in tourism-related jobs far below their qualifications because that is the only option for them to earn a good income.

As they confront these challenges, Cubans know that they will one day see a change in leadership, a turn to a new generation that did not fight the revolution that brought socialism, but rather grew up in that system. Cuba’s next generation of leaders will have to decide how to run the economy, knowing that new doses of centralization and socialism will not produce the results their nation needs. And they will decide whether to preserve or adapt their current political system.

Faced with this situation, American policy toward Cuba is centered on two ideas: a justified criticism of Cuba’s human rights practices, and a misguided, counterproductive attempt to block contacts of all kinds between the Cuban and American peoples.

Based on measures that are in the jurisdiction of this Committee – principally the trade embargo and the travel ban – American policy toward Cuba has created a barrier to a flow of people, commerce, and ideas that would constitute a powerful source of American influence in Cuba.

This policy amounts to an embargo on American influence in Cuba.

It has no parallel in the approaches we pursue toward communist countries such as China and Vietnam today. It is squarely opposed to the approach America adopted toward the Soviet bloc, where we championed the Helsinki accords precisely in order to promote the kinds of trade, travel, exchanges, and unregulated people-to-people contact that we prohibit with Cuba today. It may not be an exaggeration to state that if our Cuba policy had been in place toward Eastern Europe, deliberately isolating those countries from direct Western influences, the Berlin Wall might still be standing today.

It may be some time before Congress considers what to do about the Cuba embargo as a whole. However, even if that debate remains postponed, there are steps we can take that would put our policy on a constructive course and benefit our national interest.

I strongly believe that the first and most important step is repeal of the travel ban, which would bring several benefits.

Communication. America’s policy of principled engagement with communist China recognizes the value of American contacts with Chinese citizens in all walks of life. This has long been a missing element of American policy toward Cuba. We should take the federal government out of the business of regulating and licensing Americans who seek to travel to Cuba to see and learn about the island and its people, to participate in exchanges or conferences, or to deliver humanitarian aid. Unrestricted travel by Americans will unleash a flood of contact with Cubans, transmitting information, ideas, and values.

Freedom and fairness. Our belief in personal freedom and limited government should lead us to deny freedom of travel only where a direct national security rationale exists. No such rationale exists in Cuba’s case. Moreover, the Cuba travel ban is enforced in a discriminatory manner. The Treasury Department has assessed fines against more than 1,200 Americans for illegal travel to Cuba since the Bush Administration took office. Yet in response to Congressional requests, the Treasury Department has not cited a single case where a Cuban American has been cited for a violation of restrictions on travel or remittances.

Small enterprise. Many of Cuba’s 140,000 small entrepreneurs – especially private restauranteurs, artists, taxi drivers, and families that rent rooms in their homes – earn their revenues from foreign travelers who use their services. They will benefit greatly from the dollars that American travelers spend; their numbers will expand dramatically, they will gain independence, and their families will have better livelihoods.

Terrorism. The Treasury Department office that governs Cuba travel, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, is also the key Treasury element in the effort to break al Qaeda’s global money network. Its resources should be dedicated fully to fighting terrorism, not to duties such as licensing, investigating, and fining travelers to Cuba.

Agricultural sales. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform Act of 2000 that permit purchases of U.S. agricultural products, Cuba has made purchases of $366 million since December 2001, and has signed contracts valued at an additional $120 million. The purchases cover a wide range of products including grains, poultry, livestock, apples, wood, and finished consumer products such as cereals and beverages. The revenues Cuba would earn from American travelers would greatly expand Cuba’s ability to purchase American farm products. If Cuba purchases $500 million in American farm products annually, American farm exports would expand by one percent.

Second, Congress should seek improvement in the means by which agricultural transactions with Cuba are conducted. Today, these transactions are made in a highly circuitous and inefficient manner: Cuba typically makes payment in a foreign currency such as the Euro, sending payment through a European bank, converting the currency to dollars, then sending payment to the U.S. exporter’s American bank account. This process can take up to a week, and the resulting fees, foreign exchange losses, and excess shipping charges often absorb upwards of five percent of Cuba’s payment. French banks are typically the beneficiary of this process, which makes American exports less competitive, and causes Cuba to spend less of its foreign exchange on American products. These inefficiencies could be eliminated, and the transactions would be more transparent and easier for regulators to monitor, by a simple licensing action whereby Treasury would authorize the direct wire transfer of Cuban payments, in dollars, to the U.S. accounts of U.S. exporters.

Finally, Congress should sunset Cuba sanctions laws that violate WTO norms by penalizing foreign nationals who do business in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act, which sanctions foreign business executives and their families and authorizes lawsuits in American courts against foreign businesses whose investments touch properties expropriated from Cuban nationals who now live in the United States, and Section 211, which intervenes in a trademark dispute on the side of the Bahamas-based Bacardi corporation, both create needless conflict with American trade partners, and are obstacles to greater diplomatic cooperation with our allies on political issues involving Cuba. By setting a date for the expiration of these laws, Congress would bring about an overdue debate about these laws’ costs and benefits, and would force itself to decide whether they deserve reauthorization.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your decision to re-examine our policy toward Cuba. Our sanctions have succeeded in compounding Cuba’s economic hardships, but they have sent the unseemly signal to the Cuban people that America wants to use economic hardship to precipitate political change. And with regard to that political objective, they have been a perfect failure. The cost of changing this policy would be zero.

So I would urge you and your colleagues to consider a radical change in the orientation of our policy.

It is not necessary to invent new theories and paradigms for this socialist country that happens to be a Caribbean neighbor. Rather, we should look to the mainstream of American foreign policy. We should continue our principled defense of human rights. We should cooperate with our allies rather than castigate them for having the same trade relations with Cuba that we have with other communist countries.

And rather than hold our eleven million Cuban neighbors at arm’s length, we should respectfully and confidently open every avenue of contact with them at a time when history is leading them toward a new world, and they are looking for answers.

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(*) before the Committee on Finance
United States Senate / September 4, 2003

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Philip Peters is Vice President of the Lexington Institute and served in the State Department’s Latin America bureau during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. A monograph on Cuba’s economy and the new policy measures adopted in the 1990’s – “Survival Story – Cuba’s Economy in the Post-Soviet Decade” – is found at www.lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba along with studies of individual sectors of Cuba’s economy and analyses of U.S. policy issues.

Domingo, Setembro 07, 2003

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The Problem With the French ...
... is that they have no word for rapprochement

By Gene Weingarten
The Washington Post Magazine - September 7, 2003

The French minister of agriculture politely awaited my question. We were seated in the study of his ministry in the heart of Paris, overlooking a garden with ancient statuary. At 43, Herve Gaymard is already a member of the national cabinet, custodian of nothing less formidable than the French wine industry. Sandy-haired, lithe, urbanely handsome like Paul Henreid in "Casablanca," the minister was in shirtsleeves, slacks and -- as became apparent when he crossed his legs -- loafers sans socks. He looked effortlessly fabulous, of course. He is French.

This interview almost didn't happen. I had requested an audience with the highest French official available, on the subject of the strained relations between our two nations over the war in Iraq. The French Embassy initially seemed reluctant, at which point I observed that it would be a pity if, to secure an official audience with a French dignitary, I had to seek out Jean-Marie Le Pen. That would be the race-baiting crypto-fascist whose stunning showing in the last presidential elections threatened to create an international embarrassment for the French of a magnitude unseen since a swastika flapped beneath the Arc de Triomphe.

Soon afterward, Monsieur Gaymard was made available.

This was a delicate situation. If I was not representing all of America, I was surely representing the American media, blamed by many for taking an awkward situation and, in search of spicy headlines, gleefully making it worse.

I began by assuring M. Gaymard that confrontation and controversy were the last things on my mind; that my role was conciliatory; that my questions were designed to elicit an open and frank exchange of views, so vital to the healing process. The minister inclined his head graciously, and I began.

"I think we can both agree that the diplomatic situation between our two nations is both regrettable and unnecessary . . . Perhaps the worst part is that it has resurrected in the United States some ugly, unfair, inaccurate and totally unsupportable stereotypes about the French. You know: that you are elitist, that you are rude, that you are cowards, that you have an insufferable air of superiority, that your fashion shows are nothing more than elaborate parades of clown costumes . . ."

The minister waited for translation.

". . . that your movies are long and boring and unbearably pretentious, that you lack personal hygiene and let your dogs poop all over the streets, and indeed, that your national pet, the poodle, is a ridiculous life form better never to have survived the evolutionary process."

The minister shifted slightly in his chair.

"I will not insult you, or dignify these preposterous, obviously untrue stereotypes by asking you to respond to them. But I was just wondering if the French have any equally preposterous and obviously untrue stereotypes about Americans that you might enumerate here for the purpose of my not dignifying them with a response."

As I awaited his answer, it occurred to me that, yes, diplomacy is a difficult and subtle art. But one must try to do one's part.

In France, the president of the United States is widely perceived to be a squinty-eyed bully, a cowboy given to shooting first and asking questions later. Worse, he is seen by the sophisticated French as something of a yokel -- uncultured, unschooled, inarticulate, anti-intellectual, dangerously shallow -- elected and supported by a populace too fearful of terrorist attacks, an electorate that values too much the blunt, common touch and too little the more complex virtues of the Renaissance man.

For his part, the prez isn't so crazy about the French, either. Small wonder, then, that a relatively minor dispute would lead to intemperate words and a serious crisis in diplomacy.

We are talking, of course, about . . . 1834. The man in the White House was Andrew Jackson, hero of the Indian campaigns, our first cowboy president. Sorry, you have been hoodwinked by the oldest journalistic trick in the book, the ironic time-frame switcheroo. You stupid, gullible, non-European, linear-thinking, literal-minded American.

Yes, that is a stereotype. But this is all about stereotypes, and journalism, and the rhythms of history.

It is often said that the French republic is our oldest continuous ally, and this is inarguable. The American Revolution might never have succeeded without the support of the French; it is immaterial that their real goal was sticking it to their superpower rival, England. It is likewise immaterial if that initial alliance was a hypocritical marriage of convenience between our fledgling democracy and a country that was at the time a despotic state more suffocating than the one against which we'd just rebelled. The fact is, the French were there for us when we needed them the most.

And yet, conventional wisdom aside, relations between the United States and the French republic have never gone smoothly. The Washington Post library is full of yellowed newspaper clippings, beginning in 1898 and resurfacing every 15 years or so, breathlessly reporting the latest rupture or repair in Franco-American relations. Franco-American relations freeze and thaw and warm right back up like a plate of SpaghettiOs.

We are now facing a time of chill, with repercussions both silly ("freedom fries") and substantial (tourism and commerce in both directions have taken a hit). There is a great deal of hand-wringing about it on both sides of the Atlantic. No one seems quite certain how to deal with it -- least of all the French, who thought it a swell idea to enlist Woody Allen to tell us, as a specialist in ethics, how we are being unfair to France.

As usual, it falls to a journalist to make things right. This has happened before.

Back in 1834, during the Jackson administration, the French-American rift was trivial, really -- largely a matter of bookkeeping: We sought reparations for damage done to American shipping during the Napoleonic wars, and France was stiffing us. The whole matter was easily resolvable, but President Jackson was given to gruff, obliquely threatening pronouncements -- "bring 'em on" kind of stuff -- and before you knew it, France had recalled its Washington ambassador, and invited ours to leave Paris. There was muffled talk of war.

At that precise moment, a young French writer named Alexis de Tocqueville published a book about the national character of America, gleaned from a nine-month visit here. Democracy in America proved an instant balm to global tensions, not because it was entirely complimentary -- it wasn't -- but because it was entirely honest. It confronted openly the differences between Americans and the French, and found much for the French to like and admire. War reparations were paid and cultural exchanges began again between the two countries, with young Tocqueville himself in the middle of it -- an ambassador without portfolio.

Tocqueville had nine months, but he probably dillydallied. You know the French.

I figured six days should do it.

In preparation for my trip, I tried to cleanse myself of the many prejudices we Americans hold against the French. Unfortunately, the French kept doing stereotypically French things. When Marseille found itself in the middle of a trash collectors' strike, with tons of garbage rotting in the streets, the French government leapt into action. It sprayed the garbage with perfume.

This was also the time of the great Parisian fashion shows. The main New York Times photo featured a male model striding purposefully down the runway in a Louis Vuitton ensemble consisting, in its entirety, of a nice sports jacket, a striped shirt, a bow tie, dress shoes, white socks, and what appeared to be underpants.

To purge myself of negativity, I decided to consult experts who liked and admired the French -- the authors of two excellent cultural guidebooks: 'French or Foe?' by Polly Platt, and 'Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong' by Jean-Benoit Nadeau and Julie Barlow. From them, I concluded that France is a splendid place, though visiting it can be like visiting a beloved but eccentric maiden aunt of sensibilities as fragile as Limoges: One must be careful at all times not to offend, and to adhere to her rules of decorum, however peculiar. And so I learned that one must never ask personal questions, for although the French will opine volubly on any and all subjects of public discourse, they will bridle if asked their name or occupation or anything at all about their personal lives. I learned that, in greeting, one must not say merely, "Bonjour," but, "Bonjour, madame" or, "Bonjour, monsieur," lest one appear impolite. I learned that before addressing strangers, one must apologize profusely for intruding on their time, using a French sentence that must be memorized precisely and may not vary by even a syllable. I learned that the French have no precise word for "friendly."

The authors warned that the locals can

be somewhat prideful and protective about their culture, wary of accepting strangers into their fraternity.

How wary, I asked Jean-Benoit Nadeau.

Oh, very, he said.

Well, I speculated, let's say I went to France, and decided I loved it so much I could not bear to return to the comparatively odious United States. So I quit my job, bought a chateau in Lyon, adopted a French child, and spent the remainder of my life writing influential articles in prestigious international publications about the splendors of France and its superiority to any other place on Earth. By the time I was 80 and toothless, might the French be willing to accept me as one of them?

Silence. Finally: "They would have reservations."

The most surprising thing I learned, from Polly Platt, was that when visiting France, one must not smile at strangers. The French do not condone the casual smile, she reported. They think it a sign of untoward familiarity.

I brought this matter up at lunch with Nathalie Loiseau, the capable press officer at the French Embassy in Washington. Loiseau is in the business of bringing people together; she is inclined to regard the current French-American rift in optimistic terms, convinced our two peoples have far more in common than what divides them. But what about the smiling thing. Can this be true?

Not really, she said. The French like to smile.

Whew.

Then the French diplomat paused, diplomatically.

What? What?

"They just don't like the American smile," she said. "It is too commercial and . . ." She searched for the word.

"Insincere?" I suggested.

Yes, she said. Precisely.

It was shortly afterward that I stepped off the plane in Paris, scowling balefully, hoping for acceptance.

Day One

"Bonjour, monsieur," I say, careful to remember the monsieur. The news dealer looks up from his kiosk. "Excusez-moi de vous déranger," I say, careful to remember the precise words and syntax of the sentence necessary to assure the French person to whom you are speaking that you are a miserable insect requesting the honor of a moment of his time. Unfortunately, my next words, in English, are, "Do you speak English?" and that gets a shake and a shrug. So I have to wait until I am joined by my photographer and translator, Jerome De Perlinghi.

The news dealer, Guinot Fabrice, is literally surrounded by anti-American, I-Told-You-So sentiment: headlines reporting the latest squirmy bit of buck-passing by a U.S. government facing the growing likelihood that there are no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, never were, and that the stated purpose of the war may well have been a cynical pretext. I chose this place for my first interview on the theory that if one is to defuse a prejudice, one must first confront it. So I ask Fabrice what he thinks about Americans.

"They are nicer than the French."

C'est what?

Certainement, he says. But, I protest, Americans malign the French mercilessly. We say the most impolite things, such as that the French are rude.

Fabrice shrugs. "That is probably because the French are rude. We complain about everything. We will get the best room in a hotel, and still complain about this and that." Americans, he says, are fine. "It is the French who can be . . ."

. . . And then he uses a French word that, were it an English word, would rhyme with "glass bowls."

Jerome and I decide that Fabrice must not be typical enough. So we walk to the Frenchiest place in all of Paris, Les Deux Magots, a famous Left Bank cafe that caters to an idle class of clientele the French call boulevardiers. (There is no easy English equivalent for the term, though, in a neat accident of transliteration, the name of the cafe offers a clue.) It is at Les Deux Magots that we spot our perfect Frenchman. He is a man of middle age and impossibly erect bearing, bald as a thumb, seated alone outside, dressed in midmorning in a jacket and tie, smoking a cigar, reading Le Monde, his mustache waxed just so.

Here is where we could begin to explore the nature of stereotype. This man would dislike America, would be positively eager to explain why, but above all would be fiercely protective of his privacy, reluctant to disclose any personal facts. We approach gingerly and ask his opinions of Americans. He answers instantly in English.

"I spend sree years in ze United States, and I cannot find ze woman to put in ze bed! In France I am married four times and have 12 women in ze bed!"

Vincent de Kerempenec, 57, describes himself as "an aristocrat from an old family, with a pack of hounds for the hunt and a small castle in the Dordogne." He doesn't seem to have much problem with privacy. He also doesn't seem to have much problem with Americans, except for his lamentable difficulty in the boudoir, which he ascribes to the fact that American women suspect a man of his appearance and bearing to be gay. This, he says, is a monstrous injustice, but what can one do? American men cannot bed French women, either, he says with dignity.

And so it goes throughout the day. The French people are open, not suspicious. They are self-deprecating, not arrogant. They are almost gallant in their treatment of a stranger. They are defying stereotype.

They are being contrarian. How damnably French of them.

When I am inwardly troubled, I often consult the dead. And so, toward day's end I find myself shuffling alone through historic Montparnasse Cemetery, contemplating the puzzlement that is France. How can I explain this in Tocquevillian terms? The whole country seems paradoxical. The French do not spend money on air conditioning -- in mid-July, Paris is a sweatbox, indoors and out -- yet their underground parking garages pipe in classical music. They are famously resistant to American cultural influences, yet "Charlie's Angels" is their current big movie, and in the subways Hulk Hogan sells Internet service. The French are famously artistic and creative, yet, by indisputable evidence on the radio, they still haven't figured out how to write a competent rock song.

It is, perhaps, a historical thing. The French have always considered themselves the most sophisticated people on Earth, and yet at the fin de siècle a century ago, the most popular performer in France was a man billed as Le Petomane, whose entire act consisted of farting.

At this moment I see before me three elderly women on a cemetery bench, chatting intently. Those eccentric old aunts I am seeking, perhaps, with Limoges sensibilities. Here is a chance to be treated with classic Gallic disdain, particularly because I am without Jerome and, exactly as I suspect, they speak no English. Pressing one's English upon a Frenchman is supposed to be like pressing one's tongue upon a wall socket.

But the ladies just listen politely as I ask them about their feelings toward Americans. They chatter to one another in French, hands flying. Clearly the American wants something, but what?

Finally, one of them stands up and crooks a finger. Follow me.

I start to protest, but she takes my hand. We walk perhaps 100 feet, and finally she points triumphantly at the ground. It is the grave of Jean-Paul Sartre.

I stand there contemplating the tombstone of France's most famous existentialist, and then contemplating the woman contemplating me contemplating the tombstone of France's most famous existentialist. She is smiling and nodding.

What is the meaning of this?

Can it be that . . . it has no meaning?

Sartre's grave offers nothingness. Dates of birth and death only. But on the footstone are little scraps of paper that mourners have left, weighted with pebbles. They are in French, but some I can decipher. One says simply, "You make us proud. Thank you."

And suddenly I understand.

"You make us proud" -- that simple phrase tells me what I need to know. I have been asking the wrong question. Or rather, I have been asking the right question the wrong way. I now know what I have to do. It won't be nice, but it is necessary.

Day Two

Jerome and I are at Le Bec Rouge, an excellent Alsatian restaurant in south-central Paris. It is still morning, and the place is not yet open for business. The dapper owner and head chef, Jean-Luc Maurice, graciously comes out from the kitchen to meet us. Maurice is dressed in crisp chef's whites, and carries himself with an air of self-confidence authorized by years of training under the tutelage of the great chef Paul Bocuse.

Yes, yes, Maurice likes Americans. They are like all people, he says -- there are good, there are bad . . .

Right, right, right.

"I was just wondering," I ask slowly, "why portions in French restaurants are so small."

Maurice gives a wary answer, something about quality being paramount.

"Well, we like big portions back in the States," I say, patting my tummy. "I was wondering if you agree that American chefs are better than French chefs because they give you more food."

Maurice listens to the translation. There is a moment of silence. And then he begins to speak very rapidly.

"He says French chefs make love to their food . . ." Jerome translates.

And American chefs? I ask.

Now Maurice is really elocutionizing. His hands are flying. He appears to be pointing to . . . his derriere. I don't really have to wait for the translation, but when it arrives, it does not disappoint.

American chefs, he says, make love to the food, too. But in a most unnatural and deviant way.

Voilà.

Here is what I had failed to understand. The French are quite willing to admit that they are quintessentially French, for good or bad. They will cop to being terribly Gallicly rude, or too Gallicly refined and continental to land ze American chick, and they will confess to a prejudice for logic over spirituality -- "We French are Cartesians, after all," explained Anne-Marie Leveque, a woman I had met in the cemetery and with whom I was discussing God.

Sartre makes them proud. Descartes makes them proud. This is the key. If one is in France and one wishes to roil within the French the deepest, muddiest waters of prejudice and stereotype, one must be prepared to belittle their Frenchness.

In short, you have to be prepared to show a little . . . gall.

I am on a bridge overlooking the Seine. Below me is one of the odder sights available to an American in Paris -- a pipsqueak Statue of Liberty. It is identical to the one that illuminates New York Harbor, but 50 feet tall, tops. It's a prototype model produced by sculptor Frederic Auguste Bartholdi before he tackled the big one. The very subordinate scale of this statue is what gives it power -- modestly yielding grandeur to the one France gave to a nation it considered an undying friend. It's hard to look upon this restrained work and not feel some depth of emotion.

Hard, but not impossible.

"How come yours is so small?"

Sophie Martins is 24, an auditor for a French company. She is taking in the exquisite summer day, comely in a sleeveless black top and white slacks.

Small?

"Yeah, in the States we have a much bigger one. Are you embarrassed this one is so puny, compared to ours?"

Martins remains pleasant. "We do not need a large statue, because we have the Eiffel Tower," she says -- pointing proudly down the Seine to the magnificent filigreed monolith.

"Actually, in the States, we have office buildings bigger than that," I say. She blinks.

"Also, why is it just brown? Don't you think you guys should paint it?"

"Yes, it is true, everything is bigger in the United States," Martins says dryly. "When you go to the supermarket, all the food is sold in very large quantities." American women, she says, are always buying large volumes of food.

French women do not?

She fixes me with a steely stare. "French women like to be slim."

Aboard the Metro, heading back to my hotel. The news today is good for the French -- a Frenchman has briefly taken the lead over American Lance Armstrong in the revered Tour de France. I observe to the man next to me that the Tour de France is swell and everything, but it could be better. Alain Bequer is a mechanic and, as it happens, a bicycle enthusiast. His English is passable, and he seems most affable. How, he asks, could the Tour be better?

"Motorcycles."

Motorcycles?

"Sure. That would get more Americans to come watch it. You could use our business, if you know what I mean. In the States, we like things fast and loud."

"Yes, you do," Bequer says. "Guns, zey are fast and loud. And Americans like to shoot people and kill people wees guns, no?"

Day Three

Despite our progress, Jerome and I are once again doubting the quality of our science. Are we losing our Tocquevillian objectivity? We have found the classic French rudeness, but only by coercion and sabotage. Plus, by limiting ourselves to Parisians, are we not also creating a geographical bias? One would come away with a decidedly skewed view of Americans if one confined one's inquiries to, say, New York City, or Provo, Utah.

Tocqueville traveled far and wide. So we decide to go on a road trip, to the place most likely to embrace us.

Opera house executive Laurent Bondi lives in the small dairy village of Argueil in the heart of Normandy. It is there we meet Daniel Foucret, Bondi's next-door neighbor. The retired restorer of fine art is 75, a character, plopping down at Bondi's picnic table and demanding a whiskey -- at noon.

Foucret was a 16-year-old in Paris on August 25, 1944. That was the day the American army marched in, the final day of a four-year German occupation under which there had been no liquor, no sports, no jobs, no fun. Foucret's father, a steel merchant, was permitted only one client: the Nazi army. This client did not pay.

So when the Americans arrived, Foucret went to watch them. He took his girlfriend along. She was 16 also, Foucret says, wistfully tracing an hourglass in the air with his hands. So, did he run to greet the Americans?

No, he says. But she did.

Ah.

No hard feelings, though. Foucret's affection for Americans may be laced with a certain Gallic flavor -- one example he gives of our worth as a people is that we are intelligent and refined enough to admire French impressionist painters -- but it's surely genuine. Just don't get him started on our president.

It is impossible to overstate the French antipathy for the current American head of state. A successful Parisian stage play, now in its fifth month, is titled "George W. Bush, God's Sad Cowboy," a farce about how Dubya wants to create a "United States of the World." The exterior of the theater is splattered with faux blood.

Back at Les Deux Magots, the fox-hunting Victor de Kerempenec had called Bush "a very large liar." This theme has been repeated and repackaged by people of all ages and backgrounds: America, good. American leadership, bad. Americans, nice. President Bush, glass bowl.

"Doubleyou Boosh," Foucret calls him in a sort of curse. The socially liberal French detest Bush on almost every level, from the predictable -- his adventurism in Iraq, his enthusiasm for the death penalty and handgun ownership, his aggressive malapropisms and other perceived lack of refinement -- to the more surprising. Though predominantly Roman Catholic, the French demand secularism in government and find Bush's very public trumpeting of his Christian faith to be naked sanctimony.

Interestingly, the French prefer our previous president. His zipper weakness not only doesn't bother them, it seems to be a humanizing point in his favor. They like Hillary, too. Foucret begins to tell of a time that the first couple was out driving, and it is only when he is halfway through that you realize it is a joke. Bill and Hill stop at a gas station, and Hillary gets out to hug the attendant. When she gets back in the car, Bill asks her who that was, and she answers that it was an old high school boyfriend. "Interesting," Bill says. "Imagine, if things had gone differently, you would have been married to a gas station attendant instead of the president of the United States."

"No," Hillary says. "If things had gone differently, he would have been president of the United States."

We are all laughing and having a great time, and toasting the friendship of our two countries. At precisely that moment, Laurent Bondi's beautiful 10-year-old daughter, Analia, arrives, bounds up to each American in turn, and greets us with innocent European abandon.

Both cheeks still wet from Analia Bondi's kisses, I head off confidently for the Normandy beaches themselves.

Marie Lebourg and David Chesnel are enjoying a day in Dieppe, a resort town on the English Channel. She is as lovely as any woman you or I are ever likely to see in person; he is all man. They look like Aniston and Pitt would look if Aniston and Pitt were French -- which is to say, more self-possessed than Aniston and Pitt, and more intelligent and more sophisticated. They are not movie stars, though. They are just ordinary people. Ordinary French people.

(I am feeling good and loved and magnanimous, and thus able to confront some stereotypes with openness and candor. Frank observation No. 1: The French are slimmer and sexier than we are. No, this is not a matter of different cultural norms and attitudes toward body type yadda yadda yadda. Americans are "consumers." By and large, we buy, and are large.)

I have chosen Dieppe for a reason. It is here, in this town, on August 19, 1942, that a dry run took place for the great Allied invasion that would eventually liberate France. Operation Jubilee, as it was grotesquely named, was a massacre. The picturesque white cliffs overlooking the harbor held Germans in machine gun bunkers, and they picked off Canadian and American soldiers like wharf rats as they stumbled up the rocky beach as slick as wet marbles.

The old German bunkers are still there, and so are the slippery and treacherous rocks. But Marie and David seem to be negotiating these imperturbably. It is as though, when one reaches a certain level of beauty and grace, one need not remain obedient to the laws of physics.

(Frank observation No. 2: It is possible to become envious and resentful of the French. One must resist this.)

Jerome approaches to ask a question on my behalf, but Marie and David wave him off. How friendly of them to take a crack at it in English! I frame my question simply, and speak slowly, as if to children: What do they think of America and Americans?

They whisper together a moment. Was the question too complicated? Finally, Marie speaks in perfect English.

"I am afraid we do not approve of your commercial and ideological imperialism."

(Frank observation No. 3: While envy and resentfulness of the French is unbecoming, a small amount of indignation is, at times, unavoidable.)

She is a student, he works for Renault. They are well traveled, of course, though they are only 24. They are genuinely distressed at having to tell an American of their disappointment in his country, but he has asked, and they are being honest. David explains that hungry French people used to get a baguette and some cheese; now they are likely to visit a McDonald's. From his expression, he may as well be describing a visit to an abattoir.

Marie shakes out her chestnut hair over the top of her sundress. "We perceive this situation," she says, "almost as . . ."

Don't say it.

" . . . an invasion."

(Frank observation No. 4: The French are completely intolerable.)

Where is the gratitude? Surely they can find something good to say about America, in this of all places. I actually ask this: What's good about America? They are consulting each other in fevered whispers. They want to throw the American a bone, they really do. There must be something, I hear Marie say. David shrugs massively. She pouts, then looks at me helplessly. She holds up a finger for more time.

Finally, Jerome intercedes. He needs a picture. So the three of them begin walking off toward a picturesque floral backdrop, which will seem wan and wilted beside Marie's beauty. When they are 50 feet away, I see her suddenly stop, and turn to Jerome. She looks triumphant, and says something to him. He turns and shouts back to me:

"Pancakes!"

I think this is the appropriate moment to address, and dispense with once and for all, an oft-repeated and particularly noxious American calumny about the French. Do the French stink?

After many days in France, I have a solid answer to this question. And it

reminds me of the old joke about the billionaire who hired a famous architect to build him a new bathroom. Cost was no object. Space was no object. All that mattered to the billionaire was that he had a bathroom designed so it would not stink.

No problem, said the architect, and

after six months, for a cool million dollars, he produced the stateliest bathroom anyone had ever seen. It had a library, a lounge and gold-plated fixtures. The billionaire was delighted, but that night, he telephoned the architect in a fury, demanding that he rush right over, which the architect did.

"I said I wanted a bathroom that didn't stink! Well, the first time I used it," the billionaire bellowed, "the smell was terrible."

And the architect said, "You used it?"

No, the French do not stink. It is only when they fail to bathe regularly -- a circumstance occurring with slightly greater frequency than with Americans -- that they stink.

Day Four

We are back in Paris, at the abattoir. If it so offends the French, I figure it must be truly terrible, but near as I can tell, it is simply a McDonald's. Well, not simply a McDonald's. It doesn't offer super-sizing, for some reason. But everything else is pretty much what we know and love, and what's not to like?

As I leave the premises, I can't get over how silly the French are. If they don't want a Quarter-Pounder ® with Cheese ™ they can always walk right across the street to the restaurant at the ancient, five-star Hotel Concorde Saint-Lazare, and order from the menu, which today features terrine de poule confite et foie gras de canard à la sarriette. From the Saint-Lazare, you get a nice view of the McDonald's. It's been installed in an old building with an 18th-century Strasbourg feel. Iron Parisian balconies and a mammoth bas-relief monarch adorn the facade. Atop the building is a statue of pelican and a handsome ancient coat of arms that is still mostly visible behind the enormous plastic Golden Arches ™ that dangle above it on a chain from the roof, like a big cartoon tushie. No other object insults the majesty of the building, other than the 30-foot-high tomato-red and banana-yellow McDonald's banner that hangs from top to bottom.

Jerome and I continue discussing the oversensitivity of the French, their sometimes-comical resistance to what they see as cultural rape. You've heard of these things: The custodians of the French dictionary are thin-lipped despots, banning certain English-influenced expressions. The term "e-mail" is forbidden in French government correspondence, replaced by the French "courriel." French laws require that 40 percent of all playlists on the radio be French songs. Don't they understand how preposterous this makes them look to the rest of the world? Can't they see that times have changed? There is a new global economy, an exchange of ideas and cultures.

It's not all bad. Is it?

I lose track of Jerome for a minute, but then find him. He is bent over a car, taking a photograph of the rear windshield. I crane my neck to see. It is a yellow plastic sign that reads: "Bébé à Bord!" Jerome looks at me, and I look at him, and we keep walking in silence.

We are almost done for the day. All that is left is a photo opportunity. We decide that because this story is about slurs and stereotype, we will seek a visual pun for the cover of this magazine. Jerome will shoot me with the Eiffel Tower in the background, contemplating a . . . frog.

We simply need to find a live frog. Two hours later, we are still looking. No frog is to be found. In Paris, France.

Finally, we are in a market district, talking to a dealer in reptiles and amphibians. Alain Debouve shrugs. There are strict import laws. It's been some time since you could easily get a frog in France. Even the ones in restaurants don't come from France.

Where do they come from?

"Many come from the United States," he says.

Day Five

It has been quite a while since I left you dangling, my insolent question to French Agriculture Minister Herve Gaymard as yet unanswered. Your wait is over, because he is now seated in front of me, composing his response.

I did not spring that question out of the blue. I had first asked him about his primary ambit of responsibility, the French wine industry. Would France, I asked, be willing to reach out to the American consumer by converting its cabernets and merlots to twist-top caps?

Gaymard's English is pretty good, but he needed the scroogie concept explained.

It was. He opened his mouth to speak, then closed it again. A flicker of a smile.

"In a word," he said placidly, "no."

Excellent! He is defying stereotype. To the French politician, stereotypically, nothing is monosyllabic, and nothing is simple: Whereas American politicians are said to be ignorant of history and inclined to regard all situations as having been birthed fully formed the day before, the French are said to be chained to a thousand-year past, turning every issue into a complex geopolitical morass, nursing grudges and flogging old causes.

Now we are ready for the big question: The one about the French being insufferable, elitist, silly, effeminate, filthydirty pretentious snots. The one inviting the minister to reciprocate with his own stereotypes of Americans. Will he take the bait?

He listens. "Well," he offers at last with a smile, "it is said you eat tasteless food."

Good, good! And . . .

He steeples his fingers. "Now, this is not really a stereotype because stereotypes are what the ordinary person believes. But what the European elite holds against Americans . . ."

Remember, he is responding to a question about whether the French are pompous.

". . . is that your country will vacillate between virtuous hegemony and contemptuous retreat." The minister follows with a lengthy historical dissertation about how American foreign policy has waffled inconsistently between isolationism and humanitarian activism. He nimbly plucks historical antecedents involving Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations, William Howard Taft and Charles de Gaulle, moving forward through the abandonment and fall of Dienbienphu in French Indochina in 1954. I stop taking notes midway through the 12th minute.

It is all very instructive, and I have no doubt the minister is correct on all points. I depart chastened and deflated, pretty sure my own country has behaved disgracefully, particularly during the first Eisenhower administration.

Bastille Day on the Champs-Elysees, Paris's grand boulevard. I've been told what to expect, but it still comes as a surprise. The French celebration of their day of independence is a hyper-military display, featuring a parade of tanks and other massive armored hardware one would more expect to see in Beijing or at the central square of a consonant-oriented country with a name like Tkczjrkistan.

Before the festivities, Jerome and I mingle with the marchers, companies of cadets in their dress finery -- with cutlasses in scabbards and swagger sticks and splendiferous, ornate multicolored uniforms of a sort that would not be worn by the American military outside of some cruel hazing ritual. Some wear aprons and carry axes. One man wears a hat featuring a dangly, red feather-tufted ball. I want to tell the guy I have seen this precise fashion accessory in a book by the distinguished American author Dr. Seuss, but there are too many cutlasses around.

There are waves of flyovers by Mirage jets, and long columns of treaded vehicles rumbling on the cobblestones, giant amphibious tanks with rear-mounted howitzers, an endless march of businesslike war machines in camouflage green, missile launchers and troop transports. For a while it is truly impressive. Then the vehicles begin looking more and more ordinary until we are watching what seem to be military garbage trucks.

The crowd is demonstrating an odd solemnity, at least by our standards. There are no balloons dancing or Frisbees flying -- just polite, almost awed, applause. In the ensuing sweltering summer weeks, thousands of elderly French will die alone of heatstroke, victims of an inadequate public health safety net. But at the moment, surrounded by symbols of power, people just seem . . . reassured.

You don't see this sort of display in the United States, a country that in three minutes could -- not to put too fine point on it -- flatten France like a crepe suzette. We do not flaunt our might in this way. We do not need to. We do not whistle in the dark.

Well, except perhaps for our continued dispatches from the War on Terrorism, which we are, needless to say, winning.

Day Six

Did I mention that when I am troubled I often consult the dead?

I am negotiating once again the walkways of Montparnasse Cemetery, this time with Jerome. Here is the grave of another great writer beloved by the French. Samuel Beckett, of course, wrote "Waiting for Godot," but also a lesser-known work called "Happy Days."

No, it is not about the Fonz. You stupid American. Beckett's "Happy Days" is about a woman who is trapped in a mound of sand up to her waist, but who is perfectly content and finds her life a paradise. By the end of the play, she remains equally optimistic and satisfied, even though she is now buried to her neck. "Happy Days" is said to be about the power of denial.

There's nothing wrong with denial, of course. It's how we get through life without being consumed by the inevitability of our own death. You know, whistling in the dark. It explains a lot of human behavior, things big and small, including the elaborate, xenophobic dance we do to hold on to our pride and self-confidence -- denying our own weaknesses by ridiculing others not like us. You know what I mean?

Yesterday I was in a close-packed, un-air-conditioned Parisian bar. It was at the end of a long day, and I couldn't help noticing that stereotypical, telltale body odor of the French. Then I realized it was coming from me.

What's real? What's slander? I am telling Jerome how confused I am by all this, how the only thing I can count on is that there is not a person walking the streets of France who likes George W. Bush.

"I like George W. Bush," a woman calls out to us, in English.

"I love George W. Bush," says her husband.

I pull out my notebook. Why? Tell us why!

"Well, we live only 30 miles from his ranch." Allan and Arminda Lane of Whitney, Tex., are in Paris on vacation with the kids, Amy, Aaron and Rachel. Allan is a Baptist minister. He counts himself one of George W. Bush's most ardent supporters. Arminda, too. Their support knows few reservations.

But what about those missing WMDs? Allan says he thinks they might still be there, hidden, waiting to be found. I shoot him a skeptical look.

"Well, either that," he says, "or we had to delay so long in dealing with those U.N. resolutions that they snuck them out of the country."

It's France's fault!

Maybe it all comes down to this: We're going to believe what we want to believe, if it keeps us feeling good about ourselves. French people love to repeat the well-known idiocy by George W. Bush, a Bushism now famous in France: "The main problem with the French is that they have no word for 'entrepreneur.'" It's a wonderful quote, very revealing, if only he had actually said it. He also never said that "gruyere cheese is stupid because it has holes." I have heard that one in France, too.

As we all know in the United States, the French are soft on terrorism because they haven't felt its sting the way we have. But here in the cemetery -- as well as all over the streets of Paris -- you can't help but notice the absence of garbage cans. Instead, there are translucent green plastic bags hanging from metal rings. That's because you can see a terrorist bomb in those. The French were there, long before us.

National prejudices aren't attractive, but there's one thing about them that's hard to deny: They're inextricable from national pride.

You don't have to take my word for it. That was the conclusion of an expert in human and international relations who studied democracy and aristocracy and discovered an essential difference between them:

"Men living in democracies love their country just as they love themselves, and they transfer the habits of their private vanity to their vanity as a nation . . . Moralists are constantly complaining that the ruling vice of the present time is pride . . . I would willingly exchange several of our small virtues for this one vice."

That was Tocqueville, writing in Democracy in America.

I would like to end this story here, but I can't do it in good conscience. Tocqueville confronted everything, however distasteful.

Jerome and I are still standing in the cemetery, and something happens that must be reported.

Jerome has taken the Lane family of Whitney, Tex., away to be photographed against the cemetery wall. As they are shooting, Allan Lane mentions how much his whole family likes Paris. Really, he says, they have only one complaint. They've had to wait too long for their meal at McDonald's. What's wrong with Paris, he says, is that it needs more McDonaldses, so the lines will be shorter. Also, he says, some Burger Kings would be nice.

Gene Weingarten writes the Below the Beltway column for the Magazine. He will be fielding questions and comments about this article at 1 p.m. Monday on www.washingtonpost.com/liveonline.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

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Chile's Allende seen as a hero 3 decades after overthrow, death

BY KEVIN G. HALL
Knight Ridder News Service

SANTIAGO, Chile - Thirty years after Chilean President Salvador Allende died in a U.S.-backed coup, new books, political tributes, court cases and press revelations are prompting Chileans to reassess the man and the 1973 coup that began the 17-year dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

Chile is tense as the Sept. 11 anniversary of the coup approaches.

Protests have been banned next week, and young leftists challenged the government Wednesday with a surprise demonstration in the La Moneda presidential palace. They want Chile to match neighbor Argentina and revoke the amnesty laws that protect former military rulers from prosecution.

Police made numerous arrests as the raucous demonstration spilled onto Santiago's streets.

Over the objections of socialist President Ricardo Lagos, 10 lawmakers in his governing coalition introduced legislation Thursday that would void the amnesty laws in cases where torture, kidnapping and illegal detention were involved.

The legislation is sure to keep the issue in public debate for months to come.

In Valparaiso, Chile's Congress on Wednesday paid its first homage to Allende, a career legislator and a socialist who was narrowly elected president on Sept. 4, 1970. His daughter Isabel presides over Chile's lower house of Congress. His niece, also named Isabel, is a famous novelist.

Only last month his daughter confirmed what historians had long contended: that her father committed suicide as Pinochet's forces approached the palace, using a rifle that his friend, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, had given him.

On a talk show this week, she said that only now were Chileans honestly assessing her father and Pinochet's abuses.

''Nobody said there was a coup. There weren't murders; there were excesses. For years it was like this. Nobody was detained or disappeared,'' she said. ``Today, people know there were murders and gross violations of human rights. People know it was the policy of the state.''

Allende organized a tribute concert that at the National Stadium, where Pinochet's forces held thousands of political prisoners during the first weeks of the bloody coup. Top entertainers from Brazil and other parts of Latin America were to perform.

U.S. ROLE

The Nixon administration, fearful that Chile would become a communist beachhead, helped end Allende's three-year rule. President Clinton, and later Secretary of State Colin Powell, apologized for the intervention.

Nominated as Allende's ambassador to Moscow before the coup, Lagos choked up Wednesday as he recalled watching the bombing of the presidential palace, which he now occupies, from his in-laws' house.

``He was a quality person. You felt like you were in the presence of something special,`` Lagos said of his friend and former political comrade.

Lagos went into exile after the coup, teaching for a while at Duke University in Durham, N.C.

Pinochet dominated Chilean politics for almost three decades, which explains why Allende's record and place in history seldom were discussed.

A truth commission found that 3,198 people died in political conflict during Pinochet's rule, from 1973 to 1990. After Chile returned to democratic rule, Pinochet flexed his muscles from the shadows as armed forces chief until 1998, when he became a senator-for-life.

He was detained in October 1998 in London on an extradition request by a Spanish judge who was seeking to try him for the deaths of Spanish nationals in Chile. The detention emboldened Chileans, and after Pinochet returned to Chile in March 2000, ruled medically unfit for trial in England, he was stripped of immunity from prosecution at home. Chile's Supreme Tribunal ruled in July 2002 that he suffered from dementia and couldn't be tried.

``I am convinced that Pinochet's detention in London started a process that ended with his political and moral death,`` said Carmen Hertz, one of the plaintiffs who brought the landmark human rights case against Pinochet in Chile.

PLAQUE

Lagos will unveil a plaque Wednesday in the room in the palace where Allende died. And on Thursday, while Americans mark the second anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Lagos will reopen an entrance of the palace that Allende liked to use when greeting the public.

Pinochet had it sealed off.

The symbolic event, said Pablo Orozco, a close aide to Lagos, seeks ``to open doors to the past.''

No representatives from the armed forces were invited.

© 2003 The Miami Herald

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The New York Times - September 7, 2003

For Many Chinese, America's Allure Is Fading

By DAVID W. CHEN

HANGLE, China — His older brother was the pioneer, more than a decade ago. His son followed three years ago. As recently as last year, his daughter planned to join this exodus of thousands from Fujian Province who have gambled that the life of a smuggled immigrant in America would eclipse that of an impoverished native in China.

But she lost interest after her brother's experience.

"Life is much more difficult than he expected, so I regret sending him to America," said the father, Mr. Wang, who — like some others interviewed for this article — spoke on the condition that only his surname be used. "He is miserable. He says to me, `Why am I working so hard in America? I can get rich at home.' It's very different from the way it used to be."

Ten years ago this summer, human smuggling exploded into international consciousness when the Golden Venture, a decrepit freighter stuffed with 286 Chinese, most from the Changle area in southern China, ran aground off Queens, New York. Ten people died in the cold and pounding surf, and soon, the name Golden Venture became shorthand for a cruel world of exploitation of desperate people.

Today, the smuggling trade continues, though perhaps at a slower clip, people here say, costing $60,000 per head. But for the first time, many Fujianese feel less urgency about venturing abroad.

They have more options at home, with jobs available in small businesses, steel factories or construction sites. It is far more convenient and less troublesome, some people say, to make small money in the comfort of familiar surroundings, instead of relatively big money in the clutches of a lonely and inhospitable land.

Some smuggled Chinese are even leaving America as soon as they pay their debts, and without gaining permanent residency, because they want a less stressful life at home.

"America is no paradise," said one man surnamed Zheng, who returned to the village of Shengmei a few years ago. He described a seven-year odyssey that started in New York but took him to many other places. "It was the same routine every day for six or seven years," he droned. "Get up. Work for 16 hours. Go to bed. Get up again. I was a fool. A machine."

America is still in people's thoughts here. Of dozens of people interviewed in half a dozen villages around Changle, nearly everyone claimed to have at least one relative overseas, most in New York.

In small fishing villages like Houyu, where jobs are scarce, the urge to leave remains strong.

But in many places, that desire is now muted by considerations such as economics, family and safety. Some people attribute their reluctance to tighter security in China and America after the Sept. 11 attacks.

"The Golden Venture has defined the discourse for years, and people still have the same ideas about Chinese and smuggling," said Peter Kwong, director of the Asian-American studies program at Hunter College. But things have changed, he said, adding, "The economic incentive is no longer absolute."

The woman accused of being the chief smuggler, or "snakehead," behind the Golden Venture, Cheng Chui Ping, is on trial in New York. The lawyer who represented many of the immigrants, Robert E. Porges, is in jail, after admitting that he helped many of them concoct false stories of persecution to bolster their asylum cases. The ship itself is being used as an artificial reef about a mile off the coast of Boca Raton, Fla.

Changle, a county of about 650,000 people, has changed, too. Several years ago, the county seat, also named Changle, was a dusty, lethargic town with bleak prospects, said Mr. Kwong, who collaborated on a documentary film about Fujianese emigrants in the mid-1990's. Now, it is a bustling city crowned by new high-rise apartments, stylish new stores and a new boulevard, North Shiyang Street.

Changle is full of people, like Zhou Xueqing, whose attitudes toward emigration have changed. More than a decade ago, her husband went to New York to work as a cook, and he sends home a few hundred dollars a month. But he is depressed, and his health is deteriorating.

His hard life deterred their son from going to America. He went to Shanghai instead. He now runs a mobile phone business and earns $12,000 a year, a good income there.

"The average person doesn't want to be smuggled into America anymore," said Ms. Zhou, who works at a new bedding store. "The economy is so terrible there."

That view can also be heard on the busy streets of Jinfeng, another longtime starting point for illegal emigration. At her family's fashionable Wei Wei wedding store, Chen Meicun described a conundrum of yearning and conflict, risk and reward.

Ms. Chen, 21, said she once thought of joining her brother, who left 10 years ago for Peru. But she is loath to give up her job and the comforts of an upwardly mobile life.

"It's dangerous to go — look at what happened in England," she said, referring the deaths three years ago of 58 Chinese who were being smuggled in the back of a truck. "Every country has its good and its bad, so why should I leave?"

In village after village, people outlined the same choices. If they got a good job here, they would stay. If not, they would try to borrow enough money to leave. Not one person talked about politics or human rights here, or China's one-child policy. The issue was money.

In a small store in Tingjiang, across the Min River in Lianjiang County, questions about smuggling people into America prompted a lively discussion.

The owner, a 28-year-old woman surnamed Lin, said she wanted her only child, a 4-year-old boy, to study hard and get a job close to home. She could not bear the thought of him going to America. "Everyday life here is not too bad," she said. "Our country is developing very quickly."

One customer, playing cards with some underemployed friends under a creaky ceiling fan, disagreed. "Not everyone can afford to go, but everyone wants to go," he said.

The nearby town of Shengmei is the hometown of Ms. Cheng, the alleged Golden Venture mastermind, and she is revered there as a benevolent patron.

But it is also the home of Mr. Zheng — the man who called himself a fool for having gone to America. Mr. Zheng, 50, who holds a degree in marine biology from Xiamen University, said he had a miserable existence overseas. Though he was able to send home about $2,000 a year, he said he never laughed or smiled when he was in America.

His life now is not carefree. He has found only sporadic work, mainly in construction. But at least he can have tea with his friends, go for leisurely strolls and watch his son mature, day by day.

"You don't have to climb too high up the mountain — just climb to a place in the middle that's more suitable," he said. "If you make a lot of money but don't have the time to enjoy it, what's the point? Money isn't everything."

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company

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Kofi Annan dans la tourmente irakienne

LE MONDE | 05.09.03

Il a pleuré en apprenant la mort de son ami "Sergio". Deux semaines après l'attentat de Bagdad, Kofi Annan dit l'émotion de l'ONU et sa volonté de redonner un sens à la diplomatie.

Kofi Annan se trouvait sur une île en Finlande lorsqu'un coup de fil de New York lui a annoncé qu'un attentat avait été commis contre le siège de l'ONU à Bagdad. C'était une île d'un archipel finlandais, dont le nom, sûrement imprononçable de toute façon, lui échappe aujourd'hui. Un "endroit extraordinaire", dit-il, parce qu'il est "plein de petites îles, de pierres et de gens très calmes".

Le secrétaire général des Nations unies était en vacances et il pêchait. Il a un petit rire gêné rien que d'y penser. Oui, il pêchait. L'image est presque incongrue : Kofi Annan en tenue décontractée, en train de lancer sa ligne et d'attendre que ça morde. Sur la collection de photos de l'ONU, il lui arrive d'apparaître en chemise blanche, un jour de fête à Timor. En pull à col roulé, à l'ouverture des Jeux olympiques de Salt Lake City en 2002. Mais il porte généralement la tenue de secrétaire général ayant rang de premier ministre dans l'ordre protocolaire (avec aujourd'hui une colombe de la paix à la boutonnière). Il n'est pas homme à débroussailler son ranch devant les caméras. Ou à jouer avec son chien. Sait-on seulement s'il en a un ?

Pendant toutes les semaines précédentes, le secrétaire général n'avait pas chômé. Athènes, Amman, Maputo. Des conférences internationales, des interrogations sur le rôle de l'ONU. Du Liberia au Congo, les Nations unies étaient sur tous les fronts, dans un sursaut post-irakien. Le 23 juin, devant le World Economic Forum, réuni en Jordanie, Kofi Annan tenait un discours de visionnaire. "Je rêve d'un monde où tous les membres respecteraient les vues des autres et s'efforceraient en toute bonne foi de parvenir au consensus." Un monde où "l'idéalisme ne serait plus considéré comme de la naïveté, mais apprécié à sa juste valeur", disait-il.

Sur le dossier irakien, le Conseil de sécurité avait mis les bouchées doubles. Avant l'entrée en guerre, on avait parlé du chaos qui menaçait l'Irak de l'après-Saddam. On avait oublié. Personne n'avait envie d'être laissé de côté dans la reconstruction. Nommé le 22 mai, Sergio Vieira de Mello avait quatre mois pour réussir à imposer l'ONU.

Avant de partir pour la Scandinavie le 8 août, Kofi Annan avait eu une dernière téléconférence avec Sergio Vieira de Mello. La cellule Irak du secrétariat participait. On avait plaisanté. Les relations entre Paul Bremer, l'administrateur américain, et "Sergio" s'étaient nettement détériorées, raconte un participant. Kofi Annan avait demandé à son représentant de "tenir le fort".

Le fort tenait bon, du moins le croyait-on. Lundi 18 août, de son archipel finlandais, Kofi a encore appelé Sergio. Ils ont discuté de l'impact sur la population des sabotages de plus en plus énormes commis contre les infrastructures irakiennes. "Il était en forme", dit le secrétaire général. Depuis sa mort, les personnels de l'ONU se demandent s'il est vrai qu'il ne voulait pas aller en Irak et qu'on lui a forcé la main. "Au départ, répond Kofi Annan, on avait considéré plusieurs personnes. Moi-même j'estimais qu'il avait déjà une fonction au Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l'homme. Je ne voulais pas donner l'impression que les droits de l'homme avaient moins d'importance. Mais, évidemment, la situation en Irak était si grave qu'il fallait trouver quelqu'un qui aurait un impact dès son arrivée, quelqu'un qui ait suffisamment de talent pour mettre les choses sur les rails." Le diplomate "était un bon soldat", résume-t-il. "Il n'était pas demandeur", mais il n'a pas non plus refusé la mission.

C'est en Finlande, auprès de la présidente Tarja Halonen, que Kofi Annan et son épouse ont appris que Sergio Vieira de Mello n'avait pas survécu à l'attentat. Deux semaines ont passé. Le secrétaire général cherche des mots pour exprimer ce qu'il n'a pas spécialement envie de partager. Il parle de "l'inquiétude", du "choc", de la "colère".

"Ensuite, dit-il, il y a eu les tears." Il a dit "tears", faute de retrouver le mot larmes en français. La présidente finlandaise est allée chercher des mouchoirs en papier. Et elle lui a dit quelque chose qui l'a frappé, et peut-être soulagé. "Cela montre que vous n'avez pas perdu votre âme."

Comment ne pas se sentir responsable ? Même les diplomates du Conseil avouent s'être posé la question. "On a toujours ce sens de la responsabilité, dit doucement Kofi Annan. On se pose des tas de questions. Et si on ne lui avait pas demandé d'y aller ?" Il ajoute : "On aurait préféré un mandat plus clair, beaucoup plus précis, mais après la guerre, tout le monde voulait mettre les désaccords au second plan. On s'est mis d'accord sur un mandat qui donnait satisfaction, mais qui n'était pas optimal."

Aujourd'hui la hantise des personnels du siège est de se retrouver dans la même situation. Qu'on "mette du bleu", la couleur de l'ONU, sur l'opération de la coalition, et que les Nations unies ne constituent ni plus ni moins qu'une "stratégie de sortie" pour les Etats-Unis. "On va nous donner un rôle un tout petit peu plus grand, alors que nous nous rendons compte que nous ne pouvons rien faire", dit un responsable. Kofi Annan ne partage pas cette analyse. "La stratégie de sortie, c'est la fin de l'occupation", dit-il. Nous sommes mercredi 3 septembre. Il a reçu le matin même l'ambassadeur d'Islande, venu faire ses adieux, et la reine Noor de Jordanie. L'ambassadeur américain John Negroponte est aussi venu, ce qui n'était pas prévu, apporter le nouveau projet de résolution que les Etats-Unis entendent soumettre au Conseil de sécurité. Kofi Annan n'entend pas faire de commentaires, sinon pour répéter ses mises en garde précédentes : "S'il y a deuxième résolution, ça doit être clair." Et, comme il l'a dit la semaine précédente : "Le partage du fardeau ne peut s'effectuer sans un partage des responsabilités."

Connaissant la maison, il ne semble pas prévoir d'issue fulgurante à ce nouvel épisode. Il a d'ailleurs lancé l'idée d'une réunion le 13 septembre à Genève des ministres des affaires étrangères des cinq pays disposant d'un veto au Conseil (les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, la Russie et la Chine). Il pense qu'il ne faut pas attendre l'assemblée générale pour réunir les ministres et tenter de trouver un "dénominateur commun" entre ceux qui ne se sont pas réconciliés. Il pense aussi qu'il faut choisir la discrétion de Genève, plutôt que les effets médiatiques de New York, pour éviter d'afficher une nouvelle fois les divisions, ce qui nuit à l'ensemble de l'organisation. Ceux qui plaident pour une totale absence de mansuétude à l'égard des Américains se trompent. "Ils ont tendance à dire : Ils l'ont voulu, ils l'ont eu." Ce n'est pas exact. "La réalité, c'est : ils l'ont voulu. Nous l'avons tous", dit-il. Son message est nettement plus charitable, ou pragmatique : "On doit accepter que la guerre a été faite contre l'avis du Conseil. Et maintenant, il faut laisser les rancœurs et les divisions aux historiens et aux gens de Sciences-Po. Nous avons un très sérieux problème en Irak qui nous concerne tous."

Malgré sa faculté d'encaisser les flèches, "certaines vraiment très venimeuses", comme dit un proche, on sent qu'il a été touché par le ton peu sympathique de certains articles de la presse conservatrice américaine. En juillet, le New York Posts'est moqué de ses appels à envoyer des troupes américaines au Liberia, alors qu'il n'avait pas montré le même esprit batailleur à l'égard de l'Irak ("Commander Kofi Not"). "Je les avais avertis de faire attention de ne pas critiquer l'ONU de manière si violente et injuste, dit-il, parce qu'ils pourraient en avoir besoin rapidement. Et c'est là que nous sommes aujourd'hui. Les gens pensent souvent que l'ONU a de l'importance, surtout pour les petits pays. Mais même les grands ont besoin d'alliés, d'ordre, d'accepter un certain Etat de droit."

Depuis son élection en 1997, pour un premier mandat de cinq ans, Kofi Annan avait réussi le tour de force de rendre presque populaire aux Etats-Unis une organisation que Ronald Reagan avait totalement décrédibilisée aux yeux du public américain. Sur le circuit des conférences universitaires, il comptait dans les personnalités en vue.

Il avait noué des contacts au Congrès. Aux Jeux olympiques de Salt Lake City, Kofi et Nane étaient dans le même cercle d'invités de marque que les époux Bush. Une partie de l'Organisation vit mal d'avoir soudain chuté dans l'estime des Américains. Certains proches du secrétaire général craignent que n'aient été compromises les meilleures relations qu'ait eues l'ONU avec Washington depuis l'enthousiasme de 1946, lorsque Eleanor Roosevelt faisait partie de la délégation américaine.

En plein débat sur la guerre, début février, comme pour illustrer le grand écart permanent auquel il est soumis, Kofi Annan s'est rendu en Virginie, invité dans l'avion de Henry Kissinger, pour faire un discours dans la plus vieille université du pays, le William and Mary College de Williamsburg. Il y a défendu la Charte de l'ONU. Seule "la communauté internationale dans son ensemble" est en droit de considérer le bien-fondé d'une action militaire pour faire respecter les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, a-t-il dit. En aucun cas, "un Etat seul".

A l'opposé, les antiguerre, notamment dans le monde arabe, ne l'ont "pas entendu". Il a été critiqué pour n'avoir pas protesté assez fort. Il estime avoir dit "l'essentiel et le nécessaire". "Chaque mot que j'ai dit a été utilisé par l'un ou l'autre camp. Je n'aurais fait qu'aggraver les divisions." Il fallait aussi que quelqu'un puisse rester l'interlocuteur de tous et "travailler avec le camp de la guerre et le camp de la paix". En même temps, il a été atteint plusieurs semaines d'une laryngite qui l'a laissé pratiquement sans voix. "Les peuples se demandaient où il était. C'est pour cela qu'il était si mal", analyse aujourd'hui un diplomate. "C'est toujours le même piège : soit il casse les relations avec les Etats-Unis et l'Organisation n'existe plus. Soit il ne les casse pas et elle est critiquée dans le monde entier", résume un de ses collègues.

Au trente-huitième étage, Kofi Annan travaille à la hauteur des hélicoptères. Vu de son bureau, l'East River n'est plus qu'un filet d'eau, et FDR Drive, la voie rapide, un lent défilé d'escargots. Les bruits sont étouffés, l'ambiance feutrée. A 65 ans, Kofi Annan est le septième secrétaire général de l'Organisation et le premier qui soit issu des rangs du personnel. Il a quitté l'Afrique à 20 ans pour aller étudier l'économie à l'université Macalester du Minnesota. La Ford Foundation avait repéré ce jeune activiste étudiant originaire d'un pays en pleine effervescence indépendantiste. Entré au grade le plus bas au service du budget de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), il a toujours occupé des fonctions administratives. C'est l'Irak, en 1990, qui a donné un autre tournant à sa carrière, lorsqu'il a été chargé d'organiser le rapatriement des otages du Koweït. Après il a été de toutes les catastrophes, si l'on peut dire : Somalie, Rwanda, Bosnie... Le secrétaire général est d'une courtoisie parfaite, et il ne s'impatiente pas lorsque l'heure de l'entretien est depuis longtemps terminée et qu'on essaie encore de lui arracher un souvenir d'enfance au Ghana ou un détail sur le prêt sans intérêts que l'ONU espère malgré la conjoncture obtenir de Washington pour construire de nouveaux locaux (à l'image de celui qui avait été consenti il y a un demi-siècle pour bâtir l'immeuble actuel sur le terrain offert par Rockfeller). Kofi Annan n'irait pas jusqu'à dire que l'heure est grave ou que la survie de l'Organisation est en jeu. Mais il a écrit il y a plusieurs semaines aux chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement du monde pour leur demander de participer cette année à l'assemblée générale annuelle, le 23 septembre. On réfléchira au multilatéralisme et au sort d'une organisation internationale comme l'ONU dans un monde déséquilibré.

Plus de 80 d'entre eux ont répondu qu'ils viendraient. On parlera de la réforme. "Nous passons notre temps à parler de bonne gouvernance, de droits de l'homme, dit Kofi Annan. Il faudrait les pratiquer un peu chez nous aussi." Après les fastes du prix Nobel en 2001, son deuxième mandat avait commencé dans l'insouciance. Aujourd'hui, Kofi Annan se sent un peu seul pour affronter ce qui restera pour lui l'"annus horribilis" de l'ONU.

Corine Lesnes

• ARTICLE PARU DANS LE MONDE DU 06.09.03

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ANALYSE

La gauche au piège de l'extrême gauche

LE MONDE | 06.09.03

C'est de bonne guerre, la droite jubile. Victime depuis vingt ans du piège de l'extrême droite, elle rêve désormais de voir la gauche durablement enfermée dans un piège similaire et symétrique : celui d'une extrême gauche bouillonnante, voire conquérante, attractive sinon crédible, libre de ses réquisitoires contre les socialistes et leurs "reniements", bref assez séduisante pour entraîner une partie significative des électeurs traditionnels de la gauche parlementaire et empêcher cette dernière de reconquérir le pouvoir.

Ainsi le porte-parole du gouvernement, Jean-François Copé, feignait il y a peu, au lendemain du rassemblement du Larzac, de s'alarmer de cette "extrême gauche qui surfe sur des problèmes tout à fait légitimes pour essayer d'être l'opposition numéro un dans notre pays". Le député de Paris Claude Goasguen ajoutait, peu après : "C'est sûr que la gauche va connaître à son tour les mésaventures que nous a fait subir l'extrême droite." La menace est apparue assez sérieuse pour que bon nombre de caciques socialistes - de François Hollande à Laurent Fabius, en passant par Bertrand Delanoë ou Dominique Strauss-Kahn - aient jugé nécessaire de sonner le tocsin contre le "sectarisme" et l'"impuissance" congénitaux de l'extrême gauche.

Le parallèle qui s'esquisse entre la capacité de nuisance de l'extrême droite, hier, et celle de l'extrême gauche, demain, est-il fondé et recevable ? A première vue, non. Comment comparer, en effet, la machine politique et électorale construite depuis vingt ans par Jean-Marie Le Pen, avec la nébuleuse de l'extrême gauche, ses trois partis ou groupuscules trotskistes, sa mouvance altermondialiste, sa galaxie associative, ses méfiances enracinées, ses querelles ancestrales et ses chefs de file ou porte-parole aussi disparates qu'Arlette Laguiller, Olivier Besancenot ou José Bové ?

De même, comment comparer une extrême droite, dont l'étiage électoral depuis 1984 n'est jamais descendu en dessous de 9 % à 10 % des suffrages et qui a atteint ou dépassé la barre des 15 % en 1995, 1997 et 2002, avec une extrême gauche qui n'est réellement sortie de la marginalité électorale qu'au premier tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2002 (10,4 %) ? Dans un cas, la pression sur la droite est constante ; dans l'autre cas, la menace pour la gauche est restée jusqu'à présent exceptionnelle, même si l'effet en fut ravageur pour Lionel Jospin.

Comment comparer, enfin, deux forces dont les valeurs sont aux antipodes ? D'un côté, une extrême droite à forte charpente idéologique, xénophobe et nationaliste, inégalitaire et répressive. De l'autre, une extrême gauche porteuse d'une idéologie égalitaire et solidaire, universaliste et protectrice des droits de l'homme, mais dont l'électorat disparate est tiraillé entre la défense d'un communisme dogmatique, la recherche d'un trotskisme en mutation ou la redécouverte d'un anarcho-syndicalisme "new look".

Il n'empêche. La tectonique des plaques politiques qui a fait surgir le FN il y a vingt ans et qui fait émerger l'extrême gauche aujourd'hui obéit à des dynamiques politiques comparables. Dans les deux cas, les extrêmes se nourrissent de l'échec de leur camp d'origine (pour la droite) ou d'adoption (pour la gauche) et du désarroi politique et idéologique qui en résulte. La défaite de la droite en 1981, celle de la gauche en 2002, ont été vécues, symétriquement, comme la sanction des renoncements et des abandons dus à un trop long exercice du pouvoir.

Dans les deux cas, les extrêmes répondent à un besoin de réarmement idéologique, de radicalité retrouvée et assumée, de retour aux sources les plus anciennes - celles de la contre-révolution et du pétainisme pour le FN, celles de la révolution anticapitaliste pour l'extrême gauche. L'extrême gauche, aujourd'hui, se targue d'incarner la "vraie gauche" contre les dévoiements de la social-démocratie, comme le Front national, hier, prétendait exprimer la "vraie droite" face à un gaullisme dénaturé et à un giscardisme défait.

Et, dans les deux cas, cette pureté ou cette rigueur idéologiques exercent un redoutable effet déstabilisateur. Aux constantes tentations d'alliance - au moins locale - de la droite avec le Front national répondent aujourd'hui les tentations gauchistes qui traversent les Verts, les communistes, voire les minoritaires du Parti socialiste. La capacité d'intimidation des extrêmes n'a d'égale que la culpabilité éprouvée par les deux forces de gouvernement à l'idée de céder à leurs sirènes.

Enfin, et ce n'est pas leur similitude la moins saisissante, extrême gauche et extrême droite ont en commun leur capacité à mobiliser un électorat protestataire et populaire, en rupture avec les partis de gouvernement. On savait, depuis 1995, que le Front national est le premier parti ouvrier ; or son candidat a encore progressé dans l'électorat populaire en 2002, recueillant 24 % du vote des ouvriers et 23 % de celui des employés. Or, dans le même temps, les trois candidats d'extrême gauche ont recueilli 16 % du vote des ouvriers et de celui des employés. Le FN hier, les extrêmes gauches aujourd'hui ont donc su attirer ce "vote de crise", où se réfugient principalement les Français modestes, désabusés ou révoltés et qui ne croient plus ni aux projets ni aux promesses des partis de gouvernement.

LA "FRANCE DES QUATRE"

Le piège existe donc bien pour la gauche. Potentiellement, il est même plus inquiétant pour elle que ne l'est celui du FN pour la droite parlementaire. En effet, à l'exception de 1981, la gauche est structurellement minoritaire dans l'électorat français ; elle ne peut espérer l'emporter sans le rassemblement sans failles de toutes ses forces. La concurrence de l'extrême gauche, même marginale, peut aisément lui être fatale.

Il reste que la droite aurait tort de jouer avec le feu et de se réjouir trop vite des déboires éventuels de la gauche. Pour deux raisons. En premier lieu, elle reste elle-même sous la menace d'une extrême droite qui n'a jamais été aussi présente ni pressante. Non seulement le Front national a réalisé son meilleur score en avril 2002 (16,8 %), mais il est engagé, avec la montée en puissance de Marine Le Pen et son entreprise de "dédiabolisation" de l'extrême droite, dans une mue qui peut le rendre plus dangereux encore.

En second lieu, il ne devrait pas échapper à l'actuelle majorité que cette "France des quatre" - deux forces de gouvernement encadrées par deux extrêmes - confirme, chaque jour davantage, le discrédit grandissant des gouvernants, de quelque camp qu'ils soient. Longtemps, la France n'a été confrontée qu'à un seul parti hors système : pendant un quart de siècle (1947-1972), ce fut le PCF qui polarisait le vote protestataire ; pendant deux décennies (1983-2002), c'est le FN qui a pris le relais et exercé cette fonction tribunicienne. Or on assiste, aujourd'hui, à la conjugaison de deux forces hors système - le FN d'un côté, les extrêmes gauches de l'autre -, en phase avec bon nombre des anxiétés françaises mais en rupture avec tout projet de gouvernement. Dans cette redoutable tenaille, la gauche pourrait ne pas être la seule perdante.

Gérard Courtois

• ARTICLE PARU DANS LE MONDE DU 07.09.03

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POINT DE VUE

Mes jours et mes nuits à Cancun

par Pascal Lamy

LE MONDE | 04.09.03

"Sept jours, sept nuits à Cancun..." Non, il ne s'agit pas de tourisme, mais de la réunion des ministres du commerce des membres de l'OMC, qui aura lieu du 10 au 15 septembre, au Mexique. C'est une étape importante pour réussir le "cycle du développement", cette grande négociation sur le commerce international que nous avons lancée à Doha, en novembre 2001.

Elle n'en marque pas la fin - et pour cause ! - mais le rendez-vous intermédiaire chargé de faire le point, de s'assurer que la fusée est sur la bonne trajectoire pour atteindre son objectif à la fin 2004, date prévue de la fin de ce cycle. Pour rappel, le programme de Doha est étoffé : 20 sujets, relatifs à la mise à jour des règles du commerce international, discutés par 146 Etats, avec pour objectif premier le développement.

Commissaire européen chargé du commerce mondial, je représenterai, avec mon collègue Franz Fischler, chargé de l'agriculture, les 15 Etats membres de l'Union européenne, et les 10 futurs adhérents, pour défendre nos intérêts et notre vision de la mondialisation, maîtrisée et encadrée par des règles du jeu identiques pour tous. Bardés d'une telle ambition, nous n'aurons à coup sûr pas le temps de profiter des joies balnéaires si l'on imagine ce que serait notre semainier thématique.

Agriculture. Les échanges agricoles sont l'un des dossiers les plus"chauds" de ce cycle, j'en conviens. Notre objectif est simple : concilier l'ouverture des marchés et le maintien de zones rurales viables, partout dans le monde.
L'UE a fait le choix politique de soutenir son agriculture car ce n'est pas une activité économique comme les autres. Elle remplit bien d'autres rôles que celui de produire ; elle participe de la préservation de l'environnement, de la sécurité alimentaire, du bien-être animal, etc.

L'UE est pourtant, ici ou là, accusée de "protectionnisme déguisé". Vraiment ? Laissons parler les chiffres : l'UE est le premier importateur de produits agricoles au monde (près de 60 milliards d'euros en 2001). Nous importons à nous seuls autant de produits des pays en voie de développement que les Etats-Unis, le Japon, le Canada et l'Australie réunis... Grâce aux nombreuses préférences accordées aux pays en développement, nos droits de douane effectifs sont de l'ordre de 10 %.

Cela n'a pas empêché l'UE de mettre sur la table, en janvier dernier, des propositions ambitieuses. Nous avons proposé de réduire nos droits de douane de 36 %, d'abaisser les subventions aux exportations de 45 % et de diminuer les aides qui perturbent les échanges de plus de 55 % !

La récente réforme de la politique agricole commune va dans le même sens : elle permet de continuer à soutenir l'agriculture tout en perturbant moins les échanges. L'UE peut se targuer auprès de ses camarades à l'OMC d'avoir fait son devoir pour réduire l'impact des subventions sur une concurrence loyale. Elle peut sans rougir défendre ses priorités : enjoindre aux autres la même discipline et promouvoir les produits européens de qualité grâce aux indications géographiques. Le 13 août, Européens et Américains avons passé la vitesse supérieure en présentant une initiative conjointe sur l'agriculture. Ce texte doit permettre d'achever ces négociations car il répond à la fois à nos attentes et à celles de nos partenaires.

Marchandises. Petit travelling arrière : à l'origine étaient les biens industriels. Les premiers cycles de négociations commerciales portaient essentiellement sur la circulation des marchandises et l'abaissement des droits de douane. Ce processus étant sur de bons rails, il porte moins au débat aujourd'hui. Et pourtant, les produits industriels représentent plus de 70 % des exportations des pays en voie de développement. D'où leur insistance pour que nos droits de douane diminuent davantage. Suivant l'esprit de Doha, l'UE a, là encore, proposé à ses partenaires de jeu une offre substantielle visant à comprimer tous les droits de douane dans une fourchette étroite pour éviter, par exemple, les pics tarifaires sur certains produits. Elle a même suggéré la suppression des restrictions à l'exportation pour les matières premières et l'abaissement jusqu'à zéro, pour tout le monde, des droits de douane sur les produits du textile et de l'habillement, principales productions exportées des pays en voie de développement. Les Européens n'y perdront pas au change : l'augmentation des échanges favorise la croissance.

Services. Autre gros morceau des négociations commerciales, le commerce des services. De quoi s'agit-il ? De ce qui fait aujourd'hui l'essentiel de nos économies et entre dans le secteur dit tertiaire : informatique, conseil, banque, assurance, distribution, transport, tourisme, aide aux entreprises, etc.
Les services sont le secteur le plus dynamique de l'économie européenne. Ils représentent deux tiers du produit intérieur brut (PIB) européen et deux tiers des emplois en Europe, soit 110 millions. Mais ils sont également essentiels pour l'économie des autres pays (environ 50 % du PIB des pays en développement). Fait marquant mais trop méconnu : parmi les 40 premiers exportateurs mondiaux de services, 15 sont des pays en voie de développement.

Pourtant, la part qu'ils occupent dans les échanges internationaux ne reflète toujours pas le rôle essentiel et croissant qu'ils jouent dans l'économie mondiale. Différentes barrières à l'entrée continuent d'entraver le commerce des services et d'agir comme un frein sur la croissance économique. L'ouverture de ces marchés est une demande pressante des pays en développement. Elle doit se faire de façon encadrée pour garantir à la fois la croissance, la justice et la solidarité au niveau mondial. Tous les services ne sont cependant pas concernés. Je rappelle que l'UE a exclu des discussions l'éducation, la santé et la culture. Tous trois participent en effet de notre modèle européen de société et ne sont pas des marchandises comme les autres.

Médicaments. Faire en sorte que les malades frappés en particulier par les trois grandes maladies transmissibles - sida, tuberculose et malaria - aient accès aux médicaments semble une évidence. Pourtant, ce dossier a longuement divisé les membres de l'OMC, les Etats-Unis étant les plus réticents à une solution.
C'est un problème urgent et nous ne pouvons le laisser de côté. Il s'agit de faire une exception aux règles de la propriété intellectuelle, qui protègent légitimement la recherche pharmaceutique, en autorisant les pays en développement à produire ou à acheter des médicaments génériques à moindre coût. La question qui restait en suspens concernait les pays en développement qui n'ont pas les capacités de produire ces médicaments et doivent donc importer, si besoin est, des génériques (médicaments sans brevet). A la veille de Cancun, un accord a finalement été dégagé !

C'est sans conteste un signe fort de notre capacité collective à réguler la mondialisation. C'est la preuve la plus parlante que ces négociations - malgré leur rythme forcément trop lent - produisent des résultats concrets en faveur des pays qui en ont besoin. Personne n'a pour l'heure proposé de solution plus efficace.

Sujets dits de "régulation". Derrière cette appellation exotique se cachent quatre sujets de discussion moins "sexy" mais non moins essentiels : les investissements, la concurrence, la facilitation des échanges et la transparence dans les marchés publics. L'objectif est de définir autant que possible les règles dans ces domaines. Pour uniformiser ? Non, pour établir une plate-forme minimale de règles du jeu identiques à tous, et par là non discriminatoires, transparentes et prévisibles. Et qui pourraient avantageusement remplacer des traités bilatéraux toujours inégaux pour les pays en développement. Mais l'UE n'a pas une vision maximaliste : nous avons conscience de l'effort supplémentaire que demande cet exercice aux pays en développement. C'est pourquoi l'approche suivie est celle du "chacun à son rythme suivant ses capacités", tout en assurant une aide technique à ces pays pour l'adaptation ultérieure de leurs législations internes.

Environnement. Un autre aspect nouveau des négociations commerciales, et pour lequel l'UE a mis son poids dans la balance : intégrer les considérations environnementales dans les discussions sur le commerce. Les échanges ont en effet un impact sur l'environnement. Si nous voulons être fidèles à nos engagements répétés dans divers sommets en matière de développement durable, nous devons agir en ce sens à l'OMC aussi. L'UE mène la danse pour encourager l'OMC à prendre en compte les règles environnementales dans ses décisions. Nous avons déjà parcouru un bout du chemin malgré la réticence de certains qui y voient, là encore, un protectionnisme déguisé. Nous devons nous assurer d'arriver à bon port avant la fin des négociations.

La cloche du dernier tour. On saura s'il faut, ou non, que sonne la cloche qui annonce le dernier tour du parcours. Une grande négociation est comme une course de fond : on ne fait un bon temps que si le rythme à mi-parcours est suffisant. Après le faux départ de Seattle, le vrai démarrage de Doha, Cancun nous dira si nous sommes au train pour finir sur un résultat ambitieux pour 2004.

par Pascal Lamy

Pascal Lamy est commissaire européen au commerce.

• ARTICLE PARU DANS LE MONDE DU 05.09.03

Sábado, Setembro 06, 2003

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Blown Coverage

Why doesn't the California media give Bustamante the Schwarzenegger treatment?

by Jill Stewart
The New Republic - 09.05.03

You'd hardly know it from the simpering coverage by political reporters who typify the sad state of journalism in California, but recall candidate Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante is proposing fixes that polls suggest are horribly divisive and not at all what voters have in mind. Yet as I watch the deepening media bitterness toward Arnold Schwarzenegger for failing to sit down for one-on-one interviews and for missing Wednesday's too-safe debate, I see that the journalistic herd moving to protect its natural ally--the Democrat Bustamante--as it prepares for a classic pack journalism stampede.

Poor Schwarzenegger. The signs are everywhere.

Bustamante wants to toss out California's much-cherished Proposition 13--at least the half that keeps commercial property taxes from skyrocketing. He claims that'll stop "skyscrapers" from shirking their fair share of the tax burden. But in truth, Bustamante's plan to grab $3 billion in taxes will also hit California's struggling mom-and-pop stores and ubiquitous immigrant-owned shopping strips. Incredibly, the media is virtually silent on Bustamante's controversial plan. Instead, they've repeatedly pummeled Schwarzenegger because his advisor, billionaire Warren Buffett, merely suggested Proposition 13 might deserve a fresh look.

I marvel, too, over the protective media glow that has encircled Bustamante ever since he refused, in a written response to the Los Angeles Times several days ago, to support a cap on Sacramento's overspending.

The left-leaning Democrats who control the legislature, and were largely put into office by government employee unions that want to grow their departments like fungus, show no signs of halting a spending spree that exploded under Governor Gray Davis. Compliments of California's livid taxpayers, for instance, you can still get free chiropractic and dental care for your kids even if you earn up to $38,000 per year. And not one state worker, out of roughly 230,000, has yet been laid off to help solve the state's $38 billion budget shortfall.

Bustamante opposes spending caps by claiming that more state spending helps grow California's economy. That's a debatable proposition. But what isn't debatable is how the lavishly-spending state legislature can and does help screw up parts of the economy.

A case in point, which Bustamante cheered in Wednesday's first gubernatorial debate, is California Senate Bill 2, which forces businesses with as few as 20 workers to pay for employee health care. If approved, it would be the closest thing to socialism to become law in a generation. If California's walking dead media had been conscious while SB 2 and other dreadful bills fermented in backrooms this month, the Sacramento Bee wouldn't have been one of the state's only papers to report on the bill. As Democratic TV analyst Susan Estrich, commenting on the scads of foolish bills being rushed to Davis before a legal deadline next week, said on KABC TalkRadio: "What is happening now up in Sacramento, and the fact that there is a recall--these two things are not a coincidence. ... You can't blame the recall on Darrell Issa anymore."

If only the California media had a clue. Instead, they think the big story is that Arnold isn't talking to them. In Fresno, at a mobbed Schwarzenegger appearance, one peeved Los Angeles Times reporter finally got called on by Schwarzenegger--and asked Schwarzenegger when he was going to answer questions. At Wednesday's debate in Walnut Creek, media organizers planned to punish Schwarzenegger for declining to participate by displaying an empty chair. They put the chair away when Schwarzenegger rightfully complained they were editorializing.

Reporters say it's the public's right to know that fuels their anger. That's a crock. If the lazy California media were motivated by the public's right to know, major newspapers would not have resoundingly failed to dig into the budget crisis while Davis was running for reelection. As we now know, former chief state economist Ted Gibson and others showed Davis figures last fall indicating that stock market revenues had dried up and that the budget the legislature was contemplating at the time would put the state many, many billions in the hole. But, Gibson says, Davis refused to even discuss the depressing new data. That would have been an easy story for the media to nail, with rumors swirling all over the capitol about a major spin underway to mask the size of the upcoming deficit.

If journalists gave a rip about the public's right to know, the media also wouldn't have failed (with rare exceptions) to detail outrages such as Davis's decision to take a pass on California's $12 billion Big Tobacco lawsuit windfall in exchange for a quickie $4 billion loan to plug the egregious hole. Nor would the media have meekly accepted Davis's untruths about the size of the deficit. After Gibson and others alerted him to the looming crisis, Davis continued to publicly cite the far rosier "official" revenue figures from May, right up to his November election. Most reporters just laughed at Republican candidate Bill Simon's estimate of a deficit greater than $20 billion. A few days after Davis was reelected, he admitted the new deficit was $21 billion. Then, a few weeks later, Davis said it was actually greater than $35 billion. Had journalists cared about the public's right to know about that, Davis probably would not be governor today.

I want Schwarzenegger to give in-depth interviews as much as the next journalist. But it's clear that the media is much more interested in a giant sob session than it is in policy details. We're talking about some very ego-bruised journalists here. After Schwarzenegger entered the race, the herd chattered on about what fun it was going to be. But now their key source of amusement refuses to play.

Boo hoo.

Jill Stewart writes a syndicated column about California politics.

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washingtonpost.com

Powell and Joint Chiefs Nudged Bush Toward U.N.

By Dana Milbank and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post - September 4, 2003

On Tuesday, President Bush's first day back in the West Wing after a month at his ranch, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell walked into the Oval Office to present something close to a fait accompli.

In what was billed as a routine session, Powell told Bush that they had to go to the United Nations with a resolution seeking a U.N.-sanctioned military force in Iraq -- something the administration had resisted for nearly five months. Powell, whose department had long favored such an action, informed the commander in chief that the military brass supported the State Department's position despite resistance by the Pentagon's civilian leadership. Bush and his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, whose office had been slow to embrace the U.N. resolution, quickly agreed, according to administration officials who described the episode.

Thus was a long and high-stakes bureaucratic struggle resolved, with the combined clout of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department persuading a reluctant White House that the administration's Iraq occupation policy, devised by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, simply was not working.

The effort by Powell and the military began with a tête-à-tête in Qatar on July 27 between the top U.S. commander in Iraq and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was furthered in a discussion between the Joint Chiefs chairman and Bush at the president's ranch on Aug. 8. And it was cemented in the past 10 days after Powell's deputy, Richard L. Armitage, went public with the proposal.

For an administration that prides itself on centralized, top-down control, the decision to change course in Iraq was uncharacteristically loose and decentralized. As described by officials in the White House, State Department and Pentagon, the White House was the last to sign on to the new approach devised by the soldiers and the diplomats. "The [Pentagon] civilians had been saying we didn't need any more troops, and the military brass had backed them," a senior administration official said. "Powell's a smart guy, and he knew that as soon as he had the brass behind him, that is very tough to ignore."

For months, Rumsfeld and his civilian aides had successfully resisted wishes of the State Department and the British government for U.N. help, arguing that U.S. troops, and foreign troops assembled outside U.N. authority, could get the job done. But this time was different, because the situation in Iraq made Rumsfeld's view look increasingly doubtful to the White House. A wave of attacks -- at the Jordanian Embassy, U.N. headquarters and Najaf -- convinced many officials that there were not enough U.S. troops in Iraq to maintain order. Nor were there enough foreign troops or American reserves to replace 40,000 troops Rumsfeld planned to bring home.

While the administration's plan to go to the Security Council surfaced publicly only in recent days, the seeds of the effort can be found in a trip by Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. While Myers was in the area, he had a 90-minute private session in Qatar on July 27 with Gen. John Abizaid, the new chief of the U.S. Central Command and the top commander in Iraq, who pressed him to accelerate efforts to bring in more international force.

According to one senior defense official, who spoke on the condition that he not be quoted by name, Myers came home determined "to get some international troops in here to do things international troops are good at doing -- de-mining, peacekeeping." Myers was convinced international peacekeeping forces were necessary to free U.S. forces to go on the offensive against remnants of Saddam Hussein's Baathist Party. Back in the United States, the official said, the usually deferential Myers "took that message reasonably strong to the president," when he visited Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Tex., early last month with Rumsfeld and others.

Abizaid, unusual for a field commander, also talks frequently with Powell, though it could not be determined whether they coordinated their efforts. But, about the same time as Myers went to Bush, State Department officials started to put pen to paper on the draft of a proposed resolution in early August. The department had long favored such an action but was waiting until the right time to make its case to Bush. After the bombing of U.N. headquarters, officials saw an opportunity. Though "it looked a little ghoulish" to act immediately, as one senior official put it, they began to prepare.

While the brass and the diplomats worked their cases, events made Rumsfeld's strategy seem untenable to many administration officials. The ongoing violence in Iraq gave new attention to Democratic presidential candidates' claims that Bush was mishandling the situation there -- just in time for the traditional, post-Labor Day kickoff of the presidential election season.

Concern was furthered by a Congressional Budget Office report that the U.S. Army could not sustain troop strength in Iraq. Bush's Iraq administrator, L. Paul Bremer, came to Washington with a stark message for Bush about his need for resources. And Bush, who is expected to speak to the United Nations in three weeks, needed a clear policy.

"You find an interesting correlation with the political calendar," said Leon Fuerth, who was then-Vice President Al Gore's national security adviser. "They were saying everything is under control and people were not buying it. There became a pressure to change course."

A diplomat at the United Nations who closely followed the evolution of the U.S. position said the "spark" for this week's decision was a meeting between Powell and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan at the United Nations on Aug. 21, two days after the car-bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. The diplomat said Annan made it clear in that meeting that "the best feasible option was a multinational force under U.S. command," a notion that Powell believed he could sell in part because of the turn of events in Iraq. The idea of a U.S.-led multinational coalition with a U.N. mandate was broached publicly for the first time on Aug. 26 by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage.

The White House was taken by surprise. "The floating of this idea was not expected by the White House," a senior administration official said. "It is very rare that an idea catches the White House by surprise, then is so quickly adopted."

Bush's national security officials, such as Rice and deputy Stephen J. Hadley, were aware of the long-standing disagreement between the State and Defense departments on a U.N. role but did not take sides because Powell was keeping his powder dry.

Sources said White House officials were still throwing cold water on the U.N. resolution when Bush returned from Texas over the weekend. Just a few hours before Bush's meeting with Powell, White House press secretary Scott McClellan stood at his lectern and distanced Bush from what McClellan called "one of a number of ideas," saying the United Nations was already playing the role that Bush had promised.

In fact, Armitage's public remarks had the effect of galvanizing the military brass. It was the kind of solution -- U.N. military help under U.S. authority -- the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been seeking. "It was Armitage's statement that gave it traction," a Pentagon official said.

Once the Joint Chiefs made their concerns known, the long-standing opposition by the civilian part of the Pentagon to a greater role for the United Nations began to crumble, allowing Powell to tell Bush he had a good consensus for the draft document he presented to Bush on Tuesday. "The Joint Chiefs are the new factor here," a senior administration official said. Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently began lobbying key members of the administration to support a resolution.

Sources said there was a continued lack of receptivity, however, in the office of one of Rumsfeld's top aides, Douglas J. Feith, the undersecretary of defense for policy. Feith and his staff "didn't want foreign help" and argued "we can do it better than anybody else; leave us alone," a senior Pentagon official said.

Feith rejected that characterization as "made up out of whole cloth" and said yesterday that for weeks he had championed the idea of going to the United Nations.

At the same time, it was becoming obvious that the administration could not recruit enough foreign troops without U.N. support. "The U.S. had gone around knocking on just about every possible door looking for money and troops, and they got the same answer everywhere: We need some kind of a new resolution," a diplomat at the United Nations said.

"All these strands came together and reached a critical mass," the diplomat said. "The coalition authority is broke. They need bodies. The administration finally understands that you can't have reconstruction while destruction is still going on."

While Bush finished his vacation, the State Department speeded up planning for the circulation of a resolution. At the end of August, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said he had been working with Powell on a new resolution over the previous two weeks. Then, this week, Powell made the final pitch to Bush.

People close to the administration said the Joint Chiefs and Powell (a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs) did not win a bureaucratic battle as much as Rumsfeld lost one. "Rumsfeld lost credibility with the White House because he screwed up the postwar planning," said William Kristol, a conservative publisher with close ties to the administration. "For five months they let Rumsfeld have his way, and for five months Rumsfeld said everything's fine. He wanted to do the postwar with fewer troops than a lot of people advised, and it turned out to be a mistake."

Pentagon spokesmen said there would be no official Defense Department comment for this report.

Staff writers Mike Allen, Vernon Loeb, Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin contributed to this report.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

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Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot

By Al Franken

After Delacorte asked me to write a book on politics, my very first creative act was coming up with the title, Rush Limbaugh Is a Big Fat Idiot and Other Observations. I thought the title, aside from the obvious advantage of being personally offensive to Limbaugh, would sell books. Let me explain why: It makes fun of Rush Limbaugh by pointing out that he is a big lardbutt.

Confident that I was now on my way to a bestseller, I took some time off and went to Florida with my wife and kids. But when I returned and sat down to work, it became immediately apparent that the "title tail" was going to wag the "content dog." That is to say, I'd actually have to write about Rush Limbaugh.

Which, of course, meant I'd have to listen to him on radio, read his books, and watch his TV show. "How much am I getting paid for this?" I asked myself.

I was not, after all, totally unfamiliar with Limbaugh. He is the king of talk radio, with an estimated twenty million listeners in a given week. I had been one of those twenty million a while back, listening to him spew about "feminazis" and their "women-as-victim" ideas. Limbaugh was railing about how feminists believe that all heterosexual sex is rape, which, I admit, is a belief that's very hard to defend. The thing is, though, I know a lot of women, almost all of whom consider themselves feminists, and I know only one who actually holds this belief. And we've been married nearly twenty years.

Limbaugh expanded . . . to TV a few years back, and I had seen his show a number of times. It's been a considerable success, though I think it was ultimately a terrible mistake for Limbaugh because we finally got to see his audience. During the shows I watched, Limbaugh presented, in a deliberately misleading way, disinformation that was devoured whole by a studio audience of rabid--but extraordinarily straightlaced--right-wing yahoos. These are the fans who voluntarily - hell, gleefully - call themselves "dittoheads" in honor of their ability to blindly and uncritically agree with everything that comes out of Limbaugh's mouth.

The first time I watched the show was in October, 1992, about a month before the election. President Bush had been on Larry King Live the night before, and during the interview Bush had said that he was bothered by Clinton's actions during the Vietnam War: "Maybe I'm old-fashioned, Larry," he said. "But to go to a foreign country and demonstrate against your own country, when your sons and daughters are dying halfway around the world? I'm sorry, I--I just don't like it. I think it is wrong." To anybody watching Larry King, as I happened to be, it was an attack on Clinton's patriotism, and the next day several newspapers ran headlines saying as much.

So Rush shows this headline from the New York Times that reads: BUSH ASSAILS CLINTON'S PATRIOTISM DURING VIETNAM WAR PROTEST ERA. Then he starts whining about the liberal media. "He didn't assail Clinton's patriotism. . . . Now let's roll Bush on Larry King Live last night, and you be the judge. Did he attack Governor Clinton's patriotism here?"

Then he runs a twenty-second clip from a totally different part of the interview. Limbaugh comes back: "I didn't hear one assault on patriotism. I didn't hear one word or syllable questioning Bill Clinton's patriotism. . . . We'll be back in just a moment." Cut to: a hundred and twenty idiots in bad suits applauding wildly.

Subsequent viewings pretty much confirmed that the point of Rush's show is to punish you for actually knowing anything.

Back to my still-unwritten book. Catchy title in hand, I braced myself for an entire season of such punishment. I would spend the summer absorbing Limbaugh-three hours a day, five day-s a week, listening to conservatism's most powerful (not to mention obnoxious) voice. I am, after all, a professional.

Rush Limbaugh, Radio Icon and Staunch Defender of Constitutional Rights for Neckwear

Spring 1995. I go to the Wiz and buy a boom box for my office at home. I pour a fresh glass of iced tea, settle into a comfortable chair, flip on WABC, and tune in to the first installment of what will be approximately one hundred and eighty hours of listening pleasure. And at 12:15, Rush is peeved:


Let me give you another example here of the press. This may be as good as an example as I could cite to show you how it is that the left has stereotypes. Now you people all know that I have introduced a new line of neckwear, commonly known as ties. And that I have, right now, we've got four styles, four designs that are out there, and we are always working on more. . . .
I was about to learn that the liberal media had deliberately misrepresented his mail-order tie collection:


. . . So I'm at the United Press International wire and I'm, reading the People section and there's a story there about the new Rush Limbaugh No Boundaries tie collection, and would you like to hear it described? "Limbaugh's ties are as conservative as he is. Blue, white, red, and gray stripes." My friends. The last thing my ties are is conservative. That's why we're calling it No Boundaries! These are . . . the last thing in the world these ties would be described as would be conservative. There's not one stripe! On any of the ties! . . .
And he won't stop. He's just going on and on about these ties. So I flip around the dial, catch an inning of the Mets game, and then come back to Rush. And his brutally defamed ties:


. . . I mean, that is another example of the stereo types that the left, and I am including the press in this, have about conservatives. . . . It was my wife Marta who came up with the whole concept, to tell you the truth, of No Boundaries. And she said no themes on these ties, no ties to issues, no ties to politics . . . These are going to be gorgeous, beautiful ties that anybody would want to wear to make themselves look better. And they are. And there's not one stripe! Not one stripe! On any tie! . . .
Time for another iced tea. I head to the kitchen, wander around the apartment a bit. Back to my office and . . . the vicious media smear campaign directed against Rush's ties:


. . . They could have called me first to ask me about it. They could have called and said, "Hey, we hear you got some new ties out; we'd like to see them; we're going to write a story." . . .
Back to the fridge. I root around for some leftovers. Make a sandwich. Read the sports page. The Twins are having a pretty tough year. Back to the ties, which--near as I can tell--have now had their civil rights violated by the hounds of attack journalism:


. . . In this battle for the soul of democracy, it is more and more clear that the press, which has a designed Constitutional role, can't be trusted, cannot be counted on. My gosh, if the press, which Constitutionally is protected so as to get the truth, is this far off as often as they are, then is it any wonder that there is a new media led by me, America's truth detector? No, there's not. Quick break. Back to the phones in just a moment . . .
Only a hundred and seventy-nine hours to go. Hmmm. Maybe it would be okay if I just . . . sampled . . . the show. Every now and then.

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche--and Limbaugh

After the tie episode, I sent my research assistant Geoff to Barnes and Noble, where he found a paperback of Limbaugh's bestseller See, I Told You So.

Picking up a new book is always exciting to a curious person like myself, but I became especially jazzed by Rush's introduction: "Prepare your mind to be challenged as it has never been challenged before." Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, now Limbaugh.

By Chapter Two, I had learned the key to Limbaugh's success. "My show works because people are tired of being insulted elsewhere on the radio or TV dial. They enjoy listening to someone who respects their intelligence."

Fortunately, I was soon treated to an example of just how much respect Rush has for his readers' intelligence:


With the exception of the military, I defy you to name one government program that has worked and alleviated the problem it was created to solve. Hhhmmmmmmm? I'm waiting. . . . Time's up.
This got me thinking. Now, I'm no expert on government. And besides, I'm a liberal. So my naming ten or twenty of the hundreds of successful government programs isn't going to impress anyone. Hell, I think Rural Electrification worked! That's how big a dumbass liberal I am! So instead, I called a few bona fide conservatives and asked them to name a few:(*)


1. George F. Will (grim-faced conservative columnist)-rural Electrification, the Interstate Highway System ("the most successful public works program in the history of the world"). "The federal government has been tremendously successful in disseminating health and safety information, for example, about smoking and seat belts."

2. Rep. John Kasich (R-Ohio; boyishly rugged, straight-talking chairman of the House Budget Committee)--National Institutes of Health, Youth Summer Jobs Program.

3. Rep. Bob Dornan (R-calif.; Republican candidate for president; crazy homophobe)--The F.A.A., lighthouses, federal penitentiaries ("We gotta keep those guys locked up").

4. Arianna Huffington (enigmatic, Greek-born, Cambridge-educated socialite; conservative commentator; fund-raiser for Newt Gingrich; wife of unsuccessful California Senate candidate Michael Huffington)--The National Park System, guaranteed student loans, aid to Greece.

5. Ben Stein (conservative columnist for the American Spectator; former Nixon speechwriter; noted character actor, famous for role as the "Bueller, Bueller, Bueller" teacher in Ferris Bueller's Day Off) - Social Security. Medicare. Head Start. Food Stamps. "The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the most wildly successful government program in the history of man."

6. Richard Viguerie (former publisher the Conservative Digest, archconservative direct-mail pioneer)--Public libraries, the F.B.I., the G.I. Bill.
So, is Limbaugh that out of touch with conservatives like Will, Kasich, and Dornan? Or does he just take his readers to be complete morons? Hhhmmmmmmm? I'm waiting. . . . Time's up!

Didiots-Limbaugh's Legion of Fans

Now, am I saying that dittoheads are ignoramuses? No. I don't need to. Listen to Kathleen Hall Jamieson of the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Pennsylvania:

We just concluded a study of 360 people, whom we watched watch the health care reform debate for nine months. And at the end of that period, we took the people who said they relied on talk radio, and by this, we mean primarily Rush Limbaugh. . . . And we asked them how well informed they felt. . . .Of all the people we watched, they said they were the best informed. And of all the people we watched, they were the least informed.
What a surprise, huh? Limbaugh listeners thought they were the best informed, and yet were the least informed.

How is such a thing even measured? Well, like all the other people studied, talk radio listeners were asked questions of "objective fact" such as: "Which groups (the elderly, poor, middle class, etc. "are most likely to be uninsured?" The Limbaugh listeners were "highly likely" to give an incorrect answer such as "the elderly" who, of course, are all covered by Medicare.

But why would people so woefully lacking in the basic facts of an issue think they were the best informed? Social scientists call the phenomenon "pseudo-certainty." I call it "being a fucking moron."(*)

Limbaugh and Women--A Pathetic Story

It's safe to say that most of Limbaugh's fact-challenged dittoheads are men. Limbaugh has tapped into the resentments of "the angry white male," which are quite legitimate. I mean, if you think about it, what chance for advancement have white men really had in this country?

Limbaugh, himself, seems to have a problem with women. He has been married three times. Personally, I am not one for psychoanalyzing public figures. I wouldn't, for example, attempt to create a psychological construct to explain why a desperately insecure man would weigh three hundred pounds and have difficulty sustaining intimate relationships. Psychobabble mumbo jumbo doesn't interest me, and I would never suggest that a difficult separation from the primary love object at an early age might cause a man to hate women and look to food as a substitute for the mother's teat. Instead I thought it might be fun (after all, that's what this is about), to juxtapose some of Rush's own words with those of people who know him. (I saw some of this stuff on Frontline.)

Rush: Feminism was established so that unattractive, ugly women could have easy access to the mainstream of society.

Millie Limbaugh, Mother: No. He did not date in high school.

Rush: If you want a successful marriage, let your husband do what he wants to do.

David Limbaugh, Brother: I don't think he would have chosen to break up either marriage. I think it was the choice of both of his ex-wives. . . . Women, especially young women, don't want guys to be sedentary.

Rush (Writing to a woman on E-mail): I remain in an interminable funk, no end in sight-listless, uninspired, and self-flagellating.

Hazel Staloff (The woman): I thought, "What a sad thing to write, and to write to somebody you didn't even know." Later I came to realize that it was probably his way of trying to attract a woman. You know, for a woman to read, "Rush has no friends" and for her to respond, "Let me make it better for you."

—from Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot and Other Observations by Al Franken. Copyright © Al Franken, 1999. All rights reserved. This excerpt, or any parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without permission.

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...decididamente, en Irak las cosas están muy peores de lo que muchos piensan...


Museum planes stripped

MUSEUM aircraft are being stripped of parts to keep 50-year-old Canberra spy jets flying in Iraq, it was revealed yesterday.

Spares were “cannibalised” from redundant Canberras on display in the RAF Museum at Cosford, near Wolverhampton, and flown to Basra.

Other pieces were taken from mothballed aircraft held in storage at RAF Marham, Norfolk, and RAF Shawbury, Shropshire.

An RAF spokesman said: “This solution to aircraft parts provision offers good value-for-money for the taxpayer. The so-called ‘robbing’ of aircraft parts from one aircraft to use on another is a very sensible, long established, and routine procedure. Due account is given to safety.”

(C) The Sun

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PATRIOT Act Forges Unlikely Alliance

By Paul Rush
Insight Magazine

Charles Dudley Warner's timeless observation that "politics makes strange bedfellows" arose from his unlikely alliance with author Harriet Beecher Stowe in support of abolitionism, despite their dramatically different religious beliefs. Recent alignment of the political right and the political left on civil-liberties issues in a post-9/11 America again proves Warner's axiom. This time, antiterrorism legislation has galvanized the two political polar opposites and, according to their leaders, the solidity of their union is resolute indeed.

Defense of civil liberties has been a rallying cry of American liberals almost as long as limiting government has been the raison d'être of the conservative movement. Now, amid the flurry of antiterrorist proposals, acts, executive orders, notices and legislation - which both sides see as threats to infringe the privacy rights and other civil liberties of all Americans - both ends of the political spectrum again are being reminded of what they have in common.

On Aug. 19, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, opened a monthlong speaking tour defending the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act" (USA PATRIOT Act) against its critics. "We have used the tools provided in the PATRIOT Act to fulfill our first responsibility to protect the American people. ... We have used these tools to provide the security that ensures liberty," he said. But critics noted that his rhetoric and pragmatic arguments sidestepped the issue of whether the principles of the PATRIOT Act gave the government a broad grant of authority that could be misused.

On March 12, ABC News reporter Dean Schabner presented a news piece titled "Conservative Backlash" detailing the joint efforts of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Conservative Union (ACU) to protest many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and a possible follow-up law, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (dubbed PATRIOT II). Rare, indeed, was the news that these two anchors of the political dichotomy had managed to find so much common ground during an administration that has presided over one of the most philosophically divided U.S. Senate sessions in modern times.

From its founding as part of a socialist united front, the ACLU always has sought to maximize the reach of the ever-growing blanket of an autonomous "right to privacy," as evidenced today by its support for abortion on demand, abolition of sodomy laws and advocacy for homosexual rights. The ACU, the oldest grass-roots conservative lobbying organization in the country, is motivated more by its historical desire to limit the scope of the national government to the level prescribed in the 10th Amendment.

These motives, divergent as they might seem when traced to their historical antecedents, nevertheless have led both groups to resist the antiterrorism laws as unconstitutional - the ACLU on grounds that these laws violate the "right to privacy," and the ACU on grounds of the need to limit federal authority, a limitation which it views as the heart of the Constitution. ACU Chairman David Keene says that the ACLU's objections to many of the antiterrorism schemes are broader than those of the ACU. The rights of resident aliens feature prominently in the ACLU's objections to the PATRIOT Act, Keene says, whereas the ACU focuses more specifically on the rights of U.S. citizens.

Both the left and right make slippery-slope arguments, noting that in times of crisis the U.S. government tends to justify lowering constitutional safeguards against intrusions by the government to protect U.S. citizens. Both warn, however, that many of the provisions found in these bills allow the government to prosecute citizens for activities other than terrorist-related crimes. If, for example, roving wiretaps are used to investigate potential terrorist-related activities (an action allowable under the USA PATRIOT Act), any evidence of other potential criminal activities by U.S. citizens uncovered in this process may be used to prosecute them. ACLU spokesman Timothy Edgar emphasizes that the USA PATRIOT Act and related measures tend to overreach their mandates. One of the current goals of both the ACLU and the ACU is to limit the scope of these bills to actual terrorist-related activities.

Of special concern to the ACLU, says Edgar, is the "delayed-notice provision," also known as the "sneak and peek." The USA PATRIOT Act grants government officials the power to conduct searches of a suspect's home without prior notification, as typically would be required. Edgar worries that granting such powers to fight terrorism may, by familiar use, put at risk the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizure. The ACU and many other conservative organizations make the same argument.

One difference between left and right is their view of why the Department of Justice has insisted on broadening its authority. Keene and others on the right say that U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and others in his department are not evildoers out to roll back the protections of the Constitution, but are instead loyal Americans who may have fallen victim to "mission creep." They say the increasingly broad powers Congress is authorizing result from a poor definition of terrorism in many of the controversial bills. The USA PATRIOT Act, for example, repeatedly uses the phrase "terrorist activities" to define the term "terrorist activities." To some, this is reminiscent of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's famous definition of pornography: "I know it when I see it." Many on both the left and right tell Insight they worry that vague legislative definitions inevitably will lead to inconsistent use of the term and, therefore, to an unpredictable application.

Edgar argues that the USA PATRIOT Act is not really about terrorism but "is a laundry list of powers that came labeled in a package of terrorism-prevention methods." When asked how Congress managed to pass a bill that has generated such intense opposition from ideologues of both parties, Edgar explains that the bill was passed in an "attractive political environment" shortly after Sept. 11, 2001. "It was too rushed. Practically no one in the Senate had any clue what was in the USA PATRIOT Act before it was voted on," he says, echoing Insight's observation made at that time [see "Police State," Dec. 3, 2001].

Keene agrees that following the 9/11 attacks the Senate was under tremendous pressure from the public to pass strong antiterrorism legislation. As a result, he says, the Department of Justice proposed the USA PATRIOT Act, nearly all of which consisted of provisions that had been defeated by Congress during the Clinton administration. "They just threw it all together and passed it. Few, if any, in Congress even read it. The theory now is that any proposal emphasizing the words 'security' or 'terror' is golden," he says.

According to Keene, such behavior hardly is surprising. "The history of individual rights in America is such that, whenever there is a crisis, the public is willing to listen to leaders who tell them that they need to trade freedom for security. And the public will buy it," he says. Infringements on the people's liberties then gradually accumulate, which is why the ACU is focused on adding sunset provisions to eliminate the act's most intrusive aspects as soon as the emergency has ended.

The left and the right agree on this, and several other proposals have attracted vehement criticism from many in both parties. Among these are the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), an airline-security proposal that would snoop into public and private databases for information on all travelers, and the Terrorist Information Awareness (TIA) proposal developed at the Pentagon by the recently resigned Adm. John Poindexter.

CAPPS II is a computerized system that gathers information on each passenger from a variety of sources (including credit reports), compiles it and generates a rating for each passenger to determine the likelihood that this passenger might be affiliated with terrorists. The ACLU and the ACU both believe that "this is a perfect example of mission creep," says Edgar. "The original goal of securing our airlines has become such that, under CAPPS II, every single traveler will come under a cloud of suspicion."

The TIA Act originally appeared under a similar moniker as the Total Information Awareness Act. The TIA essentially is a data-mining infrastructure that would allow the government to monitor all transactions made by all Americans in all databases around the world. Under this plan, the Pentagon could track the shopping habits, travel patterns, medical records and finances of every American resident. This proposal, like CAPPS II, was roundly rejected by civil libertarians on both the left and right; since that time the Pentagon has modified its proposal by changing its name. The word "Terrorist" has been substituted for "Total," presumably in the hope that the public and those in Congress will view the measure as a necessity for the prevention of terrorism.

Until fairly recently, both the ACU and the ACLU have come under fire by many in their own organizations for their willingness to reach across traditional ideological barriers. The ACLU, for example, was blasted by longtime supporters for its decision to hire Republican former congressman Bob Barr of Georgia as a consultant to find common ground with conservatives on issues relating to privacy. In defense, the ACLU declares, "We are very protective of our alliance with the American Conservative Union. We need to work together to have a prayer of success."

Indeed, both unions likely will seek to strengthen their alliance in the future, as they may join forces again to battle what in their minds are such imminent threats to civil liberties as CAPPS II, TIA, PATRIOT II or the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement.

Paul Rush is a summer reporter for Insight.

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PEGGY NOONAN

September 11 Today
Looking back, and around, 21 months after the day that changed (nearly) everything.

Seems like a long time ago; seems like yesterday. Actually we're in that awkward period of historical memory in which it's too soon to see 9/11 as History Channel fodder and too late to feel it freshly. It was 21 months ago; life moves on; we don't talk about "Where were you?" anymore.

I.

And yet it seems that everything that is happening in the world right now is related to 9/11. President Bush meeting with the new head of the Palestinian Authority and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, in Aqaba, Jordan: That is about 9/11. Mr. Bush had no intention of going into the long chain yank that is the Mideast . . . until 9/11, which forced the toppling of the Afghan regime, the U.S. counterassault on the Taliban and terrorism, the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam. All of that came out of 9/11. And Mr. Bush is pushing a Mideast roadmap because he knows what all but children know: 9/11 grew from, was gestated in, the intense hatred of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

President Bush as nation-builder: That is 9/11. He suggested when he ran for president that international nation-building efforts were presumptuous and perhaps hubristic. All changed. Mr. Bush speaking last week to Arab leaders when he didn't know his remarks were being broadcast, speaking of what "Almighty God" expects of them. That kind of fervor--a lot of that is traceable to 9/11. In an interview two years ago, three months before 9/11, Mr. Bush told me of his recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Their talk had turned personal, and Mr. Bush spoke of his understanding of the nature of Christianity and the meaning of the cross. Mr. Bush shows the impulses of the evangelist: When something has saved your life and has the added benefit--you are certain--of being true, you want to spread it around. But those impulses have come out more publicly, less embarrassedly or self-protectively, after 9/11.

The debate over the Homeland Security bill, its cost and adequacy: That is 9/11. Fears that the pursuit of security will result in a constriction of civil liberties: 9/11. The rift with France and Germany, the closer ties with Britain, the official return of members of the military as figures of respect, the resurgence of American patriotism: 9/11.

The bloated national budget: 9/11, for two reasons. One is the cost of security and defense, the other is Mr. Bush's reluctance to fight Congress on spending when an overall preservation of national political unity is his goal. The Republican Party staying institutionally mum on budget deficits: 9/11. Whatever it takes in an age of rising stakes.

September 11 made it impossible for the American government and America's elected leaders--all of them, senators, congressmen--to continue to ignore the issue of weapons of mass destruction and those who would wield them. "It doesn't show up in the polls," a Democratic legislator told me in 1997, explaining why President Clinton did not seriously address it.

It's in the polls now.


II.

Who would have thought that day, who knew that morning, at 8:45 a.m., for instance, three minutes before the first plane struck, that everything in our lives was about to change? "Expect the unexpected," as the journalist Harrison Salisbury said near the end of his life when asked what he'd learned from history.
Someone speaking of the shooting of John Kennedy once mused on the moment when the trigger was pulled and the bullet launched. That instant bore so much weight of subsequent history that it became a kind of warp in time, a moment whose weight was so much greater than its duration that it was like a collapsing of time, a special lost moment of gravity, like a black hole in space.

I think 9/11 is like that. People are still changing from it, being affected by it. There are those who have wondered why 9/11 was so cataclysmic, compared with, say, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, by essentially the same people with the same motives and intentions. One answer is that on 9/11 almost 3,000 people died, and eight years before the number was six. Another is that the Pentagon was in effect bombed on 9/11. America has two great capitals, of politics and money, and both capitals were hit.

Both answers are true. But truest I think is this: The first time the towers didn't fall. The first time they were damaged and unchanged. They were blacked with smoke. We cleaned them up.

We took it--some of us anyway--as a warning. The second time--that was not a warning. That was war. And a war shockingly begun, with two great skyscrapers crumbling to the ground.

That was then. New York is rebuilding downtown and taxing uptown. The national story line has changed from trauma to triumph, at least right now. A new Mideast peace process has begun, and there is perhaps a sense that this time, after all we and others have been through the past two years, maybe it can be got as right as . . . well, as it can be got.


III.

New Yorkers themselves have returned to fighting with each other. There's been plenty to fight over, from the new taxes to the mayor's new antismoking laws, which are not so much a policy as a non sequitur--New York is in crisis, let's ban smoking! And there is the declaration of the organizations of World Trade Center families-of-victims that there should not be a statue of the firemen at the WTC memorial site. Three hundred forty-three of them died that day, but to commemorate their sacrifice would be "hierarchical." They want it clear that no one was better than anyone else, that all alike were helpless, victims.
But that is not true; it is the opposite of the truth. The men and women working in the towers were there that morning, and died. The firemen and rescue workers--they weren't there, they went there. They didn't run from the fire, they ran into the fire. They didn't run down the staircase, they ran up the staircase. They didn't lose their lives, they gave them.

This is an important disagreement, because memorials teach. They teach the young what we, as a society, celebrate, hold high, honor. A statue of a man is an assertion: It asserts that his behavior is worthy of emulation. To leave a heroic statue of the firemen out of a WTC memorial would be as dishonest as it would be ungenerous, and would yield a memorial that is primarily about victimization. Which is not what that day was about, as so much subsequent history attests.

But go tell some New Yorkers. They're all arguing. September 11 didn't change everything.

Ms. Noonan is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal and author of "A Heart, a Cross, and a Flag," published today by Wall Street Journal Books/Simon & Schuster. You can buy it from the OpinionJournal bookstore. Her weekly column returns in the fall.

Copyright © 2003 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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Spain arrests Al-Jazeera reporter

From CNN Madrid Bureau Chief Al Goodman

MADRID, Spain (CNN) --Police have arrested a correspondent for Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV at his home in southern Spain accusing him of having links to the al Qaeda terrorist group.

Authorities believe that Tayseer Allouni -- who interviewed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden nearly two years ago -- provided support for two suspected members of the group, a Spanish court official told CNN.

Allouni is expected to appear in Madrid's National Court on Monday, the official said.

The arrest warrant was issued by Judge Baltasar Garzon, who has been leading the investigation in Spain into alleged members of al Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups, Allouni's wife Fatima Hamed Layasi told CNN.

The warrant accuses Allouni of having links to "important members" of al Qaeda and using his status as a journalist to get an interview with Osama bin Laden in October 2001, Hamed Layasi said in an telephone interview from her home in Granada, where the arrest took place.

Authorities believe Allouni provided support for Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, alias Abu Dahdah, who was arrested on November 13, 2001, and is thought to have been an al Qaeda ringleader in Spain, the court official said.

Allouni is also suspected of providing aid to Mohamed Bahiah, alias Abu Kalhed, a suspected al Qaeda fugitive thought to be in Afghanistan, the official said.

Several dozen suspected Islamic terrorists have been detained in Spain since the September 11, 2001 attacks, and some have been linked to that attack. Others have been released on bail or for lack of evidence. No one has gone to trial.

"A group of police came with a judicial order at noon today and searched the home," for about three hours while Allouni was present, before taking him away, Hamed Layasi said.

Asked if the charges were true, Hamed Layasi said, "Surely it is not so."

She said she would soon hire a lawyer to defend her husband.

Hamed Layasi said the warrant says that Allouni "took advantage of his status as a journalist to get an interview on October 7, 2001 with Osama bin Laden, where bin Laden called for a holy war."

Police took several books and newspapers in Arabic and two computers -- one belonging to Allouni's son and the other belonging to a production company that Hamed Layasi identified as Andalusia Directo, which she said provides programming to Al-Jazeera.

Since the September 11 attacks, Al-Jazeera has aired numerous video and audio recordings purported by have been made by bin Laden.

(C) CNN

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Egyptian tries to kidnap American to help Iraq

Thu Sep 4,12:00 PM ET

CAIRO (Reuters) - Egypt has detained a hotel cleaner who tried to kidnap an American tourist in hope of forcing U.S. troops to leave Iraq (news - web sites), security sources say.

"It's clear he's not mentally balanced," one security official said on Thursday.

The 20-year-old cleaner was arrested on Wednesday after threatening a group of U.S. tourists with a knife at the hotel where he worked, and then trying to kidnap one of them.

The security sources said the Egyptian had wanted to hold the man hostage to force U.S. troops out of Iraq, but had not considered what he would do if his demands were not met.

A Cairo state prosecutor ordered his detention for an additional four days on Thursday, pending investigations, and referred him to hospital for medical checks.

The U.S embassy said it could not confirm the incident.

Egypt, which relies heavily on tourism for hard currency revenues, opposed the U.S.-led war against Iraq, and thousands of people took to the streets in protest when the war began.

Egypt's tourism industry, which had slowly recovered from shocks such as militant violence in the 1990s and the aftermath of September 11, suffered a heavy blow in the Iraq war, but has been recovering in recent months.

(C) REUTERS

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THE PHOTO STORY...

Bombing of Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf

By Jamal A. Wilson
Electronic Iraq, 30 August 2003

On 29 August 2003, immediately after Friday prayers at Imam Ali Mosque in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf, a car bomb was detonated that killed the most prominent Shiite leader, Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, and 81 other worshipers. Photographer Jamal A. Wilson was in front of the mosque as the bomb went off. This photo story for eIraq reproduces a series of Jamal's photos that convey the panic and horror of the event.

See pictures and story here

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The Falseness of Anti-Americanism

Pollsters report rising anti-Americanism worldwide. The United States, they imply, squandered global sympathy after the September 11 terrorist attacks through its arrogant unilateralism. In truth, there was never any sympathy to squander. Anti-Americanism was already entrenched in the world's psyche—a backlash against a nation that comes bearing modernism to those who want it but who also fear and despise it.

By Fouad Ajami

“America is everywhere," Italian novelist Ignazio Silone once observed. It is in Karachi and Paris, in Jakarta and Brussels. An idea of it, a fantasy of it, hovers over distant lands. And everywhere there is also an obligatory anti-Americanism, a cover and an apology for the spell the United States casts over distant peoples and places. In the burning grounds of the Muslim world and on its periphery, U.S. embassies and their fate in recent years bear witness to a duality of the United States as Satan and redeemer. The embassies targeted by the masters of terror and by the diehards are besieged by visa-seekers dreaming of the golden, seductive country. If only the crowd in Tehran offering itstired rhythmic chant "marg bar amrika" ("death to America") really meant it! It is of visas and green cards and houses with lawns and of the glamorous world of Los Angeles, far away from the mullahs and their cultural tyranny, that the crowd really dreams. The frenzy with which radical Islamists battle against deportation orders from U.S. soil— dreading the prospect of returning to Amman and Beirut and Cairo— reveals the lie of anti-Americanism that blows through Muslim lands.

The world rails against the United States, yet embraces its protection, its gossip, and its hipness. Tune into a talk show on the stridently anti-American satellite channel Al-Jazeera, and you'll behold a parody of American ways and techniques unfolding on the television screen. That reporter in the flak jacket, irreverent and cool against the Kabul or Baghdad background, borrows a form perfected in the country whose sins and follies that reporter has come to chronicle.

In Doha, Qatar, Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably Sunni Islam's most influential cleric, at Omar ibn al-Khattab Mosque, a short distance away from the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, delivers a khutba, a Friday sermon. The date is June 13, 2003. The cleric's big theme of the day is the arrogance of the United States and the cruelty of the war it unleashed on Iraq. This cleric, Egyptian born, political to his fingertips, and in full mastery of his craft and of the sensibility of his followers, is particularly agitated in his sermon. Surgery and a period of recovery have kept him away from his pulpit for three months, during which time there has been a big war in the Arab world that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq with stunning speed and effectiveness. The United States was "acting like a god on earth," al-Qaradawi told the faithful. In Iraq, the United States had appointed itself judge and jury. The invading power may have used the language of liberation and enlightenment, but this invasion of Iraq was a 21st-century version of what had befallen Baghdad in the middle years of the 13th century, in 1258 to be exact, when Baghdad, the city of learning and culture, was sacked by the Mongols.

The preacher had his themes, but a great deal of the United States had gone into the preacher's art: Consider his Web site, Qaradawi.net, where the faithful can click and read his fatwas (religious edicts)— the Arabic interwoven with html text— about all matters of modern life, from living in non-Islamic lands to the permissibility of buying houses on mortgage to the follies of Arab rulers who have surrendered to U.S. power. Or what about his way with television? He is a star of the medium, and Al-Jazeera carried an immensely popular program of his. That art form owes a debt, no doubt, to the American "televangelists," as nothing in the sheik's traditional education at Al Azhar University in Cairo prepared him for this wired, portable religion. And then there are the preacher's children: One of his daughters had made her way to the University of Texas where she received a master's degree in biology, a son had earned a Ph.D. from the University of Central Florida in Orlando, and yet another son had embarked on that quintessential American degree, an MBA at the American University in Cairo. Al-Qaradawi embodies anti-Americanism as the flip side of Americanization.

A NEW ORTHODOXY

Of late, pollsters have come bearing news and numbers of anti-Americanism the world over. The reports are one dimensional and filled with panic. This past June, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press published a survey of public opinion in 20 countries and the Palestinian territories that indicated a growing animus toward the United States. In the same month, the BBC came forth with a similar survey that included 10 countries and the United States. On the surface of it, anti-Americanism is a river overflowing its banks. In Indonesia, the United States is deemed more dangerous than al Qaeda. In Jordan, Russia, South Korea, and Brazil, the United States is thought to be more dangerous than Iran, the "rogue state" of the mullahs.

There is no need to go so far away from home only to count the cats in Zanzibar. These responses to the United States are neither surprising nor profound. The pollsters, and those who have been brandishing their findings, see in these results some verdict on the United States itself— and on the performance abroad of the Bush presidency— but the findings could be read as a crude, admittedly limited, measure of the foul temper in some unsettled places. The pollsters have flaunted spreadsheets to legitimize a popular legend: It is not Americans that people abroad hate, but the United States! Yet it was Americans who fell to terrorism on September 11, 2001, and it is of Americans and their deeds, and the kind of social and political order they maintain, that sordid tales are told in Karachi and Athens and Cairo and Paris. You can't profess kindness toward Americans while attributing the darkest of motives to their homeland.

The Pew pollsters ignored Greece, where hatred of the United States is now a defining feature of political life. The United States offended Greece by rescuing Bosnians and Kosovars. Then, the same Greeks who hailed the Serbian conquest of Srebrenica in 1995 and the mass slaughter of the Muslims there were quick to summon up outrage over the U.S. military campaign in Iraq. In one Greek public opinion survey, Americans were ranked among Albanians, Gypsies, and Turks as the most despised peoples.

Takis Michas, a courageous Greek writer with an eye for his country's temperament, traces this new anti-Americanism to the Orthodox Church itself. A narrative of virtuous and embattled solitude and alienation from Western Christendom has always been integral to the Greek psyche; a fusion of church and nation is natural to the Greek worldview. In the 1990s, the Yugoslav wars gave this sentiment a free run. The church sanctioned and fed the belief that the United States was Satan, bent on destroying the "True Faith," Michas explains, and shoring up Turkey and the Muslims in the Balkans. A neo-Orthodox ideology took hold, slicing through faith and simplifying history. Where the Balkan churches— be they the Bulgars or the Serbs— had been formed in rebellion against the hegemony of the Greek priesthood, the new history made a fetish of the fidelity of Greece to its Orthodox "brethren." Greek paramilitary units fought alongside Bosnian Serbs as part of the Drina Corps under the command of indicted war criminal Gen. Ratko Mladic. The Greek flag was hoisted over the ruins of Srebenica's Orthodox church when the doomed city fell. Serbian war crimes elicited no sense of outrage in Greece; quite to the contrary, sympathy for Serbia and the identification with its war aims and methods were limitless.

Beyond the Yugoslav wars, the neo-Orthodox worldview sanctified the ethnonationalism of Greece, spinning a narrative of Hellenic persecution at the hands of the United States as the standard-bearer of the West. Greece is part of NATO and of the European Union (EU), but an old schism— that of Eastern Orthodoxy's claim against the Latin world— has greater power and a deeper resonance. In the banal narrative of Greek anti-Americanism, this animosity emerges from U.S. support for the junta that reigned over the country from 1967 to 1974. This deeper fury enables the aggrieved to glide over the role the United States played in the defense and rehabilitation of Greece after World War II. Furthermore, it enables them to overlook the lifeline that migration offered to untold numbers of Greeks who are among the United States' most prosperous communities.

Greece loves the idea of its "Westernness"— a place and a culture where the West ends, and some other alien world (Islam) begins. But the political culture of religious nationalism has isolated Greece from the wider currents of Western liberalism. What little modern veneer is used to dress up Greece's anti-Americanism is a pretense. The malady here is, paradoxically, a Greek variant of what plays out in the world of Islam: a belligerent political culture sharpening faith as a political weapon, an abdication of political responsibility for one's own world, and a search for foreign "devils."

Lest they be trumped by their hated Greek rivals, the Turks now give voice to the same anti-Americanism. It is a peculiar sentiment among the Turks, given their pragmatism. They are not prone to the cluster of grievances that empower anti-Americanism in France or among the intelligentsia of the developing world. In the 1920s, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk gave Turkey a dream of modernity and self-help by pointing his country westward, distancing it from the Arab-Muslim lands to its south and east. But the secular, modernist dream in Turkey has fractured, and oddly, anti-Americanism blows through the cracks from the Arab lands and from Brussels and Berlin.

The fury of the Turkish protests against the United States in the months prior to the war in Iraq exhibited a pathology all its own. It was, at times, nature imitating art: The protesters in the streets burned American flags in the apparent hope that Europeans (real Europeans, that is) would finally take Turkey and the Turks into the fold. The U.S. presence had been benign in Turkish lands, and Americans had been Turkey's staunchest advocates for coveted membership in the EU. But suddenly this relationship that served Turkey so well was no longer good enough. As the "soft" Islamists (there is no such thing, we ought to understand by now) revolted against Pax Americana, the secularists averted their gaze and let stand this new anti-Americanism. The pollsters calling on the Turks found a people in distress, their economy on the ropes, and their polity in an unfamiliar world beyond the simple certainties of Kemalism, yet without new political tools and compass. No dosage of anti-Americanism, the Turks will soon realize, will take Turkey past the gatekeepers of Europe.

WE WERE ALL AMERICANS

The introduction of the Pew report sets the tone for the entire study. The war in Iraq, it argues,"has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans" and "further inflamed the Muslim world." The implications are clear: The United States was better off before Bush's "unilateralism." The United States, in its hubris, summoned up this anti-Americanism. Those are the political usages of this new survey.

But these sentiments have long prevailed in Jordan, Egypt, and France. During the 1990s, no one said good things about the United States in Egypt. It was then that the Islamist children of Egypt took to the road, to Hamburg and Kandahar, to hatch a horrific conspiracy against the United States. And it was in the 1990s, during the fabled stock market run, when the prophets of globalization preached the triumph of the U.S. economic model over the protected versions of the market in places such as France, when anti-Americanism became the uncontested ideology of French public life. Americans were barbarous, a threat to French cuisine and their beloved language. U.S. pension funds were acquiring their assets and Wall Street speculators were raiding their savings. The United States incarcerated far too many people and executed too many criminals. All these views thrived during a decade when Americans are now told they were loved and uncontested on foreign shores.

Much has been made of the sympathy that the French expressed for the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks, as embodied by the famous editorial of Le Monde's publisher Jean-Marie Colombani, "Nous Sommes Tous Américains" ("We are all Americans"). And much has been made of the speed with which the United States presumably squandered that sympathy in the months that followed. But even Colombani's column, written on so searing a day, was not the unalloyed message of sympathy suggested by the title. Even on that very day, Colombani wrote of the United States reaping the whirlwind of its "cynicism"; he recycled the hackneyed charge that Osama bin Laden had been created and nurtured by U.S. intelligence agencies.

Colombani quickly retracted what little sympathy he had expressed when, in December of 2001, he was back with an open letter to "our American friends" and soon thereafter with a short book, Tous Américains? le monde après le 11 septembre 2001 (All Americans? The World After September 11, 2001). By now the sympathy had drained, and the tone was one of belligerent judgment and disapproval. There was nothing to admire in Colombani's United States, which had run roughshod in the world and had been indifferent to the rule of law. Colombani described the U.S. republic as a fundamentalist Christian enterprise, its magistrates too deeply attached to the death penalty, its police cruel to its black population. A republic of this sort could not in good conscience undertake a campaign against Islamism. One can't, Colombani writes, battle the Taliban while trying to introduce prayers in one's own schools; one can't strive to reform Saudi Arabia while refusing to teach Darwinism in the schools of the Bible Belt; and one can't denounce the demands of the sharia (Islamic law) while refusing to outlaw the death penalty. Doubtless, he adds, the United States can't do battle with the Taliban before doing battle against the bigotry that ravages the depths of the United States itself. The United States had not squandered Colombani's sympathy; he never had that sympathy in the first place.

Colombani was hardly alone in the French intellectual class in his enmity toward the United States. On November 3, 2001, in Le Monde, the writer and pundit Jean Baudrillard permitted himself a thought of stunning cynicism. He saw the perpetrators of September 11 acting out his own dreams and the dreams of others like him. He gave those attacks a sort of universal warrant: "How we have dreamt of this event," he wrote, "how all the world without exception dreamt of this event, for no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of a power that has become hegemonic . . . . It is they who acted, but we who wanted the deed." Casting caution and false sympathy aside, Baudrillard saw the terrible attacks on the United States as an "object of desire." The terrorists had been able to draw on a "deep complicity," knowing perfectly well that they were acting out the hidden yearnings of others oppressed by the United States' order and power. To him, morality of the U.S. variety is a sham, and the terrorism directed against it is a legitimate response to the inequities of "globalization."

In his country's intellectual landscape, Baudrillard was no loner. A struggle had raged throughout the 1990s, pitting U.S.-led globalization (with its low government expenditures, a "cheap" and merciless Wall Street-Treasury Department axis keen on greater discipline in the market, and relatively long working hours on the part of labor) against France's protectionist political economy. The primacy the United States assigned to liberty waged a pitched battle against the French commitment to equity.

To maintain France's sympathy, and that of Le Monde, the United States would have had to turn the other cheek to the murderers of al Qaeda, spare the Taliban, and engage the Muslim world in some high civilizational dialogue. But who needs high approval ratings in Marseille? Envy of U.S. power, and of the United States' universalism, is the ruling passion of French intellectual life. It is not "mostly Bush" that turned France against the United States. The former Socialist foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, was given to the same anti-Americanism that moves his successor, the bombastic and vain Dominique de Villepin. It was Védrine, it should be recalled, who in the late 1990s had dubbed the United States a "hyperpower." He had done so before the war on terrorism, before the war on Iraq. He had done it against the background of an international order more concerned with economics and markets than with military power. In contrast to his successor, Védrine at least had the honesty to acknowledge that there was nothing unusual about the way the United States wielded its power abroad, or about France's response to that primacy. France, too, he observed, might have been equally overbearing if it possessed the United States' weight and assets.

His successor gave France's resentment highly moral claims. Villepin appeared evasive, at one point, on whether he wished to see a U.S. or an Iraqi victory in the standoff between Saddam Hussein's regime and the United States. Anti-Americanism indulges France's fantasy of past greatness and splendor and gives France's unwanted Muslim children a claim on the political life of a country that knows not what to do with them.

THE BURDEN OF MODERNITY

To come bearing modernism to those who want it but who rail against it at the same time, to represent and embody so much of what the world yearns for and fears— that is the American burden. The United States lends itself to contradictory interpretations. To the Europeans, and to the French in particular, who are enamored of their laïcisme (secularism), the United States is unduly religious, almost embarrassingly so, its culture suffused with sacred symbolism. In the Islamic world, the burden is precisely the opposite: There, the United States scandalizes the devout, its message represents nothing short of an affront to the pious and a temptation to the gullible and the impressionable young. According to the June BBC survey, 78 percent of French polled identified the United States as a "religious" country, while only 10 percent of Jordanians endowed it with that label. Religious to the secularists, faithless to the devout— such is the way the United States is seen in foreign lands.

So many populations have the United States under their skin. Their rage is oddly derived from that very same attraction. Consider the Saudi realm, a place where anti-Americanism is fierce. The United States helped invent the modern Saudi world. The Arabian American Oil Company— for all practical purposes a state within a state— pulled the desert enclave out of its insularity, gave it skills, and ushered it into the 20th century. Deep inside the anti-Americanism of today's Saudi Arabia, an observer can easily discern the dependence of the Saudi elite on their U.S. connection. It is in the image of the United States' suburbs and urban sprawl that Saudi cities are designed. It is on the campuses of Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford that the ruling elite are formed and educated.

After September 11, 2001, the Saudi elite panicked that their ties to the United States might be shattered and that their world would be consigned to what they have at home. Fragments of the United States have been eagerly embraced by an influential segment of Saudi society. For many, the United States was what they encountered when they were free from home and family and age-old prohibitions. Today, an outing in Riyadh is less a journey to the desert than to the mall and to Starbucks.
An academic in Riyadh, in the midst of an anti-American tirade about all policies American, was keen to let me know that his young son, born in the United States, had suddenly declared he no longer wanted to patronize McDonald's because of the United States' support of Israel. The message was plaintive and unpersuasive; the resolve behind that "boycott" was sure to crack. A culture that casts so long a shadow is fated to be emulated and resented at the same time. The United States is destined to be in the politics— and imagination— of strangers even when the country (accurately) believes it is not implicated in the affairs of other lands.

In a hauntingly astute set of remarks made to the New Yorker in the days that followed the terrorism of September 11, the Egyptian playwright Ali Salem— a free spirit at odds with the intellectual class in his country and a maverick who journeyed to Israel and wrote of his time there and of his acceptance of that country— went to the heart of the anti-American phenomenon. He was thinking of his own country's reaction to the United States, no doubt, but what he says clearly goes beyond Egypt:

People say that Americans are arrogant, but it's not true. Americans enjoy life and they are proud of their lives, and they are boastful of their wonderful inventions that have made life so much easier and more convenient. It's very difficult to understand the machinery of hatred, because you wind up resorting to logic, but trying to understand this with logic is like measuring distance in kilograms….These are people who are envious. To them, life is an unbearable burden. Modernism is the only way out. But modernism is frightening. It means we have to compete. It means we can't explain everything away with conspiracy theories. Bernard Shaw said it best, you know. In the preface to 'St. Joan,' he said Joan of Arc was burned not for any reason except that she was talented. Talent gives rise to jealousy in the hearts of the untalented.

This kind of envy cannot be attenuated. Jordanians, for instance, cannot be talked out of their anti-Americanism. In the BBC survey, 71 percent of Jordanians thought the United States was more dangerous to the world than al Qaeda. But Jordan has been the rare political and economic recipient of a U.S. free trade agreement, a privilege the United States shares only with a handful of nations. A new monarch, King Abdullah II, came to power, and the free trade agreement was an investment that Pax Americana made in his reign and in the moderation of his regime. But this bargain with the Hashemite dynasty has not swayed the intellectual class, nor has it made headway among the Jordanian masses. On Iraq and on matters Palestinian, for more than a generation now, Jordanians have not had a kind thing to say about the United States. In the scheme of Jordan's neighborhood, the realm is benign and forgiving, but the political life is restrictive and tight. When talking about the United States, Jordanians have often been talking to their rulers, expressing their dissatisfaction with the quality of the country's public life and economic performance. A pollster venturing to Jordan must understand the country's temper, hemmed in by poverty and overshadowed by more resourceful powers all around it: Iraq to the east, Israel to the west, and Syria and Saudi Arabia over the horizon. A sense of disinheritance has always hung over Jordan. The trinity of God, country, and king puts much of the political life of the land beyond scrutiny and discussion. The anti-Americanism emanates from, and merges with, this political condition.

With modernism come the Jews. They have been its bearers and beneficiaries, and they have paid dearly for it. They have been taxed with cosmopolitanism: The historian Isaac Deutscher had it right when he said that other people have roots, but the Jews have legs. Today the Jews have a singular role in U.S. public life and culture, and anti-Americanism is tethered to anti-Semitism. In the Islamic world, and in some European circles as well, U.S. power is seen as the handmaiden of Jewish influence. Witness, for instance, the London-based Arab media's obsession with the presumed ascendancy of the neoconservatives— such as former chairman of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz— in the making of U.S. foreign policy. The neocons had been there for the rescue of the (Muslim) Bosnians and Kosovars, but the reactionaries in Muslim lands had not taken notice of that. Left to itself, the United States would be fair-minded, this Arab commentary maintains, and it would arrive at a balanced approach to the Arab-Islamic world. This narrative is nothing less than a modernized version of the worldview of that infamous forgery, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. But it is put forth by men and women who insist on their oneness with the modern world.

A century ago, in a short-story called "Youth," the great British author Joseph Conrad captured in his incomparable way the disturbance that is heard when a modern world pushes against older cultures and disturbs their peace. In the telling, Marlowe, Conrad's literary double and voice, speaks of the frenzy of coming upon and disturbing the East. "And then, before I could open my lips, the East spoke to me, but it was in a Western voice. A torrent of words was poured into the enigmatical, the fateful silence; outlandish, angry words mixed with words and even whole sentences of good English, less strange but even more surprising. The voice swore and cursed violently; it riddled the solemn peace of the bay by a volley of abuse. It began by calling me Pig . . . ."

Today, the United States carries the disturbance of the modern to older places— to the east and to the intermediate zones in Europe. There is energy in the United States, and there is force. And there is resistance and resentment— and emulation— in older places affixed on the delicate balancing act of a younger United States not yet content to make its peace with traditional pains and limitations and tyrannies. That sensitive French interpreter of his country, Dominique Moïsi, recently told of a simple countryman of his who was wistful when Saddam Hussein's statue fell on April 9 in Baghdad's Firdos Square. France opposed this war, but this Frenchman expressed a sense of diminishment that his country had sat out this stirring story of political liberation. A society like France with a revolutionary history should have had a hand in toppling the tyranny in Baghdad, but it didn't. Instead, a cable attached to a U.S. tank had pulled down the statue, to the delirium of the crowd. The new history being made was a distinctly American (and British) creation. It was soldiers from Burlington, Vermont, and Linden, New Jersey, and Bon Aqua, Tennessee— I single out those towns because they are the hometowns of three soldiers who were killed in the Iraq war— who raced through the desert making this new history and paying for it.

The United States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands. If Germans wish to use anti-Americanism to absolve themselves and their parents of the great crimes of World War II, they will do it regardless of what the United States says and does. If Muslims truly believe that their long winter of decline is the fault of the United States, no campaign of public diplomacy shall deliver them from that incoherence. In the age of Pax Americana, it is written, fated, or maktoob (as the Arabs would say) that the plotters and preachers shall rail against the United States— in whole sentences of good American slang.

Fouad Ajami is the Majid Khadduri professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a contributing editor at U.S. News & World Report.

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Foreign Policy - September/October 2003

Berlusconi Goes to China

How Italy's prime minister can remake his image—and revolutionize Italian industries in the process

By Moisés Naím

The Economist calls him a "crass buffoon" and "a man of very questionable integrity." He embodies "nepotism, corruption, and dishonesty," says the Danish newspaper Information. The Swedish daily Aftonbladet dismisses him as "an arrogant clown." The German newspaper Berliner Zeitung writes that he is "a shady deal maker," France's Libération concludes that he is a "threat to liberal democracy," and the Financial Times argues that "he lives in a media bubble where his public gaffes and gratuitous insults go largely unreported at home—at least until he goes abroad." The man in question is not Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Belarus's President Aleksandr Lukashenko, or some other Third World strong man. He is Silvio Berlusconi, the twice democratically elected prime minister of Italy.

The international media's depiction of the leader of an advanced European democracy and the current president of the European Union (EU) as a banana republic dictator is shocking, but even more surprising is that this fate should befall such a media-savvy, image-conscious chief executive. After all, Berlusconi owes his extraordinary success in business and politics to his skills in managing his media companies and influencing public opinion. But his negative public image has become so ingrained that all his media knowledge, his political shrewdness, and his immense personal resources may not suffice to repair his brand name. Berlusconi risks going down in history as a cunning businessman who took advantage of his country's weak institutions to become Italy's wealthiest tycoon and then managed to get elected as prime minister because of his quasi monopoly of the Italian media.

Unless, that is, Berlusconi makes a bold, image-shattering move. And here his inspiration should be another leader who also had to cope with huge image problems: former U.S. President Richard Nixon. He is remembered for Watergate, but his name also evokes his bold move toward China. Once a fervent redbaiter during the early years of the Cold War, Nixon stunned his country and the world with his decision in 1972 to travel to communist China and have tea with Chairman Mao Zedong. With one stroke, Nixon not only launched a new era in the relationship between the United States and the world's most populous country, but he also added a new expression to the American political lexicon: "Nixon goes to China." This phrase has become a metaphor for a historic action as well as shorthand for decisions by leaders who make surprising moves that run counter to their traditional postures.

Berlusconi must also "go to China." In his case, however, he should look closer to home. Berlusconi's "China" is the reform of the Italian private sector. Coming from Berlusconi—and notwithstanding his reformist rhetoric—such an effort would shock both Italians and the world. Yet, Italy desperately needs this initiative, and few people have better insights on the subject than the current prime minister. Berlusconi has lived inside the belly of the monster and knows better than most how the system works and what laws, institutions, and practices drag it down. Carrying through all the needed reforms will take a long time—like the opening of China. But launching the process with an important, irreversible action can become a historic event that is bound to add some badly needed luster to Berlusconi's record.

Italy's private sector is actually blessed with unique creativity, a skilled labor force, and good infrastructure. Its ability to respond rapidly to changes in market conditions is enviable. Italian companies are among the best in the world in sectors such as domestic appliances and high-end fashion. But Italy's businesses are also plagued by overregulation, unacceptable conflicts of interests, excessive concentration, lack of transparency, the systematic abuse of minority stockholders, a medieval system of professional and trade unions, a rigid labor market, and a politicized and inefficient banking system.

The serious consequences of this stifling business environment are evident. Over the last decade, Italy's trade grew just 1.7 percent on average, far below the country's potential. Between 1997 and 2001, Italy averaged only $8.4 billion in foreign direct investment inflows per year, compared to more than $28 billion on average for other EU nations. While 40 of the world's 500 biggest companies are French, just 9 are Italian. According to an assessment of regulatory barriers in 21 countries by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Italy has burdensome and complex business regulations, the most significant obstacles to the creation of new businesses, and the highest barriers to competition. The number of companies listed on the Italian stock market has barely increased in more than a decade.

The Italian private sector is in desperate need of reforming its governance, practices, and structure. Only the government can bring about the changes needed to unleash the enormous potential of Italy's entrepreneurs. Can Silvio Berlusconi be the political leader who brings Italy's business practices into the 21st century? His own corporate empire will surely suffer if Italy's economy becomes more transparent and accountable, with less tolerance for flagrant conflicts of interest and more appetite for competition. That potential cost makes him an improbable reformer. But, then again, Richard Nixon was also an improbable president to bring China closer to the West.

Moisés Naím is editor of FOREIGN POLICY.

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From AJR - August/September 2003 issue

Miller Brouhaha

The New York Times' Judith Miller has been pummelled unmercifully for her reporting on the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But coverage of this murky subject has hardly been the finest hour for the news media in general.

By Charles Layton
AJR contributing writer

As the war in Iraq has turned into a grueling occupation, the question of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction persists. To investigate that question, there would seem to be no better-qualified reporter on Earth than Judith Miller of the New York Times.

Miller is a genuine expert on weapons of mass destruction or, in Washington parlance, WMD. She has written important books about Saddam Hussein and about germ warfare, and she shared a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 for stories about al Qaeda. She has been a Times foreign correspondent based in Cairo, has traveled extensively on assignments, has covered the United Nations' WMD inspection program, and has experience covering the federal government dating back to the 1970s, when she was Washington bureau chief for The Progressive magazine.

But with the possible exception of Geraldo Rivera, Miller has become the most-criticized journalist of the war. The New Republic accused her of having "painted a grave picture of Saddam's WMD capabilities--a picture that has, so far, not been borne out." She has been charged with "compromised reporting" in the pages of Editor & Publisher. Slate has called her a purveyor of "misinformation." A Washington Post writer has questioned the reliability of her sources.

And Russ Baker, writing in the June 23 issue of The Nation went so far as to compare her to Jayson Blair, the Times staffer who resigned when his dishonest reporting practices came to light (see "All About the Retrospect," June/July). "In Blair's case," Baker wrote, "the only serious damage has been to the paper's image. Miller, on the other hand, risks playing with the kind of fire that starts or justifies wars, gets people killed and plays into the hands of government officials with partisan axes to grind."

It is hard to think of any other reporter of Miller's stature being so barraged with criticism by fellow journalists. She herself is hard put to explain it, and more than a little angry.

In an interview with AJR, she insistently defended every aspect of her reporting, saying again and again how proud she is of her exclusive stories. What she remembers is how hard it was to talk her way inside a highly secret unit of weapons hunters, and then to bivouac with those troops in the Iraqi desert, sandstorms blowing, wild dogs howling, sometimes exposed to the elements without rain gear or sleeping gear, with little more than the personal effects she had crammed into her "little blue backpack from the Gap." Plus, she says, someone sat on her computer and broke it.

After overcoming all that--and after having to fight repeatedly with a commanding officer who didn't want her there in the first place, "because he was not comfortable with my access to the information"--it galls her to be attacked by fellow journalists. "I think we beat everybody in the field," she says, referring to her competition, "and what we're getting now is a lot of sour grapes."

Miller's reporting began to stir resentment last September, when she and fellow Times reporter Michael R. Gordon wrote that the Bush administration believed Iraq had "stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons" and "embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." They wrote that Iraq had tried to import thousands of aluminum tubes, which U.S. officials believed "were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."

This story appeared at a time when the Bush administration was struggling to convince Congress, the American public and the world that Saddam had huge stockpiles of unconventional weapons and was quickly rebuilding a nuclear program that had been dismantled after the Persian Gulf War.

These claims stirred the suspicions of some reporters. John Diamond, who had just begun a new intelligence beat at USA Today, says he had "started to notice that policymakers were saying as a flat statement that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction." Since he could find no proof of that on the record, he began asking around. "I assumed they had something secret that backed up those statements," he says. When he found out they didn't, it surprised him.

Bob Simon of CBS News says he had a similar experience last summer. He was working on a story for "60 Minutes" about the planning and execution of the 9/11 plot, and in talking to administration officials, he kept hearing about a meeting that supposedly took place in Prague between an official of Saddam's government and Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 attacks.

"We looked very carefully at the administration's claims of a link between al Qaeda and Saddam," Simon says. "Particularly the Prague meeting. We ended up finding a lot of people very dubious that it ever happened. And yet, the administration was really harping on it. Even though the administration never produced a shred of evidence."

Knowledgeable members of Congress also noticed a difference between what the intelligence showed and what the administration was claiming. Then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House Majority Leader Dick Armey warned publicly against an unprovoked attack on Iraq. Sen. Chuck Hagel, a Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the CIA had "absolutely no evidence" to prove Iraq possessed or would soon possess nuclear weapons, as the administration claimed. And so, in early September, the administration set out to silence the doubters.

On September 8, the Miller/Gordon story about the aluminum tubes appeared on page one of the New York Times. The information was attributed to unnamed administration sources. That same morning, Vice President Dick Cheney was interviewed by Tim Russert on NBC's "Meet the Press." Cheney mentioned, vaguely at first, Saddam's efforts "to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs." Russert, familiar with the Times story, prompted his guest: "Aluminum tubes."

Cheney replied: "Specifically aluminum tubes. There's a story in the New York Times this morning--this is--I don't--and I want to attribute the Times. I don't want to talk about, obviously, specific intelligence sources, but it's now public that, in fact, he has been seeking to acquire...the kind of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge."

When Bob Simon heard about this interview, he told me, he smelled a rat. "You leak a story to the New York Times," he says, "and the New York Times prints it, and then you go on the Sunday shows quoting the New York Times and corroborating your own information. You've got to hand it to them. That takes, as we say here in New York, chutzpah."

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were also on the Sunday shows that morning, talking about the nuclear threat and Iraq's purported ties to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. Bob Drogin, who covers intelligence and national security for the Los Angeles Times, says he considered the aluminum tubes piece questionable. But that wasn't the dominant view. In a short news report about the tubes that morning on NBC's "Sunday Today," White House reporter Norah O'Donnell called it an "alarming disclosure." The following day, NBC's Andrea Mitchell, dispensing with attribution altogether, stated that U.S. intelligence had "blocked several shipments of aluminum tubes heading toward Iraq, the kind of tubes only used in a centrifuge to make nuclear fuel."

CBS also ran a piece that day on "The Early Show," raising the possibility that Iraq might go nuclear within months. However, that piece included an interview with a former U.N. weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, who said it was "ridiculous" to claim the tubes were evidence of a nuclear program. "That tubing has to go into a factory. That factory needs to be operational," he said. "And if it's operational, it would be detected. So rather than talk about the tubes, let's talk about the factory. Where is the factory?"

That seems to have been the first news report to question the significance of the tubes. But doubts were raised in various quarters throughout the following week, and on Friday, September 13, Miller and Gordon published a follow-up story that included some of those doubts. It quoted senior officials as saying the doubters were a minority within the intelligence community.

The tubes continued to be featured in speeches by President Bush and others, and in newspaper and broadcast reports. Indeed, they became the key piece of evidence cited as proof that Saddam was pursuing nuclear weapons. On December 8, Simon reported on "60 Minutes" that the aluminum tubes story was being challenged. He quoted British intelligence officials and David Albright, a weapons inspector in Iraq for the U.N. in the 1990s. Albright said, "People who understood gas centrifuges almost uniformly felt that these tubes were not specific to gas centrifuge use."

Simon said to Albright: "It seems that what you're suggesting is that the administration's leak to the New York Times, regarding aluminum tubes, was misleading?"

Albright: "Oh, I think it was. I think--I think it was very misleading." Later, author and publisher John MacArthur made the same point in a television interview with PBS' Bill Moyers. "The White House leaks a story to a willing recipient, Judith Miller of the New York Times," MacArthur said, "saying that the Iraqis are acquiring aluminum tubes that are destined for a nuclear weapons program.... They put everybody on the talk shows saying, 'Aluminum tubes, aluminum tubes.' We're heading towards a nuclear Armageddon because of the aluminum tubes. Now, it took, again, two, three months for this story to be refuted."

In truth, the story has not exactly been refuted, although it is now much in doubt. In January, a United Nations report said that the tubes were probably intended for use in rockets, not for nuclear weapons production. More recently, Newsweek reported that Iraq's effort to buy the tubes had been no big secret; the purchase order was posted on the Internet. Greg Thielmann, who retired last year as head of the State Department's Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs, has said he was angered to hear the administration's public claims about the tubes, because "the most knowledgeable experts in the U.S. government believed that this was not the kind of aluminum that the Iraqis would have been seeking to use in centrifuges for uranium enrichment."

While the administration has not backed off its claims, Barton Gellman, who has followed the issue for the Washington Post, says he thinks it unlikely that the tubes were intended for uranium enrichment. Drogin of the L.A. Times says that he, too, very much doubts it.

Judith Miller says that in her opinion that question remains unresolved. What she does dispute is the accusation that she was the passive recipient of an administration leak. "It took a good long time to get that story," she says. "We were the first ones to have it. When it's to the New York Times, it's a leak; when other papers get it, it's dogged reporting."

A number of Miller's stories, although they strongly hinted at some kind of chemical-weapon activity in Iraq, had less impact. For instance, she wrote in November that Iraq had tried to import large amounts of atropine, a drug that can be used as a nerve gas antidote. And she wrote in December that the CIA was investigating a report that Iraq had obtained "a particularly virulent strain of smallpox from a Russian scientist." Neither of these stories has since been verified, nor has the Times done any follow-up.

In the weeks leading up to the war, Miller pulled off a journalistic coup that took her competitors by surprise. She talked her way into getting a secret clearance from the Pentagon and then being embedded with the 75th Exploitation Task Force in Iraq, whose teams were specially trained and equipped to look for germ, chemical and nuclear-related materials. In March, when Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times began seeing Miller's stories about the activities of this special unit, he realized that "she was in a great position to get the initial confirmation in the field" when Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were found, as everyone assumed they would be.

But the weapons weren't found. The specialized teams were crisscrossing the desert, checking out sites on a list provided by the Pentagon, and coming up empty.

This raised urgent questions back in Washington. How could U.S. intelligence have been so wrong? Did the president take the country to war under false pretenses, or as Times columnist Thomas Friedman put it, "on the wings of a lie"?

On April 21, Miller published a story that seemed to get Bush off the hook, at least partially. Of all her stories, this one has drawn the fiercest criticism. She was traveling at the time with a unit called Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha. She wrote that an Iraqi scientist (not named but said to be wearing "nondescript clothes and a baseball cap") had told MET Alpha that Iraq destroyed its chemical and biological warfare agents "only days before the war began."

According to Miller's story, MET Alpha members said this scientist had led them "to a supply of material that proved to be the building blocks of illegal weapons, which he claimed to have buried." The material was further described as "precursors for a toxic agent" used in chemical weapons.

The Americans, Miller wrote, considered this "the most important discovery to date in the hunt for illegal weapons." She said it "supports the Bush administration's charges that Iraq continued to develop those weapons" just prior to the war. She also wrote that the man in the baseball cap had said Iraq secretly sneaked some of its unconventional weapons and technology into Syria--a frightening scenario if true. And further, that Iraq had been cooperating with al Qaeda.

On the day this exclusive story ran, Fox News interviewed Miller, and the following day she was interviewed by Ray Suarez on PBS' "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer."

"Has the unit you've been traveling with found any proof of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?" Suarez asked. "Well, I think they found something more than a smoking gun," Miller said. "What they've found is...a silver bullet in the form of a person, an Iraqi individual, a scientist, as we've called him, who really worked on the programs, who knows them firsthand, and who has led MET Alpha people to some pretty startling conclusions."

The sought-after weapons of mass destruction probably will never be found now, Miller explained, because they weren't there anymore. All that was left, cleverly hidden away, were these so-called "building blocks," these "precursors," ready to be assembled on short notice.

This story was cited repeatedly on television by supporters of the war. "It was a pretty important story today in the New York Times by Judith Miller," William Bennett, the conservative author, remarked to Fox's Sean Hannity.

As part of his own argument in justification of the war, another Fox personality, Bill O'Reilly, said that "reporter Judith Miller of the New York Times does believe the weapons are there. She spelled out the weapons yesterday." As O'Reilly's comment shows, TV often has a way of stripping out the subtler elements of a serious story, such as attribution and qualification. Sometimes, on television, Miller's single scientist would multiply into "scientists."

According to program transcripts obtained through Lexis-Nexis:

Reporter Bret Baier said: "In an interview with Fox today, Miller talked about the importance of the information the scientists provided."

Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, speaking on MSNBC, said: "...the scientists told the New York Times that they had buried the chemical weapons...."

The story lived on for many weeks on cable TV, sometimes grossly exaggerated.

Former CIA Director James Woolsey, an administration adviser (he sits on the Defense Policy Board) and early advocate of war with Iraq, was still citing Miller's piece as recently as June 9. But in Woolsey's retelling, on CNNfn's "Lou Dobbs Moneyline," the scientist in question had said "he was ordered to destroy substantial shares of nerve gas." Miller's undefined "precursors for a toxic agent" had turned into "nerve gas." The interviewer, Dobbs, failed to correct Woolsey on this.

Meanwhile, other reporters in Iraq were not corroborating Miller's story. In fact, during April and May, they seemed to be contradicting it. The Washington Post's Barton Gellman published articles describing the frustration of various weapons-hunting teams as all of their hot leads turned cold. On one occasion, he wrote, a team had confiscated an unidentified powder (possibly anthrax?) along with a suspicious-looking document, handwritten in Arabic. But the powder turned out, after testing, to be harmless, and the document turned out to be some kid's high school science project.

Gellman described how a team of weapons hunters, hot after a "chemical vault" that was said to be buried at a middle school for girls, dug up and destroyed the poor girls' playground but found no weapons. Another time, investigators laid bare a swimming pool in search of underground chemicals that weren't there. Most memorably, Gellman described how a search team, following an intelligence lead, pulled up to a low stucco building in their Humvees, smashed padlocks and deadbolts, checked for booby traps, felt their way from room to room by flashlight and down "a murky stone passage, smelling of mold" where they carefully opened a creaking steel door to discover...a room full of vacuum cleaners.

On May 12, Dafna Linzer of the Associated Press reported from Kuwait that the weapons hunters were "empty-handed after seven weeks of field work." Deeper in the piece she made reference to Miller's scientist and to the site he had shown the weapons hunters. "But," Linzer wrote, "the site yielded no conclusive evidence and much of the scientist's claims have not been verified."

In May, Miller had another scoop, this one concerning two mysterious trailers found in Iraq that were equipped with high-tech gear. Miller and William J. Broad wrote on May 21 that U.S. intelligence had concluded the trailers were mobile units for producing germs as weapons. The article said intelligence analysts had reached a consensus after analyzing and rejecting alternative theories about the trailers' possible use. Miller and Broad wrote that U.S. officials expected the trailers to "become a centerpiece of their argument that Iraq had a well-concealed germ weapons program." Sure enough, one week later, President Bush declared in a television interview:

"We've found the weapons of mass destruction! You know, we found biological laboratories."

Soon, though, the content of that story was being challenged--most memorably, perhaps, halfway around the world in Australia's Sydney Morning Herald, where a headline read: "Proof of WMD is Bush trailer trash."

On June 26, New York Times reporter Douglas Jehl wrote from Washington that there was no consensus after all about the trailers' significance. The State Department's intelligence division was challenging the CIA's stated belief that the trailers were germ weapons labs.

Meanwhile, an angry backlash against Miller was building among some journalists. Jack Shafer, Slate's media columnist, called her reporting "faulty and biased," said she provided "no independent confirmation for any of her blockbuster findings" and accused her of stirring up a "wretched wake of misinformation." The subhead to one of his columns (he wrote at least five about Miller) asked the question: "Is the New York Times breaking the news--or flacking for the military?"

On May 26, in the Washington Post, media writer Howard Kurtz published excerpts from an e-mail Miller had written to John F. Burns, the Times' Baghdad bureau chief. In the leaked e-mail, Miller told Burns that Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who had returned to Iraq to try to become a political leader there, was a longtime source, and that he had "provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to our paper."

Chalabi is a controversial figure. CIA officials and others have criticized him for passing bad intelligence to American officials and journalists. (Example: Chalabi told ABC before the war that the Iraqi people would welcome U.S. troops "as liberators.") Kurtz noted that Chalabi was close to certain prominent Defense Department officials and had furnished them with questionable information about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. He "may have been feeding the Times" similar information, Kurtz surmised. He went on to criticize Miller's story about the man in the baseball cap, saying, "No evidence has surfaced to support these claims."

The New York Observer weighed in on June 22. Sridhar Pappu wrote that the baseball cap story "had caused an uproar among some reporters" in the New York Times newsroom, partly because of its thin attribution (a single source, unidentified) but also because of the concessions Miller had made in order to become embedded with the weapons hunters. Miller had disclosed in her story that she was not permitted to interview the scientist in question or to write about his disclosures for three days, and that her copy had been "submitted for a check by military officials." (Kurtz, Shafer and Baker had also criticized this aspect of the story, Shafer accusing her of consenting to "censorship" by the military.)

In Editor & Publisher, freelance writer William E. Jackson Jr. wrote two columns critical of Miller. On June 16 he said she had "hyped the threat of weapons of mass destruction." On July 2 he accused her of "compromised reporting, using and even colluding with tainted Iraqi sources, while essentially surrendering detached judgment to the Pentagon."

Miller disputes all of the above accusations. To the charge that she has acted as a mouthpiece for the Bush administration, she points out that, in fact, she was writing about the failures to find WMD in Iraq earlier than other reporters. A story of hers on April 16, for example, was headlined: "U.S. Inspectors Find No Forbidden Weapons at Iraqi Arms Plant."

Even the baseball cap story, Miller says, was not a total comfort to the Bush administration. It was "both good news and bad news for the hardliners," she says. "To me, it was world-class news that the stockpiles [of Saddam's forbidden weapons] probably did not exist. Those giant stockpiles, that were going to create anthrax clouds and nuclear clouds over our cities, did not exist." In other words, Saddam's weapons were not the imminent threat Bush had said they were. But if, as the Iraqi informer claimed, Iraq had had active weapons programs--in the form of people, plans and the raw materials for biological and chemical weapons--that offered "some vindication of what the administration had been saying."

Miller says she had a running battle with the colonel in charge of the weapons-hunting unit with which she was embedded. The colonel was nervous about her having access to classified and sensitive information, she says. And so, she says, the colonel put his foot down, forbidding her to write a story about the man in the baseball cap.

Miller was equally determined, she says. "I knew this was the story I had come to get. This was my story." And so, when the colonel continued to stand in her way, Miller says, she called her editors and told them she was ready to detach herself from the unit, come home and write the story in defiance of the Army. She says her editors didn't want her to give up her position there; they asked her to negotiate further.

Miller finally went to Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, and got a quote from him, which helped convince the colonel, she says, "that it was OK to publish the story."

As part of the embedding contract she had signed, the Army had a right to review her copy before it was sent. Pursuant to that review, she says, she deleted some details from the story, "but the question for me was, were they asking me to delete things that the reader had a right to know? And I think the things they asked me to delete were completely justified to protect that individual." She says the informant was not in American protective custody, he had come forward voluntarily, and he would be in mortal danger if word got out that he was helping the Americans.

The larger question--as to whether this anonymous individual was correct in what he told the Americans--remains unanswered. "I have no way of knowing that," Miller says.

There is no indication that U.S. forces have returned to the sites the informant showed them to investigate further. Miller says she had an even harder time with the story about the mysterious tractor-trailers. The first of these two vehicles was seized at a checkpoint on April 19. Although it ended up at the Baghdad airport where Miller's unit was stationed, the colonel in charge would not let her near it. Furthermore, she says, he ordered that no one talk to her about it.

At an impasse, she says she flew back to Washington to try to get information out of the Pentagon and other agencies. Some time later, Miller says, Gen. Petraeus gave an interview to Times reporter Sabrina Tavernise in Iraq and let her go through the trailer. Miller then went back to the colonel, who allowed her to interview three men who had done the first engineering report on the trailers.

"They said it couldn't be anything but a germ lab," she says. "Then a Pentagon team came for another survey" and reached a similar conclusion.

In a May 8 story, she wrote that "senior Bush administration officials in Washington" had concluded the trailer "could be a mobile biological weapons lab." If so, she wrote, it "would support the Bush administration's claims that Iraq continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction in violation of United Nations sanctions."

Later, Miller and others at the Times learned there was not a consensus about the trailers after all. "There was this minority view" within the intelligence community that the trailers might have some other use. As AJR goes to press, the matter of the trailers, like so much else, remains unresolved.

But that's how it often is, Miller argues, on a beat as inherently murky as intelligence. Most of the information is classified. People are often afraid to talk. Those who do talk often have secret agendas. And so, Miller says, "You do the best you can. You learn a little, you report. You learn a little more, you report." Iraq has been especially difficult, she says, because so much of what one finds there is "dual use." The same barrel of chemicals, for instance, could be meant for manufacturing fertilizer or poisons for a warhead, depending on the intentions of those who possess it.

"Like the aluminum tubes," she says, "absent someone who comes forth and says, 'I ordered them and I know what they were going to be used for,' it's very hard to say."

Her bosses continue to stand by Miller's work. Times Assistant Managing Editor Andrew Rosenthal strenuously defends her reporting and dismisses the criticism. "Our job is to inform our readers," he says, "not to get into debates with other publications."

As for herself, and all the criticism she has received, Miller says, "I'm going to go on writing in this area, and this will blow over because my reporting was accurate."

A large percentage of Americans believe weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, polls show. A large percentage also thinks Saddam conspired with al Qaeda, and even that Saddam played a role in the 9/11 attacks. One could argue that this indicates a failure of American journalism, quite apart from Judith Miller.

In the months leading up to the war, Washington Post Ombudsman Michael Getler wrote repeatedly in his weekly column about what he considered one-sided coverage by his paper. He found that the claims of pro-war politicians tended to get front-page play, while dissenting voices tended to run deep inside the paper, when they were given space at all.

On March 16, a few days before the war began, the Post's Walter Pincus wrote that U.S. intelligence had "been unable to give Congress or the Pentagon specific information about the amounts of banned [Iraqi] weapons or where they are hidden." This prescient story ran on page 17. Two days later, Pincus and Dana Milbank wrote a piece under the headline "Bush Clings to Dubious Allegations About Iraq." That one ran on page 13.

According to Getler, a Post reader wrote in to ask, "Why shouldn't Bush cling to dubious allegations? He gets to repeat them over and over in prime time in front of a huge national audience and your analysis of their truthfulness is tucked away on page 13. No wonder such a large percentage of Americans believe that Hussein was directly tied to 9/11."

Some of USA Today's most critical stories also ran inside. And the New York Times' op-ed columnists were far better analysts of the administration's evidence, day in and day out, than the paper's news reporters and editors were. When I asked Getler why he thought the media hadn't been more aggressive on such an important issue, he said he thought there was, in fact, a desire among journalists to hold the government accountable. "But," he said, "this was a tricky situation, because this is a very, very buttoned-down administration, a very closed-up and on-message administration, and you have subjects that are very hard [for the press] to get at with any sense of authority. You have an environment in which leakers are in some professional danger. And there is public opinion, which at times was certainly overwhelmingly supportive. The combination was pretty hard to confront."

Hard or not, it looks more and more as if the U.S. media failed a test here. And Judith Miller, whatever her particular shortcomings, was not the whole problem.

AJR editorial assistant Stephen E. Mather provided research for this story.

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El mejor oficio del mundo

Gabriel García Márquez

A una universidad colombiana se le preguntó cuáles son las pruebas de aptitud y vocación que se hacen a quienes desean estudiar periodismo y la respuesta fue terminante: "Los periodistas no son artistas". Estas reflexiones, por el contrario, se fundan precisamente en la certidumbre de que el periodismo escrito es un género literario.

Hace unos cincuenta años no estaban de moda las escuelas de periodismo. Se aprendía en las salas de redacción, en los talleres de imprenta, en el cafetín de enfrente, en las parrandas de los viernes. Todo el periódico era una fábrica que formaba e informaba sin equívocos, y generaba opinión dentro de un ambiente de participación que mantenía la moral en su puesto. Pues los periodistas andábamos siempre juntos, hacíamos vida común, y éramos tan fanáticos del oficio que no hablábamos de nada distinto que del oficio mismo. El trabajo llevaba consigo una amistad de grupo que inclusive dejaba poco margen para la vida privada. No existían las juntas de redacción institucionales, pero a las cinco de la tarde, sin convocatoria oficial, todo el personal de planta hacía una pausa de respiro en las tensiones del día y confluía a tomar el café en cualquier lugar de la redacción. Era una tertulia abierta donde se discutían en caliente los temas de cada sección y se le daban los toques finales a la edición de mañana. Los que no aprendían en aquellas cátedras ambulatorias y apasionadas de veinticuatro horas diarias, o los que se aburrían de tanto hablar de los mismo, era porque querían o creían ser periodistas, pero en realidad no lo eran.

El periódico cabía entonces en tres grandes secciones: noticias, crónicas y reportajes, y notas editoriales. La sección más delicada y de gran prestigio era la editorial. El cargo más desvalido era el de reportero, que tenía al mismo tiempo la connotación de aprendiz y cargaladrillos. El tiempo y el mismo oficio han demostrado que el sistema nervioso del periodismo circula en realidad en sentido contrario. Doy fe: a los diecinueve años - siendo el peor estudiante de derecho - empecé mi carrera como redactor de notas editoriales y fui subiendo poco a poco y con mucho trabajo por las escaleras de las diferentes secciones, hasta el máximo nivel de reportero raso.

La misma práctica del oficio imponía la necesidad de formarse una base cultural, y el mismo ambiente de trabajo se encargaba de fomentarla. La lectura era una adicción laboral. Los autodidactas suelen ser ávidos y rápidos, y los de aquellos tiempos lo fuimos de sobra para seguir abriéndole paso en la vida al mejor oficio del mundo - como nosotros mismos lo llamábamos. Alberto Lleras Camargo, que fue periodista siempre y dos veces presidente de Colombia, no era ni siquiera bachiller.

La creación posterior de las escuelas de periodismo fue una reacción escolástica contra el hecho cumplido de que el oficio carecía de respaldo académico. Ahora ya no son sólo para la prensa escrita sino para todos los medios inventados y por inventar.

Pero en su expansión se llevaron de calle hasta el nombre humilde que tuvo el oficio desde sus orígenes en el siglo XV, y ahora no se llama periodismo sino Ciencias de la Comunicación o Comunicación Social. El resultado, en general, no es alentador. Los muchachos que salen ilusionados de las academias, con la vida por delante, parecen desvinculados de la realidad y de sus problemas vitales, y prima un afán de protagonismo sobre la vocación y las aptitudes congénitas. Y en especial sobre las dos condiciones más importantes: la creatividad y la práctica.

La mayoría de los graduados llegan con deficiencias flagrantes, tienen graves problemas de gramática y ortografía, y dificultades para una comprensión reflexiva de textos. Algunos se precian de que pueden leer al revés un documento secreto sobre el escritorio de un ministro, de grabar diálogos casuales sin prevenir al interlocutor, o de usar como noticia una conversación convenida de antemano como confidencial. Lo más grave es que estos atentados éticos obedecen a una noción intrépida del oficio, asumida a conciencia y fundada con orgullo en la sacralización de la primicia a cualquier precio y por encima de todo. No los conmueve el fundamento de que la mejor noticia no es siempre la que se da primero sino muchas veces la que se da mejor. Algunos, conscientes de sus deficiencias, se sienten defraudados por la escuela y no les tiembla la voz para culpar a sus maestros de no haberles inculcado las virtudes que ahora les reclaman, y en especial la curiosidad por la vida.

Es cierto que estas críticas valen para la educación general, pervertida por la masificación de escuelas que siguen la línea viciada de lo informativo en vez de lo formativo. Pero en el caso específico del periodismo parece ser, además, que el oficio no logró evolucionar a la misma velocidad que sus instrumentos, y los periodistas se extraviaron en el laberinto de una tecnología disparada sin control hacia el futuro. Es decir, las empresas se han empeñado a fondo en la competencia feroz de la modernización material y han dejado para después la formación de su infantería y los mecanismos de participación que fortalecían el espíritu profesional en el pasado. Las salas de redacción son laboratorios asépticos para navegantes solitarios, donde parece más fácil comunicarse con los fenómenos siderales que con el corazón de los lectores. La deshumanización es galopante.

No es fácil entender que el esplendor tecnológico y el vértigo de las comunicaciones, que tanto deseábamos en nuestros tiempos, hayan servido para anticipar y agravar la agonía cotidiana de la hora del cierre. Los principiantes se quejan de que los editores les conceden tres horas para una tarea que en el momento de la verdad es imposible en menos de seis, que les ordenan material para dos columnas y a la hora de la verdad sólo les asignan media, y en el pánico del cierre nadie tiene tiempo ni humor para explicarles por qué, y menos para darles una palabra de consuelo. "Ni siquiera nos regañan", dice un reportero novato ansioso de comunicación directa con sus jefes. Nada: el editor que antes era un papá sabio y compasivo, apenas si tiene fuerzas y tiempo para sobrevivir él mismo a las galeras de la tecnología.

Creo que es la prisa y la restricción del espacio lo que ha minimizado el reportaje, que siempre tuvimos como el género estrella, pero que es también el que requiere más tiempo, más investigación, más reflexión, y un dominio certero del arte de escribir. Es en realidad la reconstitución minuciosa y verídica del hecho. Es decir: la noticia completa, tal como sucedió en la realidad, para que el lector la conozca como si hubiera estado en el lugar de los hechos.

Antes que se inventaran el teletipo y el télex, un operador de radio con vocación de mártir capturaba al vuelo las noticias del mundo entre silbidos siderales, y un redactor erudito las elaboraba completas con pormenores y antecedentes, como se reconstruye el esqueleto entero de un dinosaurio a partir de una vértebra. Sólo la interpretación estaba vedada, porque era un dominio sagrado del director, cuyos editoriales se presumían escritos por él, aunque no lo fueran, y casi siempre con caligrafías célebres por lo enmarañadas. Directores históricos tenían linotipistas personales para descifrarlas.

Un avance importante en este medio siglo es que ahora se comenta y se opina en la noticia y en el reportaje, y se enriquece el editorial con datos informativos. Sin embargo, los resultados no parecen ser los mejores, pues nunca como ahora ha sido tan peligroso este oficio. El empleo desaforado de comillas en declaraciones falsas o ciertas permite equívocos inocentes o deliberados, manipulaciones malignas y tergiversaciones venenosas que le dan a la noticia la magnitud de un arma mortal. Las citas de fuentes que merecen entero crédito, de personas generalmente bien informadas o de altos funcionarios que pidieron no revelar su nombre, o de observadores que todo lo saben y que nadie ve, amparan toda clase de agravios impunes. Pero el culpable se atrinchera en su derecho de no revelar la fuente, sin preguntarse si él mismo no es un instrumento fácil de esa fuente que le transmitió la información como quiso y arreglada como más le convino. Yo creo que sí: el mal periodista piensa que su fuente es su vida misma - sobre todo si es oficial- y por eso la sacraliza, la consiente, la protege, y termina por establecer con ella una peligrosa relación de complicidad, que lo lleva inclusive a menospreciar la decencia de la segunda fuente.

Aun a riesgo de ser demasiado anecdótico, creo que hay otro gran culpable en este drama: la grabadora. Antes de que ésta se inventara, el oficio se hacía bien con tres recursos de trabajo que en realidad eran uno sólo: la libreta de notas, una ética a toda prueba, y un par de oídos que los reporteros usábamos todavía para oír lo que nos decían. El manejo profesional y ético de la grabadora está por inventar. Alguien tendría que enseñarles a los colegas jóvenes que la casete no es un sustituto de la memoria, sino una evolución de la humilde libreta de apuntes que tan buenos servicios prestó en los orígenes del oficio. La grabadora oye pero no escucha, repite - como un loro digital - pero no piensa, es fiel pero no tiene corazón, y a fin de cuentas su versión literal no será tan confiable como la de quien pone atención a las palabras vivas del interlocutor, las valora con su inteligencia y las califica con su moral. Para la radio tiene la enorme ventaja de la literalidad y la inmediatez, pero muchos entrevistadores no escuchan las respuestas por pensar en la pregunta siguiente.

La grabadora es la culpable de la magnificación viciosa de la entrevista. La radio y la televisión, por su naturaleza misma, la convirtieron en el género supremo, pero también la prensa escrita parece compartir la idea equivocada de que la voz de la verdad no es tanto la del periodista que vio como la del entrevistado que declaró. Para muchos redactores de periódicos la transcripción es la prueba de fuego: confunden el sonido de las palabras, tropiezan con la semántica, naufragan en la ortografía y mueren por el infarto de la sintaxis. Tal vez la solución sea que se vuelva a la pobre libretita de notas para que el periodista vaya editando con su inteligencia a medida que escucha, y le deje a la grabadora su verdadera categoría de testigo invaluable. De todos modos, es un consuelo suponer que muchas de las transgresiones éticas, y otras tantas que envilecen y avergüenzan al periodismo de hoy, no son siempre por inmoralidad, sino también por falta de dominio profesional.

Tal vez el infortunio de las facultades de Comunicación Social es que enseñan muchas cosas útiles para el oficio, pero muy poco del oficio mismo. Claro que deben persistir en sus programas humanísticos, aunque menos ambiciosos y perentorios, para contribuir a la base cultural que los alumnos no llevan del bachillerato. Pero toda la formación debe estar sustentada en tres pilares maestros: la prioridad de las aptitudes y las vocaciones, la certidumbre de que la investigación no es una especialidad del oficio sino que todo el periodismo debe ser investigativo por definición, y la conciencia de que la ética no es una condición ocasional, sino que debe acompañar siempre al periodismo como el zumbido al moscardón.

El objetivo final debería ser el retorno al sistema primario de enseñanza mediante talleres prácticos en pequeños grupos, con un aprovechamiento crítico de las experiencias históricas, y en su marco original de servicio público. Es decir: rescatar para el aprendizaje el espíritu de la tertulia de las cinco de la tarde.

Un grupo de periodistas independientes estamos tratando de hacerlo para toda la América Latina desde Cartagena de Indias, con un sistema de talleres experimentales e itinerantes que lleva el nombre nada modesto de Fundación para un Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano. Es una experiencia piloto con periodistas nuevos para trabajar sobre una especialidad específica - reportaje, edición, entrevistas de radio y televisión, y tantas otras - bajo la dirección de un veterano del oficio.

En respuesta a una convocatoria pública de la Fundación, los candidatos son propuestos por el medio en que trabajan, el cual corre con los gastos del viaje, la estancia y la matrícula. Deben ser menores de treinta años, tener una experiencia mínima de tres, y acreditar su aptitud y el grado de dominio de su especialidad con muestras de las que ellos mismos consideren sus mejores y sus peores obras.

La duración de cada taller depende de la disponibilidad del maestro invitado - que escasas veces puede ser de más de una semana -, y éste no pretende ilustrar a sus talleristas con dogmas teóricos y prejuicios académicos, sino foguearlos en mesa redonda con ejercicios prácticos, para tratar de transmitirles sus experiencias en la carpintería del oficio. Pues el propósito no es enseñar a ser periodistas, sino mejorar con la práctica a los que ya lo son. No se hacen exámenes ni evaluaciones finales, ni se expiden diplomas ni certificados de ninguna clase: la vida se encargará de decidir quién sirve y quién no sirve.

Trescientos veinte periodistas jóvenes de once países han participado en veintisiete talleres en sólo año y medio de vida de la Fundación, conducidos por veteranos de diez nacionalidades. Los inauguró Alma Guillermoprieto con dos talleres de crónica y reportaje. Terry Anderson dirigió otro sobre información en situaciones de peligro, con la colaboración de un general de las Fuerzas Armadas que señalo muy bien los límites entre el heroísmo y el suicidio. Tomas Eloy Martínez, nuestro cómplice más fiel y encarnizado, hizo un taller de edición y más tarde otro de periodismo en tiempos de crisis. Phil Bennet hizo el suyo sobre las tendencias de la prensa en los Estados Unidos y Stephen Ferry lo hizo sobre fotografía. El magnifico Horacio Bervitsky y el acucioso Tim Golden exploraron distintas áreas del periodismo investigativo, y el español Miguel Angel Bastenier dirigió un seminario de periodismo internacional y fascinó a sus talleristas con un análisis crítico y brillante de la prensa europea.

Uno de gerentes frente a redactores tuvo resultados muy positivos, y soñamos con convocar el año entrante un intercambio masivo de experiencias en ediciones dominicales entre editores de medio mundo. Yo mismo he incurrido varias veces en la tentación de convencer a los talleristas de que un reportaje magistral puede ennoblecer a la prensa con los gérmenes diáfanos de la poesía.

Los beneficios cosechados hasta ahora no son fáciles de evaluar desde un punto de vista pedagógico, pero consideramos como síntomas alentadores el entusiasmo creciente de los talleristas, que son ya un fermento multiplicador del inconformismo y la subversión creativa dentro de sus medios, compartido en muchos casos por sus directivas. El solo hecho de lograr que veinte periodistas de distintos países se reúnan a conversar cinco días sobre el oficio ya es un logro para ellos y para el periodismo. Pues al fin y al cabo no estamos proponiendo un nuevo modo de enseñarlo, sino tratando de inventar otra vez el viejo modo de aprenderlo.

Los medios harían bien en apoyar esta operación de rescate. Ya sea en sus salas de redacción, o con escenarios construidos a propósito, como los simuladores aéreos que reproducen todos los incidentes del vuelo para que los estudiantes aprendan a sortear los desastres antes de que se los encuentren de verdad atravesados en la vida. Pues el periodismo es una pasión insaciable que sólo puede digerirse y humanizarse por su confrontación descarnada con la realidad. Nadie que no la haya padecido puede imaginarse esa servidumbre que se alimenta de las imprevisiones de la vida. Nadie que no lo haya vivido puede concebir siquiera lo que es el pálpito sobrenatural de la noticia, el orgasmo de la primicia, la demolición moral del fracaso. Nadie que no haya nacido para eso y esté dispuesto a vivir sólo para eso podría persistir en un oficio tan incomprensible y voraz, cuya obra se acaba después de cada noticia, como si fuera para siempre, pero que no concede un instante de paz mientras no vuelve a empezar con más ardor que nunca en el minuto siguiente.

Gabriel García Márquez es periodista y Premio Nobel de Literatura. Estas son las palabras pronunciadas ante la 52a. asamblea de la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa en Los Angeles, California, el 7 de octubre de 1996